Journal for Critical Animal Studies Editorial Executive Board

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**Issue Introduction**

On July 1st 2015, Dr. Walter Palmer, a Minneapolis based dentist, traveled from the tundra of Minnesota to the semi arid savanna of Zimbabwe to stalk, poach, and kill an endangered African Lion. The lion they murdered was Cecil, an internationally known symbol for the African Conservation movement. The ensuing media storm on the topic—from the crying eyes of late night host Jimmy Kimmel, to countless Facebook walls, to the righteously enraged protestors in front of Dr. Palmers house and dental office—opened up a dialogue on the way that our society views and values animals in ways that are rarely seen in Western media. While much of the coverage focused on the individuals involved—both Cecil and Dr. Walter Palmer—rarely did the discussion extend beyond the superficial and engage with the social, political, and economic systems of power that were operating in this case. This is the value for Critical Animal Studies (CAS). This field is essential for expanding the depth and quality of the cultural analysis around the intersections of speciesism, racism, capitalism, patriarchy, able-ism, ecocide, and other destructive forces in contemporary society. Unlike other supposed “critical studies” fields though, CAS scholarship is not simply concerned with intellectual exercises and philosophic inquiry. Rather, CAS scholarship is actively engaged in connecting these ideas with diverse every-day struggles for total liberation.

The four articles in this issue are all committed to the mission of critical animal studies and as such put forth interdisciplinary work that engages with essential and important topics for total liberation. This issue does just that as the four articles involved can be seen to address two topics: the relationship between animals and political rights and the importance of a feminist analysis to animal liberation politics.
Within the first topic we have the articles by Parker Schill and Luis Rodrigues. In “Animals Within the Rousseauian Republic” Schill provides a provocative and philosophically useful reading of Rousseau’s work on political theory. While most analysis of Rousseau’s work seems to portray him as a speciesist thinker who is primarily concerned with the good of the human political community, Schill’s deep reading of Rousseau’s work provides a counter reading of the great philosopher’s work. Schill provides a reading of Rousseau that understands nonhuman animals as part of the political community, much like children, and therefore their interests and rights are part of the general will. The most basic right afforded by all in the political community is the right to live and be safe, and as such, Schill argues that through Rousseau a powerful philosophic argument can be made for animal rights. Connected to this sentiment is Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues’ article “Tensions between Multicultural Rights and the Rights of Domesticated and Liminal Animals: An Analysis of Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson’s Philosophy.” In this piece, Rodrigues puts William Kymlicka’s work on multiculturalism and community rights in dialogue with his later work (with Sue Donaldson) on Animal Rights. Rodrigues shares that, while there are no theoretical contradictions between the two phases of Kymlicka’s works, in practice there exist important tensions that end up putting animal rights into conflict with a liberal, tolerant multicultural politics—most importantly, the protection of community rights that allow a group to reject the rights of a nonhuman to safety from death and harm. These two pieces, when put in dialogue, provide a powerful conversation on the potential and pitfalls of expanding political protections and rights to nonhumans.

While the first topic provides a discussion around political rights, the second explores the ways in which patriarchal power and gendered social norms impact activism and lived choices. In “Home Is Where the Food Is: Barriers to Vegetarianism and Veganism in the Domestic
Sphere” by Kathryn Asher and Elizabeth Cherry, the authors provide a comprehensive analysis of the barriers that exist within family and friend circles around becoming vegetarian and vegan in Western society. In their analysis, Asher and Cherry explain that gender and patriarchal norms around food serve as strong barriers to people changing their diets. Their work is especially important for animal advocacy groups trying to change people’s diets. Historically, these groups have tended to target women, since their social role within the domestic sphere would have a ripple impact throughout the family, but this article questions that assumption. Instead, Asher and Cherry provide a deep intersectional analysis of speciesism and gender that shows how women might be forced to subordinate their ethical values in order to meet the meat and dairy demands of their male partners. Finally, Kadri Aavik and Dagmar Kase explore the ways in which the Estonian feminist movement ended up supporting speciesm in their article “Challenging Sexism while Supporting Speciesism: The Views of Estonian Feminists on Animal Liberation and Its Links to Feminism.” This piece, which provides an empirical examination of Estonian feminists, highlights the ways in which a feminist politics not grounded in an intersectional analysis of nonhuman animal issues can ultimately reinforce a dominant human-centered political project. Their analysis provides important insights for animal rights feminists on how to expand the feminist conversation to include nonhuman animal issues. These two articles both highlight the importance of exploring and engaging in an intersectional critical animal studies, one that understands the ways in which patriarchal power intersects with speciesism in complicated and nuanced ways. Doing so helps us understand the ways in which gendered power relations are barriers to changing ones ethical decisions around food while at the same time illuminating the complex ways in which mainstream liberal feminism might actually be buttressing and supporting human supremacy.
On more practical concerns, this will be the only issue for the *Journal of Critical Animal Studies* that I am putting out as interim editors. I joined on as interim editors for the journal during the Summer of 2015, taking over the journal after Dr. Susan Thomas and Dr. Lindgren Johnson stepped down as editors. I believe the current issue expands on the work that they did as editors to put together an intellectually challenging and engaged work that pushes CAS forward. There are currently no editors scheduled to take over the journal after this issue, and for that reason, there is a moratorium for article submissions until August 2016, or at least until the board for the Institute for Critical Animal Studies (ICAS) can recruit an editorial team that will be able to carry on the strong tradition of radical scholarship published in JCAS. If you are interested, please contact John Lupinacci (john.lupinacci@wsu.edu) or stay updated by visiting the JCAS website at http://journalforcriticalanimalstudies.org/.

Finally, this issue is dedicated to Norm Phelps who passed away on December 31st, 2014. Norm Phelps was a tireless activist for nonhuman animals and an important theorist of critical animal studies. Norm Phelps’s writing helped to connect an animal rights discourse with religious communities and traditions. His book’s *The Dominion of Love: Animal Rights According to the Bible* and *The Great Compassion: Buddhism and Animal Rights* transformed the dialogue between animal rights activists and religious communities, making intellectual linkages between certain religious values and a sustained commitment to animal rights advocacy. We are pleased to have a review of Kim Stallwood’s book *Growl: Life Lessons, Hard Truths, and Bold Strategies from an Animal Advocate* by Norm Phelps in his issue. In this review, like all of Norm’s writings, he shows a deep sense of care, love, and respect while also providing a powerfully critical analysis. Let us all show our deepest respect for Norm Phelps and continue
his legacy of fighting for nonhumans while maintaining a deep level of respect and love for those around us.

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Essays

Animals within the Rousseauian Republic
Parker Schill*

Abstract: A Rousseauian Republic is a powerful instrument for the incorporation of animals into the political community currently occupied solely by humans and Rousseau’s work can help to inspire animal rights activism. Human beings have evolutionarily developed cognitive and emotive faculties that allow for interpersonal and interspecies communication. Those humans who, over evolutionary history, affiliated with certain species increased their reproductive success. Consequently, interspecies affiliation manifests itself diversely between humans and animals. These faculties have allowed for the domestication of animals and the establishment of a Mixed Community of species living in association with one another. Furthermore, these same faculties enable humanity to ascertain what constitutes flourishing for animals. I assert that the Mixed Community has a General Will. Within Rousseau’s political framework, promoting the General Will, or the common good, is the reason for establishing a government. Within a Rousseauian Republic, freedom and political actualization are attained when an individual’s interests are incorporated within the communities’ General Will. Animals’ physiological differences, such as a lack of articulate rational faculties, pose no barrier to political incorporation and participation in self-rule through the General Will. Therefore, animals’ political actualization is made possible when animals’ interests are considered in determining the General Will.

Key Words: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, General Will, Republic, Mixed Community, Mary Midgley, Interspecies Communication.

A Rousseauian vision of a legitimate Republic can, in adherence to an expanded conception of what constitutes a social and political community, provide for the flourishing and freedom of the humans and the animals that live in close association with one another. However, before demonstrating the Republic’s ability to manifest itself in such a way it is necessary to articulate the human faculties that allow for interspecies interaction and the foundations of Rousseau’s political theory. Once I have demonstrated these faculties and foundations,
argumentation on Rousseau’s work’s compatibility with animal citizenship and the Republic’s potential within deliberations on the political status of animals can be understood and substantiated. This allows Rousseau’s philosophy to be of practical use for activism demanding the incorporation of animals into political society.

When looking for philosophical support for activist movements advocating for the incorporation of the non-human world into political life, environmental and animal activists and ethicists ought not overlook Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The writings of Rousseau can help provide support for a non-anthropocentric framework. This is because Rousseau is situated in a French Enlightenment tradition that emphasized expanded moral treatment for animals and a greater valuation of the natural world. Rousseau is seated among other French intellectuals, such as Voltaire and Montaigne, who worked to undo the predominant scientific and philosophical discourse of that time which regarded animals as machines without feeling, memory, and emotion. Further, Rousseau described an appreciative and rapturous relation to nature as part of the economic and political health of societies and as part of the spiritual and personal health of individuals. He advocated for vegetarianism as the most natural and wholesome diet and he argued for land reform, which would deurbanize states in order to produce a more reverent relation to the land and to the nation. Much of Rousseau’s work is strictly humanist, but some of Rousseau’s views regarding animal life and wild nature anticipate the attitudes of 19th-century Romanticism and modern activism (Gilbert 1990: 41-72).

In the following section I will digress from Rousseau temporarily to discuss the human faculties, which allow for interspecies communication. I will articulate how these faculties developed over human evolutionary history and how they have enabled humans and non-humans to live in close conjunction. In the third section I return to Rousseau and highlight some of the
foundational elements of his philosophy, which are essential to understanding his notion of a legitimate republic. I will utilize these elements in the fourth section where I argue for a Rousseauian Republic’s potential when providing for the flourishing and freedom of both humans and non-humans. Finally, section five brings Rousseau into discourse with other non-anthropocentric thinkers and with some of Rousseau’s most notable critics.

2. Interspecies Communication and Community

According to modern science human faculties allow for interpersonal and interspecies communication. The ability to recognize and engage with patterns of biotic and abiotic phenomena, including other organisms, is necessary for an organism’s survival. Humans developed from a process of evolution; thus, humans display traits that allow them to engage reflexively with the natural environment. Part of the natural environment that humans’ cognitive and emotive faculties evolved within includes relationships with our immediate and extended social groups. Interpersonal relationships with other humans manifest themselves complexly; humans interact with each other verbally and non-verbally, in a variety of socially and biologically structured ways, such as relationships of motherhood, fatherhood, friend, foe, sibling, and many others. Social interactions are made possible only by the existence of certain abilities, such as the ability to recognize patterns of behavior, the retention of long term memory, the ability to feel emotions, and other cognitive and emotive processes that are necessary to relate to other humans.

The human relationship with other organisms and the environment is framed by interspecies engagement of human cognitive and emotive faculties over evolutionary history. The faculties that were utilized when engaging with other animals and the environment which
produced greater reproductive success were passed down in greater frequency. Hunting requires recognizing the mood of the creature being stalked; asking if the creature is afraid or aware of the hunter’s presence is essential to hunting well. Recognizing a loss of seasonal bird diversity may indicate the approach of an early winter. The incessant squawking of birds or the cries of monkeys to the unseasoned observer means little, but to the seasoned forest goer it may indicate the presence of food or the approach of predators (Midgley 1984: 121-122). Identifying with an animal’s sentience and identifying patterns of behavior and phenomena in biotic factors of a landscape proves crucial to effective survival; the ability to identify patterns and manipulate the world based on one’s findings is the hallmark of human evolutionary success.

Affiliating with non-human life confers a direct advantage to humans. Those of our ancestors who were predisposed to affiliate with and observe life and lifelike systems had a greater comprehensive understanding of the natural environment within which they existed. Subsequently, those individuals had more effective resource acquisition and survival. Those individuals displaying an affiliation with life and lifelike systems were more likely to reproduce—passing on genes with a propensity for those affiliations. For example, we observe that humans have a propensity towards enjoying flowers. This propensity can be explained by the reproductive advantage conferred by this tendency: humans aesthetically appreciate flowers because they traditionally indicate food sources. Those humans who enjoyed and were drawn to the patterns and colors of flowers were, across evolutionary time, more likely to reproduce and promote an affinity with life. In this case, that affinity manifests itself through flower appreciation (Kahn 1990: 10). These are examples of human Biophilic tendencies. Edward O. Wilson coined the phrase ‘Biophilia’ to describe the human desire to engage with and observe the natural world and the life within it (Wilson 1984: 1). He argues that human cognitive and
physical structures were forged in the crucible of evolutionary adaptation to the natural environment, especially the other life forms in that environment (Wilson 1984: 113). Many humans find animals fascinating and find flowers or savanna-like landscapes pleasing for the same reasons that incest is repugnant to our sensibilities, or why sugar is sweet: because such preferences are based in human genetic history since they conferred reproductive advantage (Wilson 1984: 113). In this paper, the Biophilic examples serve to display a human disposition, rooted in genetics, to value life and lifelike systems and indicate how this valuation, even if only instrumental, has evolutionary roots.

When these conclusions on the evolutionary roots of affiliation between humans and the environment are turned towards our understanding of domesticated animals, these conclusions will provide insight into the condition of human-animal relations. From Neolithic societies onward, human communities have never been an exclusively human experience. From the early domestication of dogs through a process of symbiosis in resource acquisition and protection, to the exploitation of beasts of burden, or the use of animals as pest control and entertainment, humans have always lived in a community composed of an integration of multiple species. This is made possible by the fact that humans and the integrated animals are both social and sensible creatures (Midgley 1984: 112-114). Mary Midgley, in her book *Animals and Why they Matter*, identifies the existence of multi-species communities and attributes the development of these communities to human sympathy (Midgley 1984: 119-121). The ability to sympathize, specifically the ability to infer an animal’s emotional state by observing and relating to behavioral cues, allows humans to be successful in social interactions with animals. Midgley demonstrates that humans have a powerful capacity for attending to and understanding animal consciousness (Midgley 1984: 113-124). Human callousness towards animals is not the result of
a lack of realization of animal suffering, rather it is a result of placing human interests before animal interests. The reasons for overworking an ox are the same as those for overworking a human slave: it is not a supposition that the animal or human does not mind the abuse or does not realize ill treatment, but a decision to put one’s own interest first (Midgley 1984: 114). Midgley points out that in our dealings with other humans our exploitative tendencies and caprice are limited by the deliberate and outspoken cries for moral treatment by other humans and by an evolutionary tendency to gravitate towards and feel familiar with one’s own species (Midgley 1984: 108-110, 114). Our caprice and exploitation are given much less restraint in regards to animals. Again, this is not symptomatic of a lack of ability to relate socially and sympathetically with animals, in fact, even the exploitation of animals is a type of social and sympathetic relationship. To lead a cow, dog, or any social and sensible animal to perform a particular action requires knowing what attracts and repels that creature. To know what that creature likes and dislikes, sympathizing with its position as a sentient and social organism, is necessary if one is to domesticate or build a relationship with that organism: “Horses and dogs are addressed by name, and are expected to understand what is said to them. Nobody tries this with stones or hammers or jet-planes. The treatment of domestic animals has never been impersonal (Midgley 1984: 108-113).” The socialness of humans and animals manifests itself in diverse ways when they come in contact. The mutual relationship of sympathy, affection, and care displayed between a human and a pet is a social interaction. A factory farmer using pain or noise to force animals into killing pens is engaging in a social interaction. Successful interaction with animals requires recognizing an interspecies ability to relate to one another emotively and cognitively.

Since a community can reasonably be defined as a grouping of individuals in relationships with one another, the word community can be used to describe the relations
between humans and animals. Because humans have lived closely with animals for millennia and evolved alongside them for eons, the concept of community must have developed alongside humans who lived in relationships with animals, despite the tendency in western culture to exclude animals from a formal definition of community. A community as an interspecies concept arises organically from the faculties humans are naturally equipped with that allow us to interact with other species.

Within any community, norms of conduct arise that can create standards of ethical and unethical behavior. When a dog is struck it cries out, the cry indicating that the strike was something the dog did not prefer. A human being’s ability to infer the dog’s displeasure comes from the analogous features dogs and humans share; in this case, both species are averse to pain and indicate this aversion vocally and physically. A human being’s cognitive ability to recognize patterns of behavior resulting from stimuli that would be considered positive or negative in cases we understand, like feeding or striking a human, can be reasonably extended to animals. Humans, through a process of sympathy and cognitive recognition of behavior, can come to understand what constitutes a state of flourishing for other humans and animals. From recognition of what constitutes harm and what constitutes flourishing, political and ethical norms can be created for a Mixed Community of individuals from multiple species (Midgley 1984: 112-124). Environmental Philosopher, Arne Naess, qualified the concept of a Mixed Community as “those communities in which we constantly and deliberately live close together with certain animals (Naess 2008: 82).” Later in this paper I will argue that the Mixed Community concept can be incorporated into the Rousseauian Republic. However, before I can begin my argumentation for incorporation in this paper’s fourth section, I will first articulate the elements of Rousseau’s philosophy necessary to his idea of a legitimate Republic.
3. Rousseau’s Political Framework

The political framework established by Jean-Jacques Rousseau is an instrument for the social and political enfranchisement of the entire Mixed Community. Rousseau weaves a lapsarian narrative for mankind; this narrative of humanity’s fall from nature is admitted by Rousseau to be hypothetical and not historical, but it serves the purpose of meditating on human beings in a state of nature and what their political status ought to be (Rousseau 1987: 33-34). By Rousseau’s account, humanity has removed itself from nature and has fallen into social association with other humans, and it is from the conventions established in association that all modern illness of mind and body originates. However, Rousseau doubts the possibility and wisdom of returning to a state of nature (Rousseau 1987: 94-95); therefore, humanity must work to find the best form of association. Rousseau articulates that in the state of nature human beings do associate as a herd but only to cooperate temporarily for short term benefit (Rousseau 1987: 61-62). Human beings identified certain animals they hunted, or those which hunted humans, as faster, larger, or stronger than themselves; by observing animals in the natural world humans were able to distinguish their own strengths and weaknesses (Rousseau 1987: 61). Humans worked together to hunt and clothe themselves, forming crude ideas of commitment. Rousseau paints a picture of a deer hunt to illustrate that pre-society human beings understood the need for coalition to achieve goals, but had no consideration for reputation or long-term benefit: individuals preferred to forgo the hunt to acquire a hare for themselves, rather than work with others to bring down a deer (Rousseau 1987: 62). As centuries passed, humanity developed tools in order to labor more effectively. As industry was perfected human life became more sedentary, since humans began to manufacture their own shelter and form small communities of individuals with a shared culture (Rousseau 1987: 62-63). A more sedentary lifestyle in close proximity to
others amplified socialness, and as social groups grew larger and more intimate, people compared themselves with one another, forming the concepts of esteem and merit. With conceptions of worth by comparison formed, preferences among individuals and groups manifest themselves and *amour-propre*, or self-love, develops. Rousseau uses the term *amour-propre* to indicate an egocentric drive toward comparative merit that fuels the human drive for recognition within social groups, which in turn helped to solidify early communities of individuals into more rigid and stratified societies (Rousseau 1987: 63-64). Soon, individuals realized that through mutual cooperation and labor they could acquire more resources and, consequently, gain esteem (Rousseau 1987: 65). The foundation of Civil Society and long term association begins when the first human lays claim to property (Rousseau 1987: 60). Norms and practices of justice then arise as humans claim land to cultivate and maintain a right of dominion over that land; this is what forms the idea of a right to property (Rousseau 1987: 66-67). As individuals unite together in labor they multiply their force for their own benefit; however, it is difficult to use one’s force and liberty in engagement with others for communal benefit while maintaining personal benefit for oneself, so that joint labor is not tyrannical for the individuals involved (Rousseau 1987: 147-148). Therefore, to maintain individual freedom, yet still unite with all individuals for common benefit, a state is created to regulate group interaction for the common good.

A state is made through the Social Contract, which exists to promote the General Will. Rousseau’s General Will is what is best for the community (Rousseau 1987: 153). It is the common good for society in its entirety, holding no specific favor towards any party or association’s interests; it only promotes the common interest. The General Will is not the aggregate or conglomerate of every person's private will (Rousseau 1987: 155-156), but rather, the will any good citizen would choose if she was alienated from herself and her interests
(Rousseau 1987: 206). The General Will is always aligned with the well-being of the community because it stems from the very reasons the state was created (Rousseau 1987: 155). A state in synchronism with the General Will acts in favor to the whole community even at the expense of a single member or group of its parts. In providing for the common good, the state may at some point tread on an individual’s interests, but the act of treading still serves the good of the affected individuals, thereby remaining legitimate (Rousseau 1987: 157). For example, the government that removes individuals’ houses to build a road for the public is legitimate because such a project benefits the society as a whole. Even the affected group is able to benefit from the road; the act is universally beneficial to all citizens and the act is general, not particular, in its orientation. For Rousseau, this commonality between individual interests that in turn serve everyone’s interests is the General Will (Rousseau 1987: 153), and it is for this common good’s sake that political society is organized: “It is what these different interests have in common that forms the social bond, and, were there no point of agreement among all these interests, no society could exist. For it is utterly on the basis of this common interest that society ought to be governed (Rousseau 1987: 153).” Rousseau’s conception of governmental legitimacy is tied to the General Will. The only illegitimate actions are actions by the state that do not serve the General Will, but instead serve a subset of the population’s interests. Therefore, adherence to the General Will is the primary criterion for state action legitimacy (Rousseau 1987: 153-154). Individuals participating in a Republic ruled in accordance with the common good are free, despite being subject to state power, because the only legitimate exercise of state power must stem from the well-being of the people (Rousseau 1987: 149-150). Citizens free themselves from the chains of government by forging those chains as embodiments of their own self-rule through the General Will.
4. The Incorporation of Animals Into the Republic

I maintain that a political structure that is anthropocentric violates the General Will, since it has placed the interest of one group of individuals within the community—namely humans—above the community as a whole. The Mixed Community has labored jointly in the conditions prior to the creation of a political state and interspecies group interaction has been thorough. The joint labor of humans and non-humans is of the same type of social coalition upon which Rousseau claims the conditions for the creation of the state were deemed necessary: human beings tilling fields with the aid of oxen multiplied their force beyond what humans could have achieved alone; coalitions between human beings and dogs hunted prey and protected themselves more effectively; elephants under the guide of skilled riders logged jungles, producing more land for cultivation. The social and economic pre-conditions for the state—joint labor—exist and have existed for millennia, across species boundaries. Therefore, animals’ interests ought to have been considered when forming a state. The social association of humans and other species, exploitative or otherwise, constitutes a social and political relationship. Just as slavery is the political disenfranchisement of an associate who is engaged socially with other associates based on race or other characteristics, animal exploitation is the political disenfranchisement of an associate who is engaged socially with other associates based on its membership to a species other than Homo sapiens. Under a Rousseauian framework, a community establishes a government to promote the General Will of the community which imbues the government with its authority. By this act the community participates in self-rule. Animals and humans exist in a Mixed Community of species and have a General Will that ought to be composed from the entire community, without exclusions based on divisions according to species. An animal’s physiological differences are no boundary to incorporation into the General Will. As previously
described, human emotive and cognitive faculties allow us to ascertain what is in the interest of animals and allow us to posit the ways in which animals can contribute to the community. As long as the interests of animals are not observed and articulated in a manner that is biased favorably towards humans, the incorporation of animals into a Rousseauian Republic is possible.

Rousseau writes that the problem created by joint labor, which the creation of a state attempts to solve, is to find “a form of association which defends and protects, with all common forces, the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before (Rousseau 1987: 148).” This problem inherent within association is solvable for animals in society since Rousseau’s Republic rests on a positive conception of freedom; citizens become free to the degree that they participate in self-rule within political society (Rousseau 1987: 148-151). Positive freedom results from scenarios in which an individual’s active expression enables an individual’s actualization, subsequently making the individual free. Freedom, in the positive conception invoked by Rousseau, is contingent upon the incorporation of citizens’ interests within the state. Animals, once their interests are incorporated into the General Will, have then participated in the process of self-rule that makes citizens free. The positive freedom of an animal would manifest itself differently than that of humans. Even within human society political expression varies, and the incorporation of animals is no major theoretical leap. Children maintain rights, direct duties towards them, and are incorporated into the General Will, despite being less rationally articulate and self-determinate than adults. The autonomy of dependent citizens, like children, is limited due to their lower capacity for active expression. Nevertheless, these dependent citizens are still free, because their interests are considered as a part of the General Will that authors, legitimates, or discredits the laws and acts that govern them.
Animals are capable of being politically incorporated into any of the multiple forms a Rousseauian Republic may take, since all Rousseauian Republics adhere to the General Will as their constituting and legitimating principle. Any state whose laws are expressions of the General Will is a Republic regardless of governmental form. Rousseau indicates government officials by the word magistrate. A Democratic Rousseauian Republic has more citizens who are magistrates than citizens who are not magistrates, but instead are private citizens; an Aristocratic Rousseauian Republic is a state in which a minority of the population are magistrates (Rousseau 1987: 178). Within either Republican system, animals cannot serve as a magistrate because they are lacking rational faculties, but animals still retain status as private citizens and are still incorporated into self-rule through the General Will. Therefore, animals are still citizens who have freedom and actualization within the state. Rousseau provides a useful analogy when describing legislative authority that illuminates how animals can be part of the free citizenry of the Republic while being less rationally articulate and self-determinate than other citizens. He asserts that any action a person wishes to undertake requires two parts: a mind commanding movement and a physical body that is commanded and subsequently moved. Rousseau compares this phenomenon to the Republic, in which the General Will of the citizens comprises the legislative force that commands governmental action and authors law, and the magistrates operating the government conduct the executive force and carry out the law as commanded by the General Will (Rousseau 1987: 173-174). Participation within the former half of Republican procedure, the General Will that determines the manner of self-rule, makes a citizen free. Participation within the latter half of Republican procedure, the group of magistrates that carry out the laws and orders passed down by the General Will, is merely an occupation which some individuals are more suited for than others. Although animals lack many abilities required for
this occupation, they remain free when incorporated within the General Will because a consideration of their interests has contributed towards the legislative authority that governs them.

In a Republic, participating in self-rule is the criterion for social and political actualization and freedom. Each citizen expresses her own interests and her conception of the common good, and by doing so participates in self-rule by helping to identify the General Will. A citizen’s expression of her perception of the General Will cannot be alienated from the citizen and it cannot be represented by another person or group of persons (Rousseau 1987: 198). Voting is the primary manner in which citizens express their contributions to the General Will. This seems to pose problems for animals’ interests being incorporated into the General Will, since they lack the ability to vote. However, since the common good, which is the General Will, is evident objectively, “it is always constant, unalterable, and pure (Rousseau 1987: 204)” and since “the common good is clearly apparent everywhere, demanding only good sense in order to be perceived (Rousseau 1987: 203),” it follows that the aforementioned human cognitive and emotive faculties underlying all social interaction allow humans to reasonably infer what flourishing is from an animal’s standpoint and articulate it within political assembly.

Rousseau is often criticized for this use of the notion of good sense in determining the common good which is the General Will. This is because good sense seems to be an ambiguous concept and one that may be harder to obtain then he implies. To clarify these ambiguities and to support the notion that there is an achievable quality of good sense which allows citizens to ascertain the General Will, I will call upon the work of Midgley and Wilson as presented in section two of this paper. Rousseau’s understanding of good sense, as quoted above, describes a quality that can realize the clearly apparent set of conditions which constitute the common good.
I argue that the evolutionarily rooted faculties which allow humans to perform interpersonal and interspecies social interaction should be taken to suffice for Rousseau’s notion of good sense. It is through these faculties that the recognition of what is good and bad for other living organisms can be ascertained. Realizing what is good for a group of living organisms is the key to determining what is in the common good for that group.

The obvious argument against this position is one of skepticism about the accuracy and completeness of human insight into the mental states of other animals. This skepticism is at the heart of the behaviorist claim that we anthropomorphize animals when we speak of their mental states with certainty because of their outward behaviors. Midgley argues against behaviorist skepticism. She says that it is unreasonably restrictive to say we cannot have any meaningful or uncorrupted knowledge regarding animal consciousness because of the fact that we cannot have complete access to their experience (Midgley 1984: 127). Midgley maintains that our social faculties and our ability to recognize patterns of behavior give us a significant, albeit not complete, understanding of animal existence (Midgley 1984: 128). The problem of skepticism also arises in contact between one human and another. Although access to language may give clearer views into other humans’ mental states than the observation of behavior alone, a lack of complete knowledge of one another’s mental states persists in human-to-human interaction: “The barrier does not fall between us and the dog. It falls between you and me (Midgley 1984: 130).”

The ability to know what is good or bad for other organisms or a grouping of organisms is not absolute, but we can ascertain enough from behavioral observation and social interaction for us to make proper decisions using our own good sense.

Certainly, Rousseau would not have had this conception of good sense in mind. However, this updated conception displays how an animal’s interests can be articulated by humans as part
of the deliberations that determine the General Will, in order that animal interests are considered in determining the laws and policies that govern the Mixed Community. Articulation in this way should not be seen as an overly or inappropriately mediated representation of the animal’s expression of the General Will, rather, it is an articulation in human language of the animal’s expression, as made evident by the animal’s behavior as understood by humans.

Opponents will claim that animals cannot fulfill positive rights, since they cannot be politically self-determinate and since they do not understand and cannot consent to the conditions of a social contract. This criticism displays a misunderstanding of Rousseau’s political framework. A lack of such faculties would not prohibit animals from being citizens. The act of acquiring positive freedom within a Rousseauian state requires incorporation within the General Will as the minimum requirement for social and political actualization. Furthermore, in other cases, Rousseau maintains that animals have natural rights and direct duties owed to them despite animals’ inability to understand, recognize, or reciprocate such duties and rights (Rousseau 1987: 35-36). Because it is the act of giving up natural rights, which Rousseau maintains that animals possess, in return for civil and political rights that demarcates the shift from nature to society, animals can become citizens (Rousseau 1987: 147-149). Rousseau’s conception of positive political freedom can be used to create a system of self-rule for animals that is comprehensive enough to allow for their assimilation and actualization within society, despite being unable to recognize law or contracts.

Procedures extending considerations to animals are not contradictory to a Rousseauian Republic. Even though Rousseau did not himself defend this particular thesis and did not incorporate animals into his political theory, his concept of legitimacy and freedom through the
General Will allows for a more progressive populace to incorporate animals’ interests into the political system.

5. Rousseau in Discourse with Other Thinkers

Now that Rousseau’s theory has been articulated as having potential for non-anthropocentric ethics when understood in conjunction with Midgley’s Mixed Community concept, it becomes necessary to engage this formulation of Rousseau in dialectic with other non-anthropocentric ethics and with some of Rousseau’s most notable critics. The following engagements of Rousseau with other thinkers are brief, but serve to distinguish Rousseau from animal liberation approaches which are incompatible with his Republic and to highlight those activist movements and theoretical approaches with which Rousseau can be seen as an ally.

Few individuals have done as much as Peter Singer in regard to promoting the popularization and discussion of animal ethics within casual and professional circles. This is, in great part, due to the clear and persuasive argumentation that he presents in his book *Animal Liberation*. Singer argues by analogy, likening the plight of animals to that of women and people of color. Singer’s argument is elegant and parsimonious: if a being can experience suffering then it can be said to have interests, even if only an interest in not being caused pain, and a being with interests ought not to be harmed against that being’s interests arbitrarily (Singer 1989: 215-216). Therefore, when humans treat animals in a way that violates their interests simply because they are non-humans they have violated animals interest arbitrarily and have done wrong. Both sex and race are seen by Singer to be arbitrary characteristics that have no bearing on giving equal consideration of interests to humans of diverse races and sexes. Singer claims that harm performed by humans onto animals is analogous to human on human harm in the form of sexism.
or racism because species membership is an equally arbitrary distinction (Singer 1989: 215-226).

Singer’s claims develop a valuable line of argumentation that exposes the exploitative treatment of animals and Singer’s argument has had some success. Despite this, exposing speciesism has not had as radical an effect as would be hoped for. I argue this is because Singer’s argument too hastily labels the species boundary as an arbitrary distinction and that Singer’s argument fails to attack the root of speciesism. In chapter nine of Animals and Why They Matter, Midgley covers how species loyalty is intrinsic in social animals because it is selected for evolutionarily by the adaptive value of kin altruism (Migley 1984: 98-111). Labeling such deeply rooted prejudices as arbitrary does not give them due attention. Showing that speciesism as a prejudice is arbitrary helps to open up discursive space for discussing the preference towards our own species, but for those not interested in logical consistency or not emotionally moved by the argument, Singer’s claims do nothing to combat or remove speciesism. I argue that to remove discrimination an individual must be brought into the folds of society. For example, cats and dogs are treated with greater care and are afforded with more legal protections because they are seen as part of human communities. Pets, especially highly social ones, are more involved in social life and are subsequently, given more protection by contemporary societies. Singer’s argument reads as an exercise in logical extension and his utilitarian framework lacks a method of maneuvering animals into the political protections typically afforded to humans. A Rousseauian framework which focuses on human’s social faculties and political incorporation deals with the root of the problems of speciesism, namely the ostracizing of most non-humans from conceptions of community.
Although a non-anthropocentric conception of Rousseau’s work is misaligned with Peter Singer, Carol Adams’s eco-feminism is valuable in dialectic with Rousseau. Adams broaches the topic of enforcing vegetarianism at feminist theory conferences. The idea that Feminist conferences and theory should be pluralistic, in order to not re-entrench patriarchy or other modes of oppression, is widely accepted and some feminist thinkers have seen mandatory vegetarianism, at conferences or in theory, as an oppressive universal claim that levels pluralism and removes individual autonomy regarding food choices (Adams 1993: 210-213). Some theorists claim that mandatory vegetarianism produces lessened sensitivity to individual preferences based on taste and restricts individual’s racial, ethnic, and cultural traditions regarding food, this is the objection to which Adams is responding (Adams 1993: 211).

Adams maintains that rejecting vegetarianism in order to preserve racial, ethnic, or cultural diversity is choosing a form of pluralism that privileges humans at the expense of non-humans: It is pluralism defined only in reference to human beings (Adams 1993: 210-213). For instance, many Feminists already reject cultural traditions that oppress women since they do ontological violence to women, rendering them as a being existing solely for another (Adams 1993: 210-211). When cultural rituals surrounding meat eating are defended by claiming that to eliminate those rituals would be to destroy diversity, animals have been implicitly naturalized as meat or object. Adams argues that naturalizing animals as consumable is a type of ontological violence that is inimical to feminist pluralism since feminist pluralism seeks to breakdown the type of oppression that renders women into objects and does not recognize them as subjects (Adams 1993: 210-213). Non-speciesist pluralism would “acknowledge that the social constructions of race, class, and sex are related to the social construction of species and must be confronted as such (Adams 1993: 212).” It is at this point that Rousseau’s concept of community
which is organized around the General Will can be useful. If Adams is correct and species, like race and sex, has facets which are socially constructed, then intersectional work between feminists and animal activists who fight for the incorporation of animals into social and political life appears fruitful.

Because of his prominence within animal rights discourse and non-anthropocentric political theory I would be remiss to not mention Tom Regan in discourse with my interpretation of Rousseau. I reject Regan’s sharp criterion of prioritizing animal consciousness and subsequent political protections. Regan extends the condition of “subject-of-a-life” to all mammals of one year of age or older (Regan 1983: 243, 247). This condition is what constitutes legal protections by Regan’s account. This criterion for legal protection is incompatible with the Rousseauian framework I have outlined. Not only does the scope of group interaction and mutual labor within the Mixed Community extend beyond just mammals, but mammals of less than one year of age also seem to fall within the protections that political incorporation based on the Mixed Community concept and achieved through the General Will would grant. For example, many dogs that are younger than one year of age are certainly social companions and have been traditionally used as herding animals and as animal assistants to disabled humans. I argue that Regan’s criterion for legal protection is too exclusive to be useful in relation to the framework I have outlined and his work appears to be hampered by its limited scope.

A critique of a non-anthropocentric usage of Rousseau comes from Jacques Derrida’s book *Of Grammatology* in which he argues that Rousseau is a prime example of the tradition within Western Philosophy which asserts, implicitly or explicitly, that speech is more primordial and valuable than writing and that writing is only supplemental to the full presence of speech. Derrida supports his criticism by highlighting passages by Rousseau in which he describes
writing as a corrupting influence and as a lesser, impassionate, mode of communication (Derrida 1976: 144). However, I argue that to see these comments as the extent of Derrida’s comments on Rousseau is to read Of Grammatology superficially. Certainly, Derrida exposes elements of Rousseau’s latent logocentrism when Derrida shows how Rousseau prioritizes the faculty of language. Despite this, Derrida does not write Rousseau off as an entirely logocentric author. Derrida describes his own criticism of Rousseau as engaging with only some of Rousseau’s texts, but not Rousseau’s entire corpus, in order to enumerate a deconstructionist critique of Western Philosophy (Derrida 1976: 141, 162). Further, prioritization of the full presence of language is a pervasive theme within Rousseau’s works, but Derrida mentions it is still only one theme among many (Derrida 1976: 141, 163).

Within this article I have already outlined some of the themes throughout Rousseau’s corpus that are ardently non-logocentric. For example, Rousseau describes amour-propre as developing in burgeoning human communities as their level of interpersonal interaction increased and grew more complex. Certainly this process is aided by language but it is not apparent that language was a necessary condition to amour-propre’s development. Many other non-logocentric themes and concepts, ranging from an environmental awareness described as an experience of oneness with nature in Rousseau’s Reveries of a Solitary Walker, to the creation of human self-identity by comparison and relation to the non-human world as described in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality serve equally as well in demonstrating the interplay of language-centered and non-linguistic themes and concepts within Rousseau’s writings.

Finally, a purely speech-centered reading of Rousseau is not even maintained by Derrida himself. Derrida displays sections from Rousseau’s Confessions which show that Rousseau saw
value in the solitude of writing because it allowed him to express himself in ways that person-to-
person speech could not (Derrida 1976: 141-143).

Derrida’s criticisms highlight seemingly problematic elements of Rousseau’s political theory, but I argue that instead of condemning Rousseau, Derrida’s criticism affords readers an opportunity to read the nuances of Rousseau’s work more exactingly.

Other critical projects have attempted to bring together traditionally conceptualized a-
political and political entities in ways which differ from my treatment of Rousseau. One notable account is Bruno Latour’s book Politics of Nature in which he describes and supports a system of ‘Political Ecology’. For Latour, political ecology is an activity of hybridization which takes politics, science, and nature as one holistic issue which a ‘collective’ must engage with (Latour 2004: 1). The use of ‘collective’ here refers to a democratic assemblage of individuals and things.

Latour warns of a deeply seated schism between nature and politics within contemporary thought. Latour describes that this divide leads to an understanding of science as uncovering objective natural facts which exist beyond social and political existence; science is tasked with uncovering objects “of Nature” and actively avoids “social constructions”, in order for science to be able to inform political life through objective and unchallengeable reasoning (Latour 2004: 52). Latour’s political ecology seeks to see elements on both sides of the schism as one whole. This unification allows science and politics to view the ways in which humans and non-humans associate and to “imagine a political philosophy for assemblages of humans and non-humans” together (Latour 2004: 52). In order to restructure the collective of human and non-human parts without appeal to an external conceptualization of nature, a key challenge must be overcome. Namely, the non-human elements which are to be evaluated for potential participation in the
collective cannot be pre-determinately seen as inactive and incapable of participation (Latour 2004: 81-82). The activity of experimentation and discovery by which entities are articulated and their potential for participation understood is, for Latour, quintessentially political and scientific since it solicits entities to “speak” to us (Latour 2004: 89-90).

In order to accomplish this activity, Latour proposes a bicameral body of politicians, scientists, economists, moralists, and diplomats composed into a lower and upper house, each with their own administrative powers. The upper house is given the power to “take into account” those things inside and outside the collective and the lower house is delegated the power “to put in order” these same things (Latour 2004: 181). When evaluating potential entities for inclusion into the collective, it is paramount that the upper house must not unduly exclude or reduce the number and type of entities under consideration (Latour 2004: 109). The lower house must seek to include newly added entities into the collective completely and must refrain from questioning their inclusion as illegitimate after they have joined collective life (Latour 2004: 109).

Although abstractly formulated, Latour identifies the powers and roles which a political system must utilize in order to comprehensively, continuously, and fluidly evaluate entities for potential inclusion into the collective. Latour attempts to traverse the traditional boundaries of society and nature and of subject and object in order that a diverse collective be established.

Despite Latour’s aspirations, I maintain that his political ecology does not do enough to safeguard non-human entities. He claims that because the process of inclusion is constant “we can have – without risk of confusion – subjects and objects, so long as they are not located at the beginning of the analysis but at its provisional end (Latour 2004: 180).” This claim presupposes the excellence of the method of identification by which entities are considered subject or object but the criterion for inclusion in the collective is not specifically identified. A more concrete
criterion for social and political inclusion, such as Rousseau’s notion of joint labor and social participation, provides a less fluid but more secure means of granting animal citizenship.

Recent political theorists have described the similarities and mutually supporting ideas of Rousseau’s and Marx’s political theory, most notably is Andrew Levine in his book *The General Will: Rousseau, Marx, Communism*. Although I will not recount Levine’s account in this article, nor the accounts of theorists like him, it is worth mentioning that the conceptual resources and activist forces present in Marxist and Environmental movements have the potential to be consolidated with Rousseau. In particular, a comparison of John Bellamy Foster’s account of Marx’s environmentalism and Rousseau’s account of the proper relation to a nation’s land appear particularly compatible.

Foster cites a number of passages from Marx’s work which demonstrate Marx’s environmental awareness such as Marx’s identification of the ways in which capitalism has destroyed the land by demanding profit from agriculture and the subsequent depletion of the land and the destruction of the soil nutrient cycle (Foster 1998: 179). Further, Foster articulates that Marx thought that part of this solution to capitalism’s environmental crisis was a better relation to the land in regards to population density. Marx is quoted regarding an insistence on the “need to carry out a gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of population over the country (Foster 1989: 176).” In a similar fashion, Rousseau in *Julie*, articulates that similarly situated lands can differ in their bounty and flourishing given the type of social, economic, and governmental systems that interact with them (Rousseau 1997: 422-423). This passage gives support to a reading of Rousseau that sees interaction with nature as a part of legitimate governance. Rousseau also articulates that the development of a strong nation requires forgoing profit and establishing a citizenry which is attached to and careful
regarding the soil and the art of agriculture (Rousseau 2005: 126). Rousseau also reached the same conclusion as Marx, claiming that the disproportionate congregation of people in cities and towns creates waste and idleness; Rousseau claimed, when describing what creates a strong state and a robust citizenry, that: [the proper constitution] “leads a people to spread itself out over the whole surface of its territory, to settle there, to cultivate all its places, to love the country life (Rousseau 2005: 126).”

Foster describes key elements of the environmentalism movement and demonstrates how Marx can be seen as an ally to environmentalism. I argue that Rousseau’s vision of the Republic is in harmony with many of the tenets of environmentalism as Foster presents them, such as de-urbanization and a sustainable relation to the land. The substantial Marxist and environmentalist movements around the world should be seen as allies to Rousseau.

6. Concluding Remarks

I have outlined the social and cognitive faculties by which humans are able to recognize what constitutes a state of flourishing for non-human animals. These faculties are rooted in our evolutionary history and manifest themselves in our daily interpersonal activities and are therefore, readily available. Due to our tendency toward inter-species sociality, humans have lived in a Mixed Community of species for millennia. Rousseau identifies the regulation and protection of joint labor and group interaction as the reasons for which individuals in a community enter into a political society. I argue that the Mixed Community of species has engaged in joint labor and group interaction throughout history. Consequently, humans and animals have existed within the same political society, despite the tendency to exclude animals from consideration in political decision making. Rousseau claims that a government is authored
in order to promote the General Will of the political society. I maintain that animals participate in the General Will and should be a part of the legislation and protections authored from it. Finally, by exploring Rousseau in discourse with other thinkers, I have attempted to display that a Rousseauian Republic which includes both humans and animals can be in mutually supportive relationships with other non-anthropocentric theories and the activist movements which stem from them.

References:


Tensions between Multicultural Rights and the Rights of Domesticated and Liminal Animals: An Analysis of Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson’s Philosophy
Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues†

Abstract: In this paper, I investigate to what extent the philosophy of multiculturalism defended by Will Kymlicka is compatible with his more recent joint work with Sue Donaldson on animal rights. In particular, I wish to assess whether giving self-government rights to national minorities will entail the violation of the rights of domesticated and liminal animals. I test this hypothesis by looking at two aspects of Kymlicka’s philosophy of multiculturalism. Namely, I test this hypothesis by assessing his distinction between internal restrictions and external protections and his theory of toleration. In relation to the distinction, I contend that, in theory, there are no tensions with his later joint work on the philosophy of animal rights; however, I affirm that, in practice, the distinction facilitates the violation of these animals’ rights. In terms of the theory of toleration, I consider this is deeply problematic because it allows national minorities to violate many of these animals’ rights. Hence, I conclude that there are tensions between Kymlicka’s philosophy of multiculturalism and his joint work with Donaldson on animal rights.

Keywords: multiculturalism, Kymlicka, animal rights, minority groups

Will Kymlicka is mostly known for his work on multiculturalism. His philosophy has been widely studied and has strongly influenced contemporary political philosophy. More recently, Kymlicka has started writing with Sue Donaldson on animal rights. Perhaps the most well-known work they have presented is their well-argued book Zoopolis. Despite the fact that both Kymlicka’s work on multiculturalism and his joint work with Donaldson have been widely discussed separately, the compatibility of both philosophies has not yet been researched. Put differently, to date, no paper or book has been written about whether the philosophy of multiculturalism defended by Kymlicka is in conflict or not with his later work with Donaldson on animal rights. The objective of this paper is to evaluate whether the philosophy of multiculturalism defended by Kymlicka is compatible work accomplished with Donaldson. Ultimately, my goal is to compare his philosophy of multiculturalism with the philosophy of animal rights presented jointly by Kymlicka and Donaldson to assess whether tensions exist.

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between the two philosophies. More precisely, this paper discusses whether the rights of domesticated and liminal animals would be protected if national minorities were given self-government rights. The reason I do not discuss the rights of wild animals is because, in contrast with liminal and domesticated animals, wild animals are not members of human-animal communities; rather, broadly speaking, wild animals are members of a separate community. Contrastingly, domesticated and liminal animals are considered by Donaldson and Kymlicka to be members of human-animal communities. Owing to the fact that Kymlicka and Donaldson consider domesticated and liminal animals full and partial members of human communities, respectively, then the status of these animals is analogous to that of internal minorities. That is, the situation of these animals is similar to that of women, children and gender minorities, those in more vulnerable situations and more likely to be victims of neglect. I intend to put Donaldson and Kymlicka’s theory to the test by raising some of the common criticisms that feminist philosophers have advanced in relation to Kymlicka’s philosophy.

With these goals in mind, this paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, I outline Kymlicka’s philosophy of multiculturalism. Next, I summarise Donaldson and Kymlicka’s ideas on the rights of domesticated and liminal animals. Third, I discuss whether the distinction between internal restrictions and external protections can be vigilant of the rights of liminal and domesticated animals. I contend that although in principle this distinction makes sense, in practice the distinction collapses, leaving animals quite vulnerable to the neglect of their rights. Finally, in the fourth section, I assess Kymlicka’s theory of toleration of national minorities and its implications to liminal and domesticated animals. I assert that Kymlicka’s tolerant approach to national minorities facilitates abuses towards animals. I end this paper in with some conclusions and a suggestion for further research.
Kymlicka’s Philosophy of Multiculturalism

I begin by outlining the four important aspects of Kymlicka’s philosophy of multiculturalism that are important to understand for the context of this paper; these are his concepts of nation, national minorities and societal culture, his justification for self-government rights, his distinction between external protections and internal restrictions and his tolerance towards national minorities.

Kymlicka uses the term “nation” interchangeably with the terms “culture,” “people,” and “societal culture.” For example: “I am using ‘a culture’ as synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’—that is, as an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history” (Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship 18). According to this definition, a national minority is a societal culture where the number of members is smaller in number than the amount of members of the majority. In turn, for Kymlicka a societal culture is a kind of culture “which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared language” (Multicultural Citizenship 76). Some examples are the Indigenous in Canada, Aborigines in Australia and Amish communities in Pennsylvania, USA. According to Kymlicka, these groups usually aspire to autonomy over their territory or the geographical area they are concentrated in, and, therefore, wish to totally or partially segregate from the larger society. These groups, moreover, have a variety of institutions and practices that are able to provide their members with a full range of human activities that encompass a wide variety of ways of life.
In Kymlicka’s view, the importance of societal cultures resides exactly in this latter characteristic. That is, it resides in the fact that their institutions and practices provide the social context necessary for individuals to make their own choices. To use his vocabulary, societal cultures provide “meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres” (*Multicultural Citizenship* 76). As a result of the importance of national minorities for individual capacity to make free choices, Kymlicka contends that national minorities ought to receive state protection. This, in turn, entails that providing group rights for national minorities is justified to protect their context of choice. In particular, Kymlicka defends the position that national minorities are entitled to self-government rights, which are rights that would give national minorities the power to make their own family law, employment law, and educational policies, among other areas of social and political life. These, Kymlicka contends, are powers that are necessary for allowing national minorities to promote their own culture and give members a context of choice.

The framework needed for deciding the kind of practices that national minorities can engage with (or not) is given by the normative distinction between internal restrictions and external protections. According to Kymlicka, national minorities are entitled to policies that consist of external protections, but they do not have the right to impose internal restrictions on their members. By external protections, Kymlicka means the kind of policies that aim to protect the group from the decisions of the majority society, and which may undermine the existence or the way of life of the group (*Multicultural Citizenship* 36–37). In other words, the purpose of external protections is to protect minority groups from the external impact made by decisions and policies of the larger group. Kymlicka affirms that, in general terms, external protections do not
entitle groups to restrict the freedom of their members, but external protections may entail some restrictions on individuals’ behaviours if they do not impose restrictions on the basic rights and freedoms of individuals. Thus, what characterises the restrictions undertaken in external protections is that these do not involve the violation of basic rights and freedoms. For instance, Kymlicka gives as an example of an external protection as limiting the right of Indigenous people to sell their own land, and of outsiders to purchase it; this means that Indigenous territory remains protected from external influence (*Multicultural Citizenship* 36–38; *Politics in the Vernacular* 137–138). In fact, Kymlicka mentions that other kinds of restrictions of liberty are also acceptable:

Of course, all forms of government and all exercises of political authority involve restricting the liberty of those subject to the authority. In all countries, no matter how liberal and democratic, people are required to pay taxes to support public goods. Most democracies also require people to undertake jury duty, or to perform some amount of military or community service, and a few countries require people to vote (e.g., Australia). All governments expect and sometimes require a minimal level of civic responsibility and participation from their citizens (*Multicultural Citizenship* 36).

Internal restrictions, on the other hand, are the kind of policies that involve intra-group practices that limit the basic rights and liberties of the members of the group. It is important to emphasise here that the only limitations of liberty that can be classified as internal restrictions, in Kymlicka’s conception, are those that limit or in any way jeopardise individuals’ basic civil and political rights:

I will use ‘internal restrictions’ to refer only to the latter sort of case, where the basic civil and political liberties of group members are being restricted. These basic civil and political liberties, in turn, are the ones that, generally speaking, enable individuals to revise their conceptions of the good, whereby [liberals] should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices. (*Multicultural Citizenship* 37)
This interpretation of the meaning of internal restrictions is reinforced by his examples of internal restrictions. He mentions the violation of physical integrity, like clitoridectomies, forced decisions such as compulsory arranged marriages, forced church attendance and gender roles, and the denial of education.

Despite the fact that Kymlicka affirms that as a rule internal restrictions cannot be imposed, he admits an exception to this rule. With respect to national minorities, he affirms that liberal majority states should tolerate national minorities, avoid intervening in the affairs of minority groups and, normally, should leave them alone. The reason for this, according to Kymlicka, is that the status of national minorities is analogous to the status of foreign states and intervention would be a form of paternalistic and colonialist aggression:

> Many of the reasons why we should be reluctant to impose liberalism on other countries are also reasons to be skeptical of imposing liberalism on national minorities within a country. Both foreign states and national minorities form distinct political communities, with their own claims to self-government. Attempts to impose liberal principles by force are often perceived, in both cases, as a form of aggression or paternalistic colonialism. (Multicultural Citizenship 167)

Kymlicka asserts that intervention is only justified in cases of gross and systematic violation of human rights “such as slavery or genocide or mass torture and expulsions” (Multicultural Citizenship 169). Put differently, only in cases of systematic violations of physical integrity is there a justification for intervening in the affairs of national minorities.

**Domesticated and Liminal Animals’ Rights in Zoopolis**

Taking the philosophy of multiculturalism on board, I will now proceed to outline Donaldson and Kymlicka’s theory of the rights of domesticated and liminal animals. To reiterate, the reason I do not engage with their theory about wild animals is because wild animals cannot,
broadly speaking, be considered members of the human-animal community or internal minorities, as they live in a different society. Hence, the multicultural philosophy of Kymlicka with respect to internal minorities does not apply to wild animals.

According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, domesticated animals are those whose preferences and natures have been manipulated by humans with the purpose of moulding them to human needs (Zoopolis 101–105). Perhaps a perfect example of this would be bulls and dogs used for bullfights and dogfights. These bulls will have been bred for a long time to gain characteristics desirable by bullfighters; namely, physical strength, resistance, aggressiveness and speed (Revista 12-13). Currently, these animals are moulded to human needs via selective breeding, special training and selective diets containing stimulants to make the animals aggressive (PETA “Bullfighting”). From Donaldson and Kymlicka’s point of view, the process of domestication has involved a variety of violations of negative liberties, like caging, beatings, and selected breeding. As a consequence of this manipulation, most of these animals, which includes dogs, cats and farm animals, are currently dependent on humans for survival. By way of illustration, from their viewpoint, domesticated dogs do not have the capacity to hunt and are highly dependent on humans for survival. Donaldson and Kymlicka assert that today these animals continue being mistreated in a variety of ways. In the case of dogs, for example, the mobility of many dogs is restricted, as they cannot enter all parks or beaches. Another practice that involves restriction is the use of animals as a means of transportation. For instance, horses and donkeys are often used by Roma, Amish and Mennonite communities in this way (see Barnett and/or Kraybill). From Donaldson and Kymlicka’s perspective, farm animals are perhaps those who have had the most rights violations. Many chicken, cows and pigs are enslaved and caged to be eaten or so humans can use their byproducts. For example, the way of life and
economic situation of some isolated minority groups, such as the Amish, is highly dependent upon the enslaving of farm animals. On top of these problems, many domesticated animals are also denied veterinary assistance and often die from disease or pain (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 101–103).

Donaldson and Kymlicka propose that to correct these injustices, domesticated animals should be given citizenship status within human communities. As such, domesticated animals would have citizenship rights applied to nine areas of their lives: mobility and the sharing of public space, duties of protection, veterinary care, diet, political representation, basic socialisation, use of animal products, use of animal labour, and sex and reproduction (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 122–123). These nine areas of rights, if applied, require substantive changes to how humans treat animals. Mobility and the sharing of public space refers to limitations in terms of freedom of movement. Donaldson and Kymlicka state that humans, broadly speaking, cannot justly restrict animals’ entry to parks, beaches, etc. They affirm that these animals should have a positive right to sufficient mobility to enable them to flourish and that humans cannot deny this without good reason. Moreover, there should be a strong presumption against the good reasons for restricting behaviour, for example, that the animals are a threat to themselves or others, alongside strong presumptions against restrictions that entail second-class citizenship status. In practice, this theory implies that domesticated animals have a right not to be physically restrained in cages, behind fences, on chains or leashes, and that their restriction to public spaces, beaches, parks, public transportations, etc. should not be enforced (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 126–132). Hence, for example, the rural practices of the Amish, where cattle, horses and other animals are caged, violate this right.
In terms of duties of protection from harm, Donaldson and Kymlicka mean that humans have the positive duty to protect domesticated animals from harm from other humans and animals, accidents, and natural disasters. In their view, this has two practical implications. Firstly, deliberate or negligent harm from humans should be criminalised. For example, if a human deliberately and sadistically harms his dog, this should be considered a crime. Dogfights practiced by some minority groups in the United States are an example of a practice that would not be accepted as moral by Donaldson and Kymlicka, but would instead be considered a crime (Donaldson and Kymlicka “Animal Rights”). Equally, ritual animal sacrifices, as happens in some groups that practice the religion Santeria, would also be considered a crime from Donaldson and Kymlicka’s perspective. Secondly, animals should be given the necessary assistance in being protected from natural disasters and accidents. This means that they should receive shelter when needed as well as veterinary care if they are harmed by an accident or a natural disaster (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 132–134).

This takes me to the veterinary care requirement. According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, all domesticated animals should have access to communal resources of well-being, which includes veterinary care. In particular, all animals should be given medication, vaccines and emergency care if they need it (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 142–144). This poses a problem for some minorities who do not normally wish to have the same health services as majorities. For instance, very often the Amish do not have the same rights to health as other citizens, preferring to make local deals with health centres and hospitals. In the case that the right to health is extended to animals, these deals may violate this requirement to the extent that they may not include veterinary care. With respect to animal diets, this means that humans have the positive duty to feed animals adequately. Domesticated animals cannot, from Donaldson and
Kymlicka’s viewpoint, regulate their diets because that skill has been lost through domestication. Consequently, as dependent beings, they have the right to be given a diet containing adequate nutrition (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 149–153). Hence, feeding animals with stimulants so that they become aggressive and can participate in dogfights and bullfights is a violation of this right (PETA “Bullfighting”).

From Donaldson and Kymlicka’s point of view, political representation for domesticated animals implies that domesticated animals should be represented in the relevant areas of political life. Some examples given by Donaldson and Kymlicka include: representation in municipal planning decisions and the legislation and regulation of labour (Zoopolis 153–154). Elitist systems of representation, as in the case of some Mennonite groups where only a restricted group of elder men have a political voice, would have to be changed according to this requirement. The right to basic socialisation means that domesticated animals are entitled to receive adequate and necessary education that allows them to become integrated and flourish in an animal-human society. From Donaldson and Kymlicka’s perspective, failing to socialise animals is a form of abuse, similar to failing to feed them. According to them, this socialisation should be limited by two principles: first, socialisation should not be undertaken for the whole life span of animals, as it should be carried out temporarily; second, the purpose of this socialisation should be to make domesticated animals members of human communities and not about moulding them to satisfy human needs (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 123-126). This imposes limits on, for instance, some Hutterite groups that domesticate horses. Some of these groups use horses for transportation and labour and, with this purpose in mind, they socialise animals in ways that mould them to human interests. This form of socialisation that neglects horses’ interests is a violation of the right to basic socialisation, as defended by Donaldson and Kymlicka.
imposes limits on groups that wish to train bulls and dogs for fighting, moulding these animals to humans’ interests.

With regards to sexuality and reproduction, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument is that the only acceptable restrictions on these aspects of animals’ lives are those made with reference to the individual rights of animals and to unreasonable burdens on humans. More precisely, this means that it is only acceptable to restrict these activities if it is not socially and ecologically sustainable for humans and animals to not have these restrictions (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 144–149). Thus, selective reproduction of bulls and dogs so that they are fit enough for fights are minority practices that consist of the unacceptable manipulation of animals’ sexuality and powers of reproduction.

Regarding the use of animal labour and products, Donaldson and Kymlicka affirm that these are acceptable only if they are compatible with full membership status in society. This means that animals should not be subordinated by their position of work, which further means respecting their agency and choices. As acceptable ways of taking advantage of animal labour and animal products, they cite eating the surplus eggs of chickens and animals guarding sheep. Donaldson and Kymlicka contend that these do not interfere with agency and do not necessarily entail exploitation. In fact, they contend that denying animals the ability to offer products and labour is in itself a form of oppression and, ultimately, a denial of citizenship. As full members of society, domesticated animals, according to Donaldson and Kymlicka, should be entitled to cooperate for the social good. They assert that denying domesticated animals the right to work would be equivalent to denying an Israeli Arab the right to join the Israeli army (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 134–142). This, however, excludes various forms of labour by animals that
take place in some minority cultures. By way of illustration, using horses for transportation, as some of the Amish and Mennonites do, is not compatible with horses’ agency and choice.

Moving now to liminal animals, in Donaldson and Kymlicka’s philosophy, the term “liminal animals” refers to those animals who live amongst humans but are not domesticated. These animals share the same geographical space with humans, but they avoid and usually do not desire human contact. Some examples of such animals include squirrels, rats, ducks and rabbits. According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, these animals are usually victims of stigma and are often considered invaders of human territory who do not have the right to live within human communities. In various passages of the Bible, for example, rats and snakes are described as animals who invade human territory. As a result, many humans engage in campaigns of mass extermination against them, including trapping, expulsion and creating lethal barriers that limit these animals from entering human territory. On top of this, many liminal animals have their habitats destroyed by humans. For example, the destruction of a park or the construction of a road may result in a loss of habitat (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 210–216).

Donaldson and Kymlicka assert that in order to surpass this unfair treatment, liminal animals should be given the status of denizens. As denizens, their rights would be included in three clusters: secure residency, fair terms of reciprocity, and anti-stigma safeguards (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 240–250). The right to secure residency entitles liminal animals to live within human communities. That is, according to this cluster of rights, liminal animals should not be considered invaders of human territory; rather, they should be considered members of human communities who have the right to live among humans. This means that even if it is acceptable to have some kinds of non-lethal and non-harming barriers to avoid their entry within our communities, when these animals enter human communities, humans are not entitled to treat
them as outsiders. Put differently, as soon as they enter, they gain the right to stay. For
Donaldson and Kymlicka, fair terms of reciprocity means primarily that humans are not entitled
to kill, eat, use or monopolise access to resources and shelter so that these liminal animals are
unable to access them (Zoopolis 241–248). Hence, according to Donaldson and Kymlicka, the
hunting and fishing practices of indigenous peoples, for example, ought to be banned.
Furthermore, having fair terms of reciprocity means that humans are duty-bound to take into
consideration the needs and interests of liminal animals when making changes to the
environment. For example, the power of humans to build a road or destroy a park should be
limited by how these activities impact the welfare of animals (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis
242–245). Another implication of fair terms of reciprocity is that humans have some duties to
protect liminal animals from harm. In particular, humans have the duty to protect liminal animals
from predators and natural disasters, while assisting them with veterinary care. However, these
three latter duties should not be intrusive; they should not entail that liminal animals’ negative
liberties are violated. As in the case of domesticated animals, the duty to provide veterinary care,
for instance, clashes with the Amish freedom to choose health and veterinary packages that do
not include some treatments. Finally, to have anti-stigma safeguards in place means that societies
should be regularly vigilant of whether there is prejudice and hierarchy of interests and avoid the
bad faith of politicians and stakeholders in policies and public debates (Donaldson and Kymlicka
Zoopolis 249–250). According to this view, forms of education that stimulate stigma and hatred
should be prohibited. For example, various passages of the Bible describe snakes and rats as
malicious and untrustworthy animals; thus, an education in a community which stimulates such
feelings about these animals should, according to Donaldson and Kymlicka, be prohibited.
Challenging the Distinction between Internal Restrictions and External Protections

With these ideas considered, I would now like to explore how Kymlicka’s distinction between internal restrictions and external protections would deal with this potential threat to animals’ interests within minority cultures. I start by assessing the theoretical implications regarding domesticated and liminal animals and the distinction between internal restrictions and external protections. Then, I will raise some practical concerns about the distinction by arguing that, with respect to self-government rights, the distinction collapses when put into practice. It is my argument that Kymlicka’s model allows a variety of forms of speciesism within minorities. However, before engaging with this question, it is important to make a distinction between the kind of speciesism within minorities living in the West and Western majorities. Broadly speaking, the main practices of Western majorities that involve harm to animals are animal experiments and the mass production of meat and dairy (Cochrane; Donaldson and Kymlicka “Animal Rights”). In terms of minority practices, these include killing in religious rituals, forms of hard labour, means of transportation, using animals for violent entertainment, and other practices (Cochrane).

Despite the fact that majority and minority practices that use animals may have some similarities, there are also some important differences (Donaldson and Kymlicka “Animal Rights”; Elder, Emel and Wolch). Broadly speaking, there are five axes that distinguish majority and minority practices towards animals. Namely, the sites where animals are harmed, the methods for harm, the kind of animals used, the person who harms the animal and the rationale for the harm.

First, majority and minority practices that are speciesist are different with respect to the sites where these happen. The majority of Western practices that harm animals are normally
performed in places, which are out of sight, like laboratories, animal factories and slaughterhouses (Elder, Emel and Wolch). These places are mostly those which the majority of individuals do not have access to, so the treatment of animals remains invisible (Adams). Speciesist minority practices, on the other hand, take place mostly in places that are highly visible (Elder, Emel and Wolch). For example, Santeria rituals of killing animals are normally performed in one’s own accommodation, backyard, living room, etc. Likewise, the Hmong animal sacrifice carried out at funerals is normally done in front of those attending the event (Falk 81).

Second, the Western majorities and minorities’ methods of harming animals are, broadly speaking, different. That is, the majorities normally use technological and laboratory tools. In particular, it is normal to use gas and electricity to simultaneously render the animal unconscious and give them a cardiac arrest (PETA “Cows”). Minorities, on the other hand, use less technologically advanced means to kill animals, like beheading the animal and cutting their throats.

Third, there is a distinction between the animals used. The main victims of majority practices are farm animals, cows, pigs, chickens and so forth; additionally, many amphibians and apes are used in experiments. Contrastingly, many minorities carry out speciesist practices on what people of the West would deem domesticated animals, like dogs and cats. For example, some Korean immigrants in the United States eat dogs and cats and various minority groups in the United States participate in dog fights (Donaldson and Kymlicka “Animal Rights”).

A fourth distinctive element of majority and minority practices is the person who is involved. Normally, in majorities’ practices, the person who performs these acts is considered a “specialist.” These are the scientists, veterinarians and specialists in slaughtering. In various
minority cultures, however, the killing of animals is performed by individuals who play a leading cultural or religious role in the group. This includes shamans, priests and Imams.

Finally, the fifth element of difference is the rationale for the speciesist practice. In majorities, the rationale is either the pursuit of scientific knowledge and/or diet. With respect to minorities, the rationale underlying speciesist practices is symbolically or religiously related. The rationale for the Hmong practice of slaughtering animals at funerals, for example, is that it symbolically gives tribute to the gods for receiving the dead person.

There are, therefore, differences at play between majority and minorities forms of speciesism; however, it is important to emphasise two points about this distinction. First, this is a general characterisation; hence, not only can exceptions be found, but in various aspects, majority and minority practices intersect. For instance, most minority groups are not vegan and, therefore, they also make use of animals for food. However, my previous point is not that minorities don’t animals for food; rather, my argument is that the industrial and massive production of animals for food is a Western practice. Secondly, there is no ranking of value in the distinction made above; majority and minority practices are both harmful for animals, despite the fact these are undertaken in different ways.

Many of these forms of speciesism cannot be prevented by Kymlicka’s theory. According to Kymlicka, internal restrictions happen only when individuals’ basic civil and political liberties are being limited. Kymlicka has quite a broad understanding of basic civil and political liberties. Some examples of civil liberties that would entail internal restrictions are discrimination with regards to welfare rights, like the right to food, shelter, medical care, employment, education and housing. Moreover, violations of rights that negatively protect individuals from excesses of the state and other people and that enable them to participate in political life are also internal
restrictions. In essence, this means that torture, threats to physical integrity, life and safety, arbitrary restrictions in association, movement, conscience, speech, assembly and voting are all internal restrictions (Kymlicka *Multicultural Citizenship* 36–38).

In principle, the distinction between internal restrictions and external protections protects all the rights of domesticated animals. Owing to the fact that discrimination in the distribution of welfare is an internal restriction, then domesticated animals’ rights in basic socialisation, veterinary care and animal diet would be protected, for denying or discriminating against domesticated animals from receiving these rights would be a denial of receiving welfare. This would entail a form of secondary citizenship status that Kymlicka considers an internal restriction. Hence, those minority practices mentioned in the previous section that consist of violating these welfare rights, like the refusal to give veterinary care and feeding animals excessive carbohydrates and protein, would be considered internal restrictions. This preoccupation with welfare also partly guarantees that humans are under the duty to protect domesticated animals from some kinds of harm. In particular, it holds humans duty-bound to protect animals from natural disasters because not protecting them would mean discrimination in the use of resources/welfare. Negative liberty safeguards domesticated animals from abuses in their use in labour, of their products, restrictions in their freedom of movement, intrusive ways of controlling their sexuality and political representation. If these rights were violated, they would entail substantial interference in terms of domesticated animals’ negative liberties. More precisely, they would violate negative liberties to the extent that they involve torture, threats to physical integrity, life and safety, and arbitrary restrictions in freedom of movement. For the same reason, this theory holds that the duty of humans is to protect domesticated animals from harm caused by humans and other animals, as these would entail threats to physical integrity, life
and safety. This requirement includes as internal restrictions a variety of minority practices mentioned previously. For example, the use of horses for transportation, bulls and dogs for fights, animals slaughtered for religious sacrifices and caging animals are all examples of internal restrictions.

Regarding liminal animals, *in principle*, there is also a strong protection of their rights. It seems a basic requirement of justice, for example, that these animals are not victims of mass extermination and expulsions or that resources (shelter and food in particular) are monopolised or destroyed by humans in ways that undermine their well-being and survival. Thus, all these forms of oppression could be considered internal restrictions. Moreover, if liminal animals were denied protection against harm caused by other humans and predators like hawks, this would be treating individuals differently with respect to the law, which also seems to be an internal restriction. On top of this, denying veterinary care could be considered a way to monopolise welfare, which is also a denial of a basic right, and, thereby, an internal restriction. Thus, Amish groups cannot make health deals with local veterinary hospitals that exclude liminal animals from this kind of care. For this reason, it can be contended that the rights of secure residence and fair terms of reciprocity are protected. In terms of the anti-stigma safeguards, it is more difficult to be sure whether these are internal restrictions or not. It does not seem to be a violation of a basic liberty to be the victim of prejudice. But if a generous interpretation of Kymlicka’s theory is conducted, then it could be affirmed that a stigma is an internal restriction to the extent that it is often a condition for other kinds of discrimination. That is, it could be affirmed that anti-stigma safeguards are also a right guaranteed by internal restrictions because protecting these would be necessary to ensure the protection of other rights. For instance, in can plausibly be argued that in order to avoid mass extermination, it is necessary to engage in anti-stigma
policies. Thus, the stigmatisation of rats and snakes that appears in the Bible could be considered an internal restriction.

Despite the fact that in theory Kymlicka’s theory seems to work, I would like to raise a practical challenge against his distinction. The challenge is that, with respect to self-government rights, when put into practice this distinction collapses. This challenge is independent from the points previously made due to the fact that it does not depend on the normative framework of the distinction (see Eisenberg and/or Shachar). The argument is that in the case of self-government rights for national minorities, the distinction between external protections and internal restrictions collapses when put into practice because “the jurisdictional powers that are important for the group to ensure its external protections vis-à-vis the larger society are the same powers which can be used to perpetuate internal restrictions on certain categories of group member” (Shachar 30). To rephrase, the kind of autonomy that national minorities acquire in order to impose external protections is the same kind of autonomy needed for imposing internal restrictions on domesticated and liminal animals. For this reason, having the power to self-govern facilitates the reinforcement and institutionalisation of speciesist practices that disadvantage domesticated and liminal animals living within national human minorities.

One of the powers that national minorities acquire is power over employment laws. According to Kymlicka, Aborigines should have the power to decide who has the right to fish and hunt on a particular tract of land; also, the Quebecois government has the power to limit the freedom of businesses to choose their working language (Politics in the Vernacular 123–124). This kind of power is the same that can be used to impose internal restrictions upon domesticated animals. In terms of animal labour and animal products' activities, this would facilitate some national minorities to make laws that enslave animals to work or provide products in ways that
harm them. The Amish culture, for example, strongly relies on the use and abuse of animals; indeed, the Amish use animals for virtually every labour activity they undertake in their communities (Kraybill 188–218). Providing autonomy in employment law to the Amish would facilitate imposing hard labour on animals and the overconsumption of animal products, which is a form of internal restriction and, more fundamentally, a violation of animals’ rights.

External protections also give power to national minorities to control education. To illustrate, according to Kymlicka, the government of Quebec should be able to choose the educational curriculum; in addition, the government can decide if French Canadians can or cannot choose the language of instruction for their children (i.e., the Quebecois state can decide that the offspring of French Canadians have to choose French) (Kymlicka Politics in the Vernacular 123–124). Control over these matters is the same as needed to impose educational policies, which can be harmful for domesticated and liminal animals within minority groups. Regarding domesticated animals, if national minorities have power over education, then they might continue the domestication of these animals. That is, they can educate domesticated animals in ways that further enslave, make dependent, and mould them to human interests. Consequently, the right of basic socialisation, with the purpose of making animals full citizens, may be undermined by entitling speciesist minorities to hold power over education. This power could be used to perpetuate, for example, the domestication of horses for transportation purposes in Amish communities. It could be also used to train dogs and bulls to enter into fights for human enjoyment.

In terms of the rights of liminal animals, if minorities are speciesist and have power over education policies, then they might also be teaching a speciesist curriculum that could potentially make humans more speciesist towards these animals. The Bible, for example, is full of speciesist
verses. For example, in Leviticus, where rats are referred to as unhygienic and malicious animals. Surely, this can only stimulate feelings of stigma, disgust and hate towards rats. Hence, the right of liminal animals to anti-stigma safeguards is at risk if national minorities have rights over education. It is important to clarify that Kymlicka would consider an education that teaches speciesism an internal restriction; in fact, he refers to similar cases with respect to humans. To wit, he considers the Mennonites’ demand for exemption from the national state’s educational minimal requirements as a demand for internal restriction (Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship 41). However, my point is not to affirm that my examples are an internal restriction or an external protection; rather, the point is that control over education gives national minorities the power to impose internal restrictions in education and, consequently, reinforces speciesism within the group.

Another power acquired by national minorities is that which presides over family law. Among other things, family law regulates paternity rules, child custody and divorce rules. Having power over paternity rules and child custody may empower national minorities to decide which and when animals can be taken from their offspring, causing obvious distress and intrusive interference in animals’ reproductive lives. By empowering national minorities to regulate divorce rules, the state is entitling them to decide whether animals can be physically restricted or not, thereby impeding reproduction. Hence, the selective reproduction of bulls and dogs for the purpose of creating fit nonhuman animals for fights would be possible if national minorities acquired this power.

Finally, external protections give national minorities the power to define who is a member and who is not. Take the example of the French language; according to Kymlicka, the Quebecois government can decide who is a member of the Francophone community and,
therefore, who is entitled to have what kind of education. Indigenous groups have the power to
decide who is a member and who has the right to own their land. Also, Aborigines can decide
who are members of their community and, consequently, who can fish and hunt on their land.
The rights of domesticated and liminal animals may be at risk here. To recall, the premise for
most of the rights of domesticated animals is that they are full members of human communities,
and for liminal animals, that they are partial members. To be sure, liminal and wild animals are
entitled to less protection from the state because they are not full citizens; rather, they are either
partial or non-members of human communities. Domesticated animals are entitled to all
citizenship rights because they are full members (Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 101-103;
210–212). In addition, Kymlicka is a liberal nationalist, and as such, he clearly states that there
are rights which are relational, meaning they are dependent on membership of a community
(Kymlicka “Liberal Nationalism”; Donaldson and Kymlicka Zoopolis 40–54). Thus, according to
this view, a certain nation has the obligation to restructure its public spaces and social and
political institutions to accommodate the members of its communities, but not to accommodate
non-members. The implication for animals is that if a national minority decides to exclude them
from full and partial membership, then all the relational duties to which they are entitled are
undermined. Consequently, as non-members they are only entitled to universal rights, like the
right not to be killed, bodily harmed, or enslaved. To be more precise, these animals are only
protected from the violation of their negative rights. In sum, the power over membership for
protecting groups from external protections is the same as that which gives national minorities
the power to impose internal restrictions: “Membership rules are notoriously both protective of
communities and restrictive of individuals within these communities” (Eisenberg 55). Hence, it
is sufficient for a group to consider domesticated and liminal animals non-members to exclude
them from having rights. Thus, national minorities have the power, for instance, to refuse to provide veterinary care to liminal and domesticated animals.

To sum up, in this section I tried to make a link between Kymlicka’s philosophy of multiculturalism and the theory of Zoopolis. I started by observing that in principle the rights of domesticated and liminal animals would be protected by the normative distinction between internal restrictions and external protections. However, I raised a query about the practical implications of the distinction. Following the insights offered by some feminist philosophers, I have contended that the distinction collapses when put into practice. Empowering speciesist national minorities with control over education, employment law, family law and membership may facilitate the violation of domesticated and liminal animals’ rights. This is because these three areas of social and political life refer to powers to decide and control many of the rights of these animals.

Challenging Kymlicka’s Idea of Toleration and the Prioritisation of National Minorities

Having analysed the distinction between internal restrictions and external protections, I will now proceed to assess Kymlicka’s theory of toleration. I wish to assert that Kymlicka’s tolerant approach to national minorities is deeply problematic for the rights of animals. The first reason is because he explicitly accepts that some national minorities can infringe the basic rights of animals. In particular, he affirms that Indigenous people and Aborigines should have the right to hunt because it is constitutive of their way of life (Kymlicka Politics in the Vernacular 137–141). This clearly is a violation of animals’ rights to no be enslaved, exploited, injured and killed. Moreover, due to the fact that the methods used by Indigenous people for killing animals are not very sophisticated, it is difficult to avoid intense pain for animals. Thus, besides being
already significantly harmful to kill animals, it is even worse to accept traditional methods of killing that increase an animal’s pain. To draw a parallel, if a person is raped, that is bad, but it is even worse if the person raped is also beaten; similarly, in this case, if it is intolerable to accept the killing of animals and worse to do so using methods that increase their suffering.

This line of argument is not just problematic because of these direct implications; it is also problematic due to the fact that it implies that the violation of animal rights is justified in the case of it promoting a nation’s societal culture. In turn, this would justify the continuation of exploitation of animals and violation of their rights in Western societies. For it is surely part of Western culture to eat animals and use their products. As Donaldson and Kymlicka rightly point out in *Zoopolis*, the process of domestication has been part of Western culture for too long (101–103). Furthermore, in their recent article “Animal Rights, Multiculturalism, and the Left,” they contend that exploitation of animals is part of the Western lifestyle (121). As a consequence of this viewpoint, it would be acceptable to sacrifice the rights of animals in the name of what members of minority cultures consider important cultural traditions.

Against my argument, it could be contended that even though the mistreatment of animals is embedded in Western culture, this mistreatment is not justified in the case of Westerners because it does not contribute to the context of choice for them. Unfortunately, however, the violation of animal rights *does* contribute to the context of choice of Westerners. For if a context of choice is provided by long-term institutions that provide “meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres” (Kymlicka *Multicultural Citizenship* 76), then surely the long history of the institutionalisation of animal rights violations contributes to the context of choice. In terms of economic life, a significant number of
individuals are dependent on the exploitation of animals, reliant on non-vegan restaurants, animal factories, and so forth. Regarding social life, it is part of many forms of socialising to eat animals, visit zoos, watch horse racing, etc. Indeed, the exploitation of animals is part of the context of choice for many Westerners.

This implication, however, could be a lapse in Kymlicka’s theory. Rather, he could simply contend that a reviewed conception of national minorities’ rights would entail an equal consideration of human and animal interests. Thus, these practices would not be tolerated because they are internal restrictions, but also because they go beyond the cases of toleration that Kymlicka himself is willing to accept. Indeed, if his theory is taken seriously, these kinds of practices would not be acceptable. Despite the fact that this can be, indeed, a plausible answer to the just outlined criticism, the truth is that the second reason why his toleration theory is problematic for animals is because it still allows significant forms of harm. To recall, in Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka contends that it is only morally acceptable to intervene in national minorities’ internal affairs if there is a violation of human rights “such as slavery or genocide or mass torture and expulsions” (169).

This laissez-faire approach that only accepts as fair interventions in extreme cases, leaves the rights of domesticated and liminal animals totally unprotected. Starting with the basic socialisation of domesticated animals, this is only partially protected. According to this toleration theory, humans cannot mould domesticated animals in ways that would enslave them. However, there is no positive duty, according to this theory of toleration, to provide domesticated animals the necessary education for becoming integrated and able to flourish in an animal-human society. In fact, to compare, Kymlicka does mention that discriminating against women in education is an insufficient condition for promoting a liberal state intervention in the affairs of national
minorities (*Multicultural Citizenship* 165). Regarding the rights to be protected from abuse, in terms of animal labour and the use of animal products, these are also partly protected. Due to the fact that enslavement and torture are conditions for intervention, it would not be tolerable to force animals to live in cages to produce products or to be overloaded with labour. Nevertheless, animals can still be discriminated against in employment law if this does not involve enslavement or mass torture. The right not to be killed, or, say, be eaten, is contrastingly fully protected, according to this theory of toleration, for this would entail the genocide of animals, which violates the limits of toleration. The duties of protection that humans have towards animals are substantially diminished by this theory of toleration. In a generous interpretation of Kymlicka’s theory of toleration, perhaps harm caused by animals and humans to domesticated animals could be considered torture or genocide. Nevertheless, not protecting domesticated animals from natural disasters does not seem to go against the limits of toleration. A similar line of thought can be applied to the duties of medical care. A generous interpretation of Kymlicka’s work may imply that denying emergency care to animals or offering aid in the case of a pandemic would be a form of genocide. Notwithstanding, denying other kinds of medical care that do not imply death does not seem to violate the limits of toleration; for example, veterinary care to fix small injuries or vaccination for diseases which are not lethal do not seem to go beyond the limits of what is tolerable, according to Kymlicka.

Regarding animal diet, if this theory of toleration were followed, animals would be entitled to receive a kind of diet that would not kill them; however, it is not slavery, genocide or mass torture to deny domesticated animals a nutritious diet. With respect to the mobility of animals, this is only partially protected. The use of leashes, cages, and other restrictive instruments could be considered both mass torture and enslavement. However, strong limitations
to their mobility, like limited access to parks or beaches, are not necessarily forms of enslavement or torture. In terms of sex and reproduction activities, if the methods used to control animals’ activities do not involve mass torture, then curtailing these animals’ sexual and reproductive activities is compatible with this theory of toleration. Indeed, in Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka affirm that there are non-harming methods of intervention that can be applied to animals’ sexuality and reproduction activities, although they say that the application of these is only fair when referring to the rights of animals (144–148). Nonetheless, the rights of animals, according to this theory of toleration, are minimised, giving priority to the autonomy of national minorities to do what they wish if it does not involve mass torture, expulsions, slavery or genocide. Finally, the political rights of domesticated animals are completely unprotected. Indeed, Kymlicka mentions that the denial of political rights to women in Saudi Arabia is not a sufficient condition for liberals intervening in Saudi Arabian affairs (Multicultural Citizenship 165).

Moving now to the case of liminal animals, a protected right is that of secure residence. This is protected because it could be considered a form of expulsion to not guarantee liminal animals this right. Moreover, fair terms of reciprocity are also, in part, protected by this theory of toleration. In particular, humans would not be entitled to engage in campaigns of mass extermination of these animals, as this could be considered genocide. Furthermore, if environmental changes, such as the destruction of parks, cause the death of many animals, then this could also be considered a form of genocide. According to the toleration theory, liminal animals are also entitled to protection from predators and harm from humans, as these could be considered genocide as well. In contrast, the duties of offering veterinary care to liminal animals are substantially diminished for the same reasons as they are diminished with regards to
domesticated animals. Finally, there is no protection in terms of anti-stigma safeguards. There is no duty to be vigilant of prejudice and, in fact, it seems acceptable to promote speciesist views, given that they are not forms of enslavement, mass torture, genocide or expulsion.

To sum up, this theory of toleration leaves a significant number of rights for domesticated and liminal animals unprotected. The rights of domesticated animals, in particular, are quite curtailed because the theory of toleration is more focused on negative rights than positive ones. This is owing to the fact that many domesticated animals’ rights are positive rights, and these are substantially curtailed. On the other hand, liminal animals’ rights are, broadly speaking, negative rights, and for that reason there is less harm that humans can cause to these animals.

Conclusion

In this paper, I analysed to what extent Kymlicka’s philosophy of multiculturalism, mainly defended in his books *Multicultural Citizenship* and *Politics in the Vernacular*, is compatible with his more recent work carried out with Donaldson on the rights of animals. Inspired by some of the well-known criticisms of Kymlicka’s philosophy of multiculturalism, I tried to tease out the implications that these criticisms have on animals who live *within* human communities. More precisely, I tried to apply some criticisms made by feminist philosophers to the status of internal minorities to the case of liminal and domesticated animals. I argued in section three that, in theory, all the rights of domesticated and liminal animals are protected by the distinction drawn by Kymlicka. Nevertheless, in this same section, I asserted that, in practice, empowering speciesist national minorities over family law, education, employment law and membership rules may facilitate the violation of domesticated and liminal animals’ rights. In the fourth section, I moved to evaluate the implications of Kymlicka’s theory of toleration towards
national minorities to the rights of domesticated and liminal animals. I contended that
Kymlicka’s approach is in conflict with Zoopolis because it allows the neglect of many important
rights for domesticated and liminal animals. The clash is more obvious, I argued, with
domesticated animals because these have more positive rights than liminal animals and the
theory of toleration is more focused on protecting negative rights.

To comprehend this tension, it is helpful to understand that Kymlicka’s work on
multiculturalism and his joint work with Donaldson were written in different historical contexts.
The paradigms with regards to the moral status of animals were different when these theories
were developed. Kymlicka’s philosophy of multiculturalism was developed in the 1990’s. In this
period, the main paradigm with regard to the moral status of animals was inspired by the
philosophy of nineteenth century utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as
well as Peter Singer’s work on animal rights which was carried out in the 1970s (Francione “The
Abolition of Animal Exploitation”). Despite the fact that these philosophers hold different views
on the moral status of animals, they do share two core ideas. First, animals are not assigned any
moral rights; they are simply given moral consideration, while the legal rights they may be
entitled to result from the total calculation of happiness. Second, animals do not have
consciousness, only sentience. Therefore, because consciousness brings more interests along
with them, human animals have more morally relevant interests than do nonhuman animals.
Hence, although in the calculations the species criterion does not count, the truth is that human
interests count more because consciousness includes a greater group of interests. This paradigm
that places a ranking between animals is very noticeable in Kymlicka’s philosophy of
multiculturalism.
However, this is a paradigm that has recently begun to lose support. Many individuals worried about the moral status of animals observe a continuation and increase in the massive exploitation of animals and an inefficiency of mainstream forms for approaching questions related to justice for animals. Consequently, as David Pellow argues, a new ideological framework and more radical social movements have been appearing. This nascent ideological framework and new types of radical social movements advocate for an ethics of justice more inclusive of all humans, nonhumans, animals and ecosystems as well as direct action tactics (see Best and/or Pellow). Zoopolis was written in this context; namely, a context of dissatisfaction with the existing approaches to justice towards animals and, therefore, one that required society to take a step further in terms of policies and ideologies aimed at protecting animal rights. In short, the writings on multiculturalism and animal rights were written in different paradigms, which certainly influenced the thought of Kymlicka and Donaldson.

This new context of dissatisfaction with mainstream ideologies and strategies is also the one in which this paper is written. It is important to offer an ideological framework and forms of campaigning that are inclusive of nonhumans, humans and ecosystems. Today, ideology and activism should no longer understand, analyze and resist a single form of oppression in isolation. That is, they should not address heterosexism, speciesism, sexism or other forms of oppression in isolation (see Best and/or Pellow). If social problems are not approached in this inclusive way, by looking at all forms of oppression, the result is likely to be the production of hierarchies. Rather, social problems should be approached aiming at total liberation—the liberation of all humans, non-humans and ecosystems. In terms of activism, this means that campaigns for animal rights should avoid promoting sexism, heterosexism, racism, xenophobia, and other hierarchical norms. There are various ways to do this, but there are primarily two things that stand out for
activist. First, activists should not enter into discourses that contribute to a process of othering. Othering is a process where the differences between groups are overemphasised, reinforced and reproduced. In other words, othering is a process that consists of essentialising and crystallising differences between groups, creating an exaggerated opposition between “us” and “them” (Al-Saji). Hence, it is important that differences between cultures with regards to the treatment of animals are not overemphasised by, for example, drawing a contrast between barbarous speciesist minority practices and normalised speciesist majority practices.

Next, activists should avoid engaging in single-issue campaigns. These campaigns consist of approaching one essential idea or policy. For example, the campaign against fox hunting in the UK was a single-issue campaign to the extent that it focused on that specific practice, rather than on animal rights in general. These forms of campaigns are problematic because they encourage the idea that some groups are worse than others with regard to their treatment of animals (Francione “The Abolition of Animal Exploitation” and/or Pellow). Indeed, many single-issue campaigns have resulted in ethnocentric and xenophobic hate speech against minorities. For example, many of the campaigns against the hunting of dolphins in Taiji resulted in racist ideology against the Japanese (Pellow). In short, it is necessary to bring about a new theoretical and activist paradigms, ones that approaches normative issues in an inclusive way.

Further research on the rights of animals in a multicultural context could be carried out on how internal restrictions and external protections can be applied to the context of wild animals. That is, it would be an interesting topic of research to analyse whether the distinction can make sense in a society of wild animals, where there are predators and prey.

References


Home Is Where the Food Is: Barriers to Vegetarianism and Veganism in the Domestic Sphere
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Abstract: Which factors in the domestic sphere serve as barriers to the successful promotion and maintenance of vegetarian and vegan diets? In this paper, we seek to explore the domestic roadblocks to vegetarian and vegan diet conversion in order to complement existing sociological research on vegetarianism, veganism, and animal advocacy. To accomplish this, we engaged in a review of sociological literature on food and domestic life, including literature from sociology of the family, sociology of gender, the sociology of food, and other areas. The barriers we found include family reactions to dietary change, mothers’ roles in providing food for young children, the subordination of women’s food preferences, women’s food provisioning as a form of power, the dynamics of food choice between spouses and significant others, the role of meat in the domestic hierarchy of meals, and race and social class.

Keywords: vegetarian, vegan, barriers, domestic life, sociology of food, animal advocacy

Food is essential to survival, yet there is much more to our consumption than merely meeting physiological needs (Germov and Williams). Our food choices stem from the complex interplay between biological, nutritional, sociological, and psychological factors (Blades). Food has a central importance in social life, with social gatherings often organized around eating (Germov and Williams). Food is also imbued with meanings and symbolism, and is thought to shape our sense of identity (Beardsworth and Keil). The food system, some argue, may be envisioned as a foundational aspect of human social organization (Beardsworth and Keil). Indeed, it is hard to point to many other consumer products that influence our social lives to the

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same extent as food (Cronin, McCarthy and Collins). It rings true, then, that humans “eat with the mind as much as with the mouth” (Beardsworth and Keil 52).

Our food habits are social constructions rather than natural phenomena, which makes them amenable to change. While historically food preferences have been viewed as largely impervious to modification, today the speed with which food consumption is shifting is striking (Mennell). Moving away from a time when vegetarians were seen as mentally ill (Taylor), modern Western societies with their “menu pluralism” offer especially hospitable conditions for change, including a move toward limiting animal products (Beardsworth and Keil). As Alan Beardsworth and Teresa Keil have noted: “[I]n modern and modernizing societies, with more rapid rates of social change, the exercise of choice between a whole range of contrasting and competing menu principles becomes increasingly possible” (68).

Many animal advocacy groups focus their attention on dietary change. High profile U.S. organizations that promote reductions or eliminations of animal products include Compassion Over Killing, Farm Animal Rights Movement, Farm Sanctuary, the Humane Society of the United States, Mercy for Animals, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, The Humane League, and Vegan Outreach. Approaches are diverse, ranging from leafleting, food sampling, and video outreach, to undercover investigations, food service campaigns, and humane education. Primarily driven by animal protection concerns, advocates for farmed animals also make the case for a move towards an animal-free diet for health, environmental, and social justice reasons, among others. While the proportion of US adults who adhere to a meat-free diet is small, around two percent (Asher, Green, Gutbrod, Jewell, Hale and Bastian), the animal protection movement also has an interest in supporting the increasing trend toward meat reduction (Cooney).
In this paper, when possible, we differentiate between vegetarian and vegan diets, though the research we review seldom distinguishes between the two. We understand a vegetarian diet to mean avoiding meat, and a vegan diet to be one that precludes meat, dairy, eggs, and other animal products. Throughout, we use the terms vegetarianism and veganism in reference to dietary choices, though we acknowledge that they also have meaning for non-dietary lifestyle decisions.

Using data that largely focuses on advocates and their supporters, social movement researchers have tended to concentrate on the paths that facilitate conversion and long-term adherence to vegetarian and vegan diets. For example, initial introductions to vegetarianism or veganism for animal advocacy purposes might come in the form of moral shocks (Jasper and Poulsen) that result from seeing images or footage of violence toward animals. Once converted, vegetarianism and veganism may be maintained by adopting the diet as part of one’s collective identity (Maurer), by developing cultural strategies and social support (Cherry, “Veganism as a Cultural Movement”), and/or by having social networks that support it (Cherry, “I Was a Teenage Vegan”), etc. To complement these perspectives, we seek to better understand the barriers to vegetarianism and veganism.

In this paper, we ask: which factors in the domestic sphere serve as barriers to the successful promotion and maintenance of vegetarian and vegan diets? To be effective, a dietary intervention must be designed with an awareness that the consumption of food is used to satisfy a host of socially determined needs (Charles and Kerr). One important aspect is the social forces at play in the private sphere, which is why an understanding of the workings of food consumption in domestic life holds potential for informing the work of animal advocates.
We seek to provide a fuller exploration of the domestic roadblocks to vegetarian and vegan conversion in order to complement existing sociological research on vegetarianism, veganism, and animal advocacy. To accomplish this, we engaged in a review of literature on food and domestic life, including literature from sociology of the family, sociology of gender, the sociology of food, and other disciplines. This included reviewing key journals for articles relating to food and domestic life, such as Appetite; Food and Foodways; Food, Culture & Society; and the Journal of the American Dietetic Association. We expanded our literature review based on citations found in these journal articles to provide a fuller sense of the literature in this area and to consider other disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives. The content of the articles largely limits our findings to the U.S., UK, Australia, and other Western countries where the studies we review were conducted, and also over-represents white, middle-class families led by two parents of the opposite sex. We address these limitations throughout the paper, and we call for more research in this area.

We approached our review of the literature through a structuration theory perspective. We view social structures as both constraining and enabling human agency (Bourdieu; Giddens), and we follow contemporary sociologists who also consider culture as a constraining and enabling structure (Hays; Emirbayer and Goodwin). Thus, in our review of the literature, we attempt to uncover the constraining aspects of the culture and social structure of domestic life to find the roadblocks to vegetarianism and veganism. Social movement studies have largely focused on the agentic, enabling aspects of social networks and subcultures, and in this review, we seek to expand our understanding of the constraints acting upon these dietary practices.

Our findings of the barriers to converting to vegetarianism and veganism focuses on family reactions to dietary change, mothers’ roles in providing food for young children, the
subordination of women’s food preferences, women’s food provisioning as a form of power, the
dynamics of food choice between spouses and significant others, the role of meat in the domestic
hierarchy of meals, and race and social class. In reviewing the literature on food sociology in the
private sphere and considering implications for future research, this paper will contribute to
sociological studies of vegetarianism and veganism, as well as to the work of animal advocates.

Family Members

Given that eating is a social activity rather than a solely individual phenomenon (Paisley,
et al.), it is no surprise that social influences play a significant role in dietary change (Haverstock
and Forgays). Researchers have shown that family members serve as such social influences and
impact the success (or failure) of dietary modifications (Paisley et al.). In addition to several
advocacy books on the subject, sociologists and other academics have written about how to deal
with negative reactions from family members (Adams; Torres and Torres).

Studies have shown families to be particularly unwelcoming of a family member’s
adoption of a vegetarian or vegan diet. One qualitative study from the U.S. showed opposition to
vegetarianism came most frequently from nuclear family members (Jabs, Devine and Sobal).
Parents often attempted to dissuade their children from embracing the diet (Jabs, Devine and
Sobal)—perhaps perceiving it as a form of rejection—and were at times antagonistic and
confrontational, with fathers being particularly put off by the change (Jabs, Sobal and Devine).
In a more recent qualitative study, North American vegans reported that the most trying social
challenges were negative views about their diet from family members, particularly parents
(Hirschler). Such tensions can ultimately lead to the weakening of a relationship, or even its
eventual breakdown (Hirschler; Beardsworth and Keil). Likewise, Richard Twine’s interviews
with 40 vegans in the UK uncovered a majority who reported negative responses to their newfound veganism from family and friends. For his participants, “the relationship dimensions of becoming vegan constituted the most difficult part of transition” (624). This, Twine says, requires vegans to have “additional competency that involves skills of emotional and social negotiation” (631). He connects these difficulties to the way omnivores categorize vegans as “killjoys,” a term borrowed from Sara Ahmed’s feminist work, which he uses to conceive of vegans as threatening the dominant happiness order by contesting—whether actively or merely through their very presence—the use of animals for food.

According to LuAnne Roth’s qualitative research in the U.S., family members often perceive the adoption of a vegetarian diet as “deviant, strange, or crazy—a threat to the family’s ‘homeostasis,’ its traditions, and its group identity” (183). Such a strong response, Roth suspects, may stem from a belief that the change in diet was “unpatriotic, un-American, and even downright un-family like” (187-188). Perceptions that the rejection of animal products is unpatriotic have also been observed elsewhere (Potts and White). Roth’s research revealed some overarching patterns of response to a family member’s vegetarianism, including families dismissing the change as temporary, coaxing the family member to eat meat, disputing the rationale for the change, and condemning them for threatening family values. Roth believes a family member’s new food ideology is perceived as a threat to family functioning at its core: established food traditions. As a result, some of the ensuing reactions appear to be aimed at restoring the family to its “homeostatic condition” by dissuading the individual from continuing the diet (Roth).

This unsettling time, Roth found, is not likely to continue indefinitely however, for “either the family or the vegetarian (or both) eventually adapt, family members make
accommodating gestures, and the frequency and intensity of conflicts decreases” (196). To avoid such conflicts, Barbara McDonald’s interviews with U.S. vegans showed that arguments with family eventually led to a decision to avoid the topic altogether, unless the family member was vegetarian or vegan themselves or at minimum sympathetic to the position. Similarly, Greenebaum’s interview-based study found that vegans in the U.S. engaged in four “face-saving” strategies as a way of presenting veganism in a positive light to combative or critical family members, one of which was simply avoiding confrontation. They also waited for the right time to discuss veganism (i.e., not during a meal), focused on the health benefits of veganism, and attempted to lead by example. Twine also found that tensions in some interviewees’ relationships with family and friends diminished over time. He attributes this to two phenomenon: the rise of “non-practising practitioners” (i.e., non-vegans who begin to unintentionally promote the diet by engaging in some aspects of the practice such as preparing vegan food), and vegans’ performance of veganism in a joyous and “demonstrative manner” that serves to improve its reputation among non-vegans and in turn restores “a sense of commensality and social connection with food” (Twine 637).

It is not only parents who exhibit resistance. In Jennifer Jabs, Jeffery Sobal, and Carol Devine’s qualitative research in the U.S., adult children were shown to respond negatively when a parent adopted a vegetarian diet later in life. This may be related to the impact this can have on childhood memories (Jabs, Sobal, & Devine). There is also evidence that the level of disapproval of a family member’s new vegetarian or vegan diet may differ along gender lines. A qualitative study of U.S. college-aged vegetarians showed that while family members perceived men’s vegetarianism in a neutral or positive light, female vegetarians were met with disapproval (Merriman). While mothers tended to be somewhat ambiguous, fathers, brothers, and other male
family members exhibited negative reactions, even hostility, and at times made efforts to interfere with the woman’s diet (Merriman). Such upsets can weigh heavily on both male and female vegetarians (McDonald) and may in the end cause some to forego their diet (Hecht).

Certainly not all families respond in a negative manner. Hirschler’s study showed that reactions spanned a continuum from antagonism, disapproval, and rejection, to acceptance, accommodation, and encouragement. Roth’s interviewees also noted that their families were not always adversarial; likewise, Beadsworth and Keil’s qualitative work in the UK showed notable differences in familial responses, ranging from severe disapproval to supportive and approving. Further, Twine’s research offered examples where omnivores’ responses to a family member or friend’s transition to veganism were more open. There may also be ways to ease families into the change, which could in turn improve their response. Katie Haverstock and Deborah Kirby Forgays’ online survey of current and former vegetarians, vegans, and pescetarians suggests that a gradual as opposed to an abrupt transition may make it easier for families to adjust.

Because women are the primary food providers, the amount of time they have for this task may also have bearing on whether they are able to implement changes such as meat-free or vegan meals. A study by Joyce Slater, Gustaaf Sevenhuysen, Barry Edginton, and John O’Neil showed that while middle-income employed mothers of school-age children in Canada wanted to provide what they saw as healthy homemade foods, external factors such as time scarcity (notably work and children’s extracurricular activities) and children’s increasing food autonomy limited their ability to do so. As a concession, they often opted instead for processed, convenience, or fast foods (Slater et al.).

The changing attitude toward the importance of children’s food preferences also affects mothers’ ability to alter the dietary practices of their families. Over the last 60 years, proper
parenting has come to mean a style that privileges children’s independence and prioritizes their enjoyment of meals (Coveney). Opting for food that children will take pleasure in and that will allow them to display autonomy can create incompatibilities with parents’ desire to provide nutritious meals (Coveney). This indicates that as families give more credence to children’s food choices, vegetarian and vegan advocates might find it useful to consider the role children play in setting the family food agenda.

Subordination of Women’s Food Preferences and Food Provisioning as a Form of Power

Some of the animal protection movement’s vegetarian and vegan outreach is purposefully designed to appeal to females. There are several justifications for this including that research has confirmed females are more willing to adopt meat-free diets than their male counterparts (Cooney), and because females are more likely to be their family’s primary food provider (DeVault, Feeding the Family). On the latter point, given that domestic food labor remains a largely female enterprise (Slater et al.), animal advocates suspect a change in a female partner’s and/or mother’s food habits will have a ripple effect in the family (Cooney). The literature demonstrates, however, that the outcome may be less straightforward in practice. Before presenting the results of the review of the literature in this area, it should be noted that these studies primarily focus on traditional nuclear families rather than queer or extended families, and they seem to assume a white, largely middle-class perspective. Expanding the literature in this area is another avenue for future research, as critiqued by A. Breeze Harper and others.

While women are far more likely than men to engage in foodwork (Harnack, Story, Martinson, Neumark-Sztainer and Stang), the idea that women control family food choice has been challenged (McIntosh and Zey). A qualitative study by Nickie Charles and Marion Kerr of
women in the UK with school-aged children showed that women’s food preferences were almost entirely subordinated to those of their male partner, and secondarily to those of their children. Indeed, the food preferences of family members were given more weight than the “goodness” or even the cost of food (Charles and Kerr). Despite the fact that the women in the study were largely responsible for family food provisioning, this responsibility did not confer power or control over what the family consumed (Charles and Kerr). Others have uncovered a similar phenomenon, showing that women based food decisions on their male partner’s likes and dislikes (Murcott; Bove, Sobal and Rauschenbach). This phenomenon could be due, in part, to gender scholars’ findings that equality in families and household labor remains “more of an ideological commitment than a documentable reality” (Risman 94). Some research has suggested that the profile of the nutritional gatekeeper is changing. While women were traditionally conceived of as gatekeepers, Brian Wansink, et al. explain that there is a new trend where “children and young teenagers are assuming the role of gatekeepers” and the reason children are the primary influencers of purchases is because they “tend to be attuned to consumer issues, as they enjoy more discretionary time” (37-38).

Despite the constrained nature of their food provisioning, the women Charles and Kerr spoke with appeared interested in a change of diet. The majority said they would eat differently if they lived alone, primarily by reducing their meat consumption (Charles & Kerr). However, to the extent that men “exert a conservative influence over families’ diets and prevent their partners from experimenting with food or introducing changes into the diet” (Charles & Kerr 71), the workings of the family’s food life may be a very real limitation on women’s ability to reduce their personal meat consumption, let alone that of the family as a whole.
Yet there is research that may support the women as gatekeeper concept. Early work envisioned women as gatekeepers who were “controlling the flow of goods (food in particular) into the household and controlling the channels through which food reaches the table” (Beardsworth and Keil 86). This gatekeeper model became so widespread that nutritionists and others concerned with nutritional policy adopted it (Beardsworth and Keil). Indeed research conducted in the U.S. during World War II suggests that while women perceived that they had limited control over family food choice, other family members were of the opposite view. As Wansink explains:

Wives conservatively believed their husbands and children had de facto gatekeeping control based on their approval or disapproval of what food was served. To avoid disapproval, she was often hesitant to stray too far from conventional recipes. The twist was that husbands and children did not share this perception. They instead indicated that they would eat most anything she served. They also believed most if not all of the food they ate was either knowingly or unknowingly controlled by the wife. (1324)

Likewise, a mixed methods study in the UK found that 77 percent of women (as compared to 15 percent of men) “bore the main responsibility for deciding what foods are purchased” (Beardsworth, Bryman, Keil, Goode, Haslam and Lancashire 482). The study does not, however, make clear the extent of the decision-making power as there would, for instance, be a notable difference between deciding what type of meat to buy versus whether meat should be purchased at all.

Certainly not all literature points to the subordinating role that food provisioning has on women. Some scholars wonder whether assuming the role of gatekeeper for food purchases and domestic consumption may actually confer power and control (Belasco). Belasco finds it curious that “so many husbands remain dependent on wives for sustenance, for why would anyone cede so much hegemony over basic biological needs to someone else?” (43). He also estimates that
many women may hold on to this role because “they like the control it gives them” (Belasco 44). In this view, even some women may see their role as conferring authority. However, Belasco also points to the complexity of the issue, noting that women’s role as food providers can also be oppressive—it is at once “empowerment and enslavement” (53). (This effect resembles that of the mechanization of housework in the United States, which ironically created more work for women and mothers [Cowan]). Carole Counihan too envisions it as a relationship that may both bestow and limit power. While men may exercise control through the financial means of food purchases, insist on specific meals, harshly judge their female partner’s cooking, or refuse to eat what is served, women may exert their power by “refusing to cook, cooking food men dislike, forcing them to eat, or manipulating the status and meaning systems embodied in foods” (Counihan 11). However, this view of women’s power and agency in household labor and unpaid carework only offers a limited version of such power (DeVault, Feeding the Family).

**Spouses and Significant Others**

Apart from its importance to the nuclear family, food also plays a significant role in the functioning of romantic relationships. Food is used to reinforce the bond between partners (Charles and Kerr), though not typically in a reciprocal fashion in that food, according to Susan Bordo, is mostly used as a way for women to convey their affection to a male spouse thereby satisfying their “desire to bestow love” (27). Food is also something that couples frequently share. Married couples in the West generally consume the same types of foods, sharing almost two-thirds of meals, particularly breakfast, dinners, and meals on weekends (Sobal).

Food can be a significant source of friction among intimate partners, and meat is one of the most contentious aspects with concerns emerging about “whether, what types, when, and
how much meat is consumed” (Sobal 142). It is interesting to note that vegetarians are less apt to be married than the general population (Hecht), while married individuals consume more meat than their unmarried peers (Sobal).

Some couples look for a middle ground between each partner’s food preferences, settling on meals that are neither distinctly “masculine” nor “feminine” (Sobal). The view that men prefer meat, even at the cost of their female partner’s choices, may be narrow in its depiction of masculinity. Jeffery Sobal outlines a variety of “scripts” used by men to navigate food choice. While a tendency to prioritize their own food preferences might best fit the “strong men” script, a “sensitive men” script may offer “a model of masculine emotion and empathy, where men are supportive and considerate of others, such as their spouses” (Sobal 146-147). The sensitive man, thus, may opt to consume less meat once married in an effort to align with the food priorities of his spouse (Bove, et al.). Men call on these diverse scripts depending on the context they find themselves in, which could result in, for example “a man lunching on hamburgers at work with his pals and sharing salad for dinner with his wife” (Sobal 147). Outside of securing a compromise from either side, Lynne Brown and Daisy Miller’s interviews conducted in the U.S. found relationships where partners do not readily share meals, including some women who cooked vegetable dishes for themselves while their husbands ate meat. One couple in which the woman cooked meatless meals for the family said: “[I]f he wanted more red meat he could have it. […] If he wants to go buy it he can have it” (Brown & Miller 221).

Brown and Miller found that couples with more egalitarian gender roles more easily compromised on food choices, whereas in couples with more traditional gender roles, the women tended to conform to the men’s desires. They note that, “fairness, accommodation, and respect underlie the food choices used for family meals” for egalitarian families in their study (Brown.
These findings could indicate that couples who espouse egalitarian gender roles may be more apt to try vegetarian or vegan food because they are likely to communicate better with their partners and can come to an agreement about how and why they make their food choices. For animal advocates seeking to promote plant-based diets, these findings suggest that using sexist images in advertising (Deckha; Glasser) may be counterintuitive as they likely have limited appeal to couples who embrace egalitarian gender roles and avoid making food choices solely based on male priorities. More research is needed on this front, however.

If a much needed settlement on a couple’s approach to food cannot be reached, there is the possibility that serious tensions or even the breakdown of the relationship can ensue. Indeed, some vegans in Twine’s 2014 study expressed an interest in finding a vegan partner in an effort to foster a safe space (called vegansexuality by Potts and Parry). Qualitative research in the UK by Jacqueline Burgoyne and David Clarke with individuals who had remarried demonstrated that strains in the previous marriage could be connected to aspects of food consumption and preparation. In some cases, conflicts over a couple’s food life can even lead to domestic violence (Ellis).

If one partner decides to change their diet, the role the other plays can have a notable impact. A Canadian study by Paisley, et al. that explored the effect that dietary change (including vegetarianism) had on the experiences of a significant other found emotional responses to vary from none at all to cooperation, encouragement, skepticism, and even anger. They showed that the role that significant others played in their partner’s ability to succeed in the new diet stretches along a continuum from negative to neutral to positive, though positive manifestations were more typical (Paisley, et al.). Based on their findings, Paisley, et al., conclude: “Changes in food purchasing and food preparation will affect the shared eating experiences of people making
dietary changes and their significant others. The impact of a partner or family member’s dietary change on the experiences of his or her significant other varies considerably” (87).

**Meal and Food Hierarchies**

Family meals in contemporary Western cultures often take the form of “proper meals,” which include meat along with some form of vegetable sides (Sobal; Marshall and Anderson). In addition to the daily proper meal, the Sunday dinner (a more elaborate version of the proper meal), Christmas dinner, and food served in celebration of birthdays (especially children’s) are also important aspects of “proper” family life (Charles and Kerr). In this way, it is possible to see how a hierarchical structure of meals can form whereby snacks and lunch-time meals are given less weight than proper meals or holiday feasts involving family presence. Traditionally, one key element in these meals has been meat, which is seen as particularly useful in facilitating special gatherings (White, et al.). Indeed, meat-based holiday meals can be a particular point of conflict between vegetarians and their family members (Jabs, Devine and Sobal), and an effort to satisfy family during holidays can sometimes lead vegetarians and vegans to eat foods that run counter to their dietary convictions (Hecht). While it is easy to anticipate the difficulty of changing the meat-based focus of meals that rank higher in the meal hierarchy, it may also be that such difficulties persist even where snacks and lunch-time consumption is concerned. Charles and Kerr’s work suggests that in traditional nuclear families, meals lower on the hierarchy may be just as impenetrable given that their female interviewees said their preferences came second even outside of proper meals.

Some studies have shown that women see proper meals—involving the provision of presumed healthy, cooked dinners typically composed of meat, potatoes, and vegetables—as an
integral aspect of their role as spouse and mother (Charles and Kerr; DeVault, *Feeding the Family*). Male partners have also been shown to assert their preference for proper meals of this type (Charles and Kerr; DeVault, *Feeding the Family*). Other research has also pointed to the preference for proper meals in family life (Bove, et al.), including a study by Anne Murcott where young female informants emphasized the importance of a “cooked dinner,” particularly to suit their male spouse’s desires. While women are typically tasked with providing meat-focused proper meals for their family, Marjorie DeVault found that men take on “occasional cooking defined as appropriate for fathers,” such as outdoor barbecuing of meat (*Feeding the Family*, 102). Though, even when men cook, they may not take on the responsibility of coordinating aspects of “feeding the family” beyond meal preparation (DeVault, “Conflict and Deference”).

A possible reason why meat is valued so highly in the domestic sphere is its position in the hierarchy of foods within the dominant culture as outlined by Julia Twigg. Under this framework, meat is the most highly valued food, and thus fully able to serve as a meal’s centerpiece (Twigg). Red meat is the most highly regarded of the meats followed by chicken and fish, which are then followed by animal byproducts (eggs and cheese) that are thought to be “sufficiently high in the hierarchy to support a meal’s being formed around them, though they are confined to the low status events” (Twigg 22). Vegetables are situated below these foods in the hierarchy, and are considered feminine and thus “insufficient for the formation of a meal” (Twigg 21-22). Vegetarian and vegan diets overturn this structure by encouraging elimination of the most highly valued foods while placing those that once occupied the lower rungs (fruit, vegetables, grains, nuts, etc.) at the center of the plate, creating what Roth refers to as a “symbolic inversion.” In this way, leaving meat off the menu challenges its very purpose (Roth)—efforts aimed at promoting vegetarianism or veganism threaten the core of the meal.
Based on their examination of the subordination of women’s food preferences, Charles and Kerr conclude:

exhortations to eat more beans and pulses, even if women are willing to listen, are likely to produce meagre results because beans and pulses neither fit into the structure of the proper meal, nor are they highly socially valued within the dominant food ideology. Their lowly social status means their high nutritional status is likely to go unappreciated and untried. The centrality of the proper meal to family eating is therefore a significant constraint limiting the types of changes that can be made to the diet. (237)

**Race and Social Class**

The focus of this review is barriers to vegetarian and vegan diets in the domestic sphere. However, we also consider outside forces that can enable or constrain food choice within the home, including those connected to race and class. Structural influences on diet can create a gulf between intentions around food and actual dietary behavior and so may have the potential to negatively impact the adoption and/or maintenance of a vegetarian or vegan diet, even given a strong motivation to embark on such a change.

In terms of income, quantitative research in the U.S. by Glanz, et al. found that those with lower incomes identified cost and convenience as being more important than taste and nutrition. These constraints are exacerbated for families living in food deserts, or “grocery gaps” (Gottleib and Joshi) that exist in areas with little to no access to full-service supermarkets or fresh foods. A study by Project CAFE (Community Action on Food Environments) found that in three neighborhoods in Los Angeles, the predominant food establishments were fast food (29.6%) or convenience and liquor stores (21.6%). Less than two percent of food establishments were full-scale supermarkets (Azuma, Gilliland, Vallianatos, and Gottlieb).

Outside of access, there is also the issue of affordability. Research has shown that individuals living in low income may be adverse to experimenting with novel foods—which
seemingly could include many specialized vegetarian and vegan products—because of the risk of waste if family members find them unappetizing (Charles and Kerr; DeVault, *Feeding the Family*). There are, however, efforts aimed at limiting class-based obstacles to eating a plant-based diet, including a vegan soup kitchen (the People’s Potato) at Concordia University as well as a new effort to establish a vegetarian food pantry (Toronto Vegetarian Food Bank). Groups like the Food Empowerment Project, A Well-Fed World, and Food Not Bombs also work at the intersection of vegetarianism/veganism and income inequality, and may vegetarian/vegan proponents argue that a plant-based diet is not inherently more costly.

Like those living in low income, people of color are also disproportionately affected by poor access to affordable healthy food. A 2002 study by Kimberly Morland, Steve Wing, Ana Diez Roux, and Charles Poole revealed that white neighborhoods in Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, and North Carolina had quadruple the number of supermarkets as black neighborhoods. As the personal narratives in Harper’s *Sistah Vegan: Black Female Vegans Speak on Food, Identity, Health, and Society* attest, many black women described receiving pushback from their black families and friends when becoming vegan. Working together, sociologists and animal advocates can engage in studies to explore ways to help the movement foster diet change among a diverse and ever-changing population while acknowledging that decisions around food consumption are “central to preserving racial identity” (Slocum).

**Discussion and Conclusions**

In this paper, we have explored the roadblocks to conversion and maintenance of vegetarianism and veganism in the domestic sphere. In this final section, we will make
recommendations for future research in these areas and ways that advocates can use this research to help limit barriers to vegetarianism and veganism within domestic life.

As we have shown, sociological literature on family, gender, and food shows that family members play a role in the success or failure of dietary modifications, yet it also tells us that individuals are often unwelcoming of another family member’s adoption of a vegetarian or vegan diet. For sociologists, this points to the need for research with long-time vegetarians and vegans whose families were able to restore their “homeostatic condition” (Roth) without the vegan or vegetarian abandoning his or her diet, in order to uncover key aspects of this process that can inform animal advocacy. A further area in need of study is whether and how the shortage of time (time famine) experienced by mothers and an increasing attention to children’s food preferences serves as a barrier to the adoption of a vegetarian or vegan diet.

For sociologists aiming to conduct research that would be directly of use to animal advocacy organizations, it would be helpful to have research on whether the animal protection movement would be best served by increasing the focus on men—by overcoming notions that “meat is male” (Fiddes; Germov and Williams; Rozin, Hormes, Faith and Wansink)—or prioritizing outreach to females while presenting information on how they can navigate life with an omnivorous partner and/or children.

Some of our findings point to areas where animal advocacy organizations could examine their current efforts to determine to what extent they are in line with research conclusions. Studies suggest that it might be useful for advocates to promote meat substitutes as stand-ins for meat in proper meals. Historically, “transitions in food consumption patterns usually happen by way of substitution with a food that can take over the function of the foodstuff that fell away” (Schösler, de Boer and Boersema 40). Recent quantitative research in the Netherlands examined
preferences for meal formats, which showed pathways for transition to be particularly difficult if they challenged established formats and hierarchies that required consumers to “break away from existing conventions” (Schösler et al. 46). Research into meat substitutes (Elzerman, Hoek, van Boekel and Luning; Hoek, Luning, Weijzen, Engels, Kok and de Graaf) is gaining popularity and, given our review, sociologists and other researchers should further investigate whether men and children in particular are open to meat, dairy, and egg substitutes as part of a reformulated “proper” meal, given the work that has already been done on women and soy foods (Wansink, Shimizu and Brumberg).

Animal advocates suspect a change in a female partner’s and/or mother’s food habits will have a domino effect in the family, as food labor remains a largely female enterprise. However, our review suggests that women’s food preferences (particularly in “traditional” family units) could be subordinated to those of their male partner—which usually center around meat—as well as to those of their children. As a result, aiming nutrition education at women may take its toll on women who already carry guilt about their food provisioning work (Charles and Kerr). The degree to which Charles and Kerr’s findings are applicable more than three decades later is uncertain. The research was conducted in the early 1980s in the UK, nearly all of the women were married and living with the father of their children, and over half were not engaged in paid work outside of the home (Charles and Kerr). Further, much existing research in this area has heretofore focused on Western, white, middle-class families led by two parents of the opposite sex. An important area for future research will be an update to this study (as well as other subjects addressed in this review) to see how they survive the test of time with a more diverse sample that includes same-sex unions, single parent families, blended families, families with less traditional gender roles, a greater proportion of women who work outside the home, as well as
low income families and more racially diverse families. Such studies would help the animal protection movement determine if the gatekeeper model should be informing their advocacy. While many animal advocacy organizations espouse messages designed to resonate with children and men, there have been recent efforts to redesign key vegetarian and vegan campaign materials to appeal primarily to women. Such a shift may have benefits for a host of other reasons (Cooney), but if Charles and Kerr’s work is shown to be replicable today, the nutritional gatekeeper concept may not be chief among them, at least not when universally applied.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank David Blouin and Michael A. Webermann for their comments on previous versions of the manuscript.

References


Challenging Sexism while Supporting Speciesism: The Views of Estonian Feminist on Animal Liberation and Its Links to Feminism
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Abstract: While vegetarian feminist and critical animal studies scholars have highlighted connections between the exploitation of women and animals in the global patriarchal capitalist system, mainstream feminism operates within an exclusively humanist framework and has been reluctant to seriously consider speciesism as a form of domination. This paper explores this unwillingness further by focusing on the discursive practices of feminists based in Estonia. We are interested in how they understand human-animal relations, whether and what connections they see between feminism and animal liberation, and how they conceptualise veganism as an ethical food practice. While our analytical focus is on discursive strategies on the individual level, we take a sociological approach, paying attention to how these individual discursive practices operate within gendered, ethnicised and speciesist social structures in the Estonian context. We found that similar discursive strategies were used to challenge sexism and support speciesism. We argue that feminists’ lack of interest and motivation to challenge speciesism could be framed as strategic ignorance. The concept, originating from critical studies of whiteness, can be understood here as actively and consciously produced ignorance that upholds and legitimises species hierarchy, human exceptionalism and the exploitation of other animals.

Keywords: feminism, animals, vegetarian ecofeminism, veganism, intersectionality, speciesism

This paper stems from our personal experiences as vegan (eco)feminists based in Estonia.

In attempting to draw attention to links between feminism and animal liberation among Estonian feminists who are often eager to discuss various issues that they see as even remotely related to feminist concerns, we have witnessed their disinterest and reluctance towards reflecting on

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human-animal relations in connection with feminism and to take seriously speciesism as a form of domination intersecting with sexism, racism, classism, etc.

The experience of not finding support in feminist activist and academic circles for our attempts to link feminist and animal liberation agendas in our specific local context is not new or exceptional. Vegetarian ecofeminist and several critical animal studies (CAS) scholars have drawn attention to this reluctance of most (mainstream) feminists to consider speciesism as a form of oppression, outlining reasons as to why animal liberation should be a feminist concern by demonstrating links between the exploitation of women and animals, particularly in the context of patriarchal capitalism.

In this paper, we seek to explore further the unwillingness by many feminists to take seriously the idea of animal liberation and its connections to feminism, drawing on interviews with feminists based in Estonia. Our aim is to investigate how they view human-animal relations; what, if any, interconnections they see between feminism (both as theory and praxis) and animal liberation; what kinds of discursive strategies they use to justify and/or challenge speciesism; and what their views are on adopting veganism as an ethical food practice.

While our analytical focus is on discursive strategies and material practices (represented in discourse) on the individual level, we examine these individual practices as operating within wider social structures and norms. We pay particular attention to the specific Estonian context, as a neoliberal political and social space, with nationalist ideologies and individualistic values strongly present, linked to ideas about the rural idyll and new “ecological” lifestyles, which include particular, often implicit, views on human-animal relations. We take an intersectional approach, considering ways in which the interviewed feminists are positioned in terms of
intersecting categories and explore how their ideas on human-animal relations relate to gender, ethnicity, class and other relevant social divisions.

Attention to how feminists draw on, reproduce and/or challenge powerful hegemonic discourses regarding human-animal relationships illuminates ways in which individuals and groups, particularly those holding otherwise critical views towards mainstream knowledge and practices leading to inequalities and oppression, contribute to upholding and/or challenging exploitative species-relations and human domination over other animals discursively and materially.

Our additional and broader aim is to help bring vegetarian ecofeminist and CAS perspectives on human-animal relations into sociology (particularly in and about the post-socialist space) by challenging implicit anthropocentrism prevalent in most feminist intersectional sociological analyses. As such, our work can be located in what Erika Cudworth has called “critical sociology of species” (32). It also aims to advance “anti-dualist sociology” (Twine Animals as Biotechnology 12) by challenging humanism in the discursive practices of feminists.

In interpreting our results, we employ the concept of strategic ignorance (Sullivan and Tuana) to frame feminists’ reluctance to include animals in their efforts to advance gender and other forms of social justice. We argue that the set of (mainstream) feminist ideas and values they rely on functions here as a hegemonic body of thought in relation to other more marginal strands of thinking, such as vegetarian ecofeminism. As such, it is deeply rooted in humanism and hence implicitly anthropocentric. This enables most feminists to see animal concerns as unrelated to human ones, and consequently, as isolated from feminist causes.
While our analysis is based on the views of a specific group of Estonian feminists, the results and implications could be relevant in thinking of feminist resistance to and/or support of animal liberation in other contexts as well, especially among similarly positioned (educated, white, female-identified, internet-savvy, urban etc.) feminists. Our results also illuminate how particular ways of framing human-animal relationships implicitly help to reproduce white, ethnic, class (and other) forms of privilege.

**Gender, Intersectionality and Animal Liberation from the Perspectives of Vegetarian Ecofeminism and CAS**

Choosing to approach feminists in order to explore their views on human-animal relations and veganism carries an implicit assumption that feminists should be concerned about the fate of non-human animals and hence be inclined towards challenging speciesism in their own and others’ everyday discursive and material practices, and in social institutions and cultural norms.

While a number of feminist scholars have discussed animals and species, from posthumanist (e.g. Donna Haraway), post-structuralist (e.g. Luce Irigaray), new materialist (e.g. Elizabeth Grosz) and other perspectives, links between speciesism and sexism (and other oppressions) as forms of domination operating according to similar principles have been most thoroughly explored and explicitly drawn out in the work of vegetarian ecofeminist and CAS scholars. In addition, we share the commitment of CAS and vegetarian ecofeminist work of being explicitly engaged with and challenging the material reality of animal exploitation, a concern missing from much non-CAS literature. Hence, in this paper, we draw on this particular body of work.

Vegetarian ecofeminist scholars (Gaard; Adams *The Sexual Politics of Meat*; Donovan; Kemmerer; Kheel “Vegetarianism and Ecofeminism,” *Nature Ethics*) have highlighted
similarities between patterns of domination over women and animals, arguing that animal liberation should be a feminist issue as the patriarchal social order endorses the objectification and exploitation of both women and animals. They have demonstrated how sexism and speciesism operate according to similar principles as they are supported by the global capitalist system. They have drawn attention to ways in which the animal industrial complex is operating as a patriarchal institution, where female animals’ capacity to reproduce and lactate is exploited (Adams *The Sexual Politics of Meat*; Cudworth; Noske). These ideas have also been influential to some posthumanist feminist work (Deckha) and indeed the entire field of CAS traces its emergence to (vegetarian) ecofeminist influences (Taylor and Twine 6).

In highlighting these connections and concerns, vegetarian ecofeminist and CAS scholars have critiqued the prevalence of anthropocentrism in mainstream feminist thought. They have emphasized ways in which feminism and critical animal studies are both critical bodies of thinking aiming to challenge normative understandings in society and also within academia, exposing “naturalised forms of practice based on oppression and abuses of power” (Taylor and Twine 4). Indeed, feminist epistemology has provided an influential critique of mainstream epistemology, pointing out how the latter has systematically produced knowledge disguised as universal, while in effect stemming from particular perspectives and serving the interests of certain privileged groups, mostly Western white males (see Harding; Alcoff and Potter; DeVault; Ramazanoglu and Holland).

In contemporary mainstream feminist theory and research, intersectionality has gained increasing prominence, which has led to feminists being increasingly attentive to analyzing various forms of oppression, such as sexism, racism, and classism as interlinked (see Crenshaw; Hill Collins *Black Feminist Thought*, “Towards a New Vision”; Davis; Choo and Ferree;
McCall). Intersectional methodologies encourage “asking the other question” (Davis 70; Choo and Ferree 135), inquiring, for example, how sexism and heteronormativity change women’s experiences of racism and how these oppressions are mutually constitutive.

Yet, while careful not to miss any important categories of differentiation from intersectional analysis, the vast majority of feminists, however, operate within a humanist framework, dismissing speciesism as a legitimate form of oppression to be taken into account alongside others. As Richard Twine notes, feminist work on intersectionality “exclude[s] the nonhuman from the political, and operate[s] an understanding of the ‘social’ as equated with the human” (“Intersectional Disgust?” 402).

Additionally, feminist work on intersectionality, while operating from a social constructivist ontology, dismisses the fact that the category “human” already implicitly signifies a particular (power) relationship vis-à-vis the “animal” and perpetuates a particular essentialized understanding of the human, ignoring ways how “human” and “animal” are “relationally performed, re- and co-produced” (Twine, “Intersectional Disgust?” 401). While with social categories such as gender, race and class, and others relevant to human social life, feminists tend to emphasize their social constructedness, internal instability and contradictory nature, the category “human” has been left largely untouched, and remains represented as essentialised and fixed. This means that its social constructedness remains unquestioned, and its relation to what is seen as located outside the human (other species) remains unexamined. Thereby human exceptionalism is reproduced. Thus, paradoxically, while feminists attempt meticulously to de-essentialize the category “woman,” they leave the category “human” unmarked and unproblematised and do not question ways in which “human” has been socially constructed, and
importantly, how the categories of gender, race, class etc. and their intersections, through which our humanity is structured, are infused with animality (Twine *Animals as Biotechnology* 10).

For vegetarian ecofeminists, CAS scholars and some posthumanist feminists, intersectionality has been a central analytical approach, as they have explored ways in which speciesism, sexism, racism and other forms of oppression are interlinked and reinforce each other. Lisa Kemmerer argues that “social justice activism in the twenty-first century must address intersectional oppressions” (6), including speciesism, sexism, racism, homophobia, etc. Harper urges us to be attentive to ways in which racism, racialization, speciesism and sexism are normative and interlinked (“Connections: Speciesism, Racism and Whiteness as the Norm” 75, 76). According to Gaard, “excluding the oppression of nonhuman animals from feminist and ecofeminist analyses can only give us analyses that are, at best, incomplete” (113). Maneesha Deckha points out that posthumanist feminist work is “always already intersectional to the extent that its purposes are to examine the species-related dimensions of oppression against women and the gender-related dimensions of oppression against animals” (350).

CAS and posthumanist feminist scholarship has potential to help rethink and expand ways in which intersectionality is conceptualized in feminist (sociological) research in thinking how “categories such as gender, class and race are infused with the human-animal distinction,” that is, how references to animality are implicitly embedded in the construction of these categories (Twine *Animals as Biotechnology* 10). As such, CAS approaches intersectionality from a posthumanist perspective, aiming at the “decentering of the human” (Twine *Animals as Biotechnology* 12). Deckha suggests that posthumanist feminist work pay further attention to race, culture and other categories, instead of always focusing primarily on ways in which gender structures speciesism. Thus, intersectionality, considering its core idea—paying attention to ways
in which multiple socially constructed categories intersect to produce privilege and/or disadvantage—offers potential to include species as a legitimate category intertwined with others.

Vegetarian ecofeminists, CAS scholars and animal rights activists have advocated for human food practices to reflect these theoretical considerations. They have stressed the moral imperative of veganism, for ethical, environmental and health reasons. Furthermore, Stephanie Jenkins and Richard Twine argue against understanding food practices as a matter of personal and autonomous (lifestyle) choice and their relegation to the private sphere. Framing food practices this way “protects the consumer from thinking about how their practices are enmeshed within systems of violence against other animals and helps to secure the habitual life of these consumption practices” (238). They argue that “the norm of food privacy enacts a double assault on autonomy: first in the ontological exclusion of animals from the moral community, and second, through compulsory participation in anthropocentric violence” (Jenkins and Twine 231-232). Thus, “food choices are always already political, cultural and ecological choices” (Adams “The Feminist Traffic in Animals” 201-202). Of interest to us in this analysis is also to explore our respondents’ understanding of veganism as an ethical food practice.

It is for at least the reasons outlined above that we think it is befitting to expect feminists to incorporate the idea of animal liberation into their agendas aiming towards greater justice. Following what Gaard brings out as the power of vegetarian ecofeminism, we do not aim to judge our feminist colleagues in this paper, but to expand sympathy for non-human animals by critiquing human speciesist discourses, using vegetarian ecofeminist and CAS perspectives.
Sample and Method

Due to the physical smallness of the Estonian society, feminist circles tend to be rather compact and interconnected. As we consider ourselves part of the “Estonian feminist community”, we are acquainted to a greater or lesser extent to many of its members. Making use of our own embeddedness in this network, we personally contacted some of its members via email, asking them to be part of our study. We opted to contact those individuals with whom we have had previous professional or personal contact and/or those who have been most actively involved in discussions in the Estonian feminist pages on Facebook. Some of our respondents are simultaneously involved in LGBTQ and/or human rights activism.

Overall, we contacted 31 individuals in June 2014. We presented them five open questions in written format and asked them to reply to these either in writing (encouraging long answers and any additional thoughts they might have in relation to these topics) or in an oral interview setting. We inquired about their understanding of feminism (including their theoretical influences, if any), personal meanings they attach to feminism, their knowledge of and opinions on vegetarian ecofeminist theory, and their theoretical and practical relationship to animal liberation and veganism. As we assumed most of our respondents to be rather unfamiliar with vegetarian ecofeminist thought, we briefly outlined some of its core ideas along with the questions.

In total, we received replies from 16 individuals. All respondents, except one (with whom we conducted an interview), opted to answer in written format. The reasons why we gave the opportunity to reply in written format were manifold. The issue of animal liberation, especially in connection with feminism, is considered a controversial and marginal topic and thus not prioritized by many, as evidenced by the fact that only half of the individuals we approached
agreed to participate in our research. Also, replying in written format enabled our research participants to think about these issues at a time suitable for them and to avoid feeling confronted in an interview setting by feminist colleagues who might have been perceived as challenging their feminist views.

Our sample reflects and compels us to be attentive to our own particular positioning in terms of intersections of gender, ethnicity, class and other categories in the specific Estonian context, and implicit bias stemming from this. The individuals we selected and contacted are positioned similarly to us, as they were overwhelmingly female-identified, mostly in their 20s to 40s, urban (living in the capital Tallinn), and educated. These demographics reflect the composition of the entire Estonian feminist community. Also, notably, all were ethnic Estonian, despite the fact that there is a large Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, which reflects lack of contact and cooperation between these ethnic communities, including among feminists such as ourselves. Our efforts to incorporate in our sample self-identified feminists from the Russian-speaking community did not succeed. Hence, throughout our analysis we are attentive to how these individuals (as well as ourselves) are positioned and the implications this has on their understanding of human-animal relations and connections between feminism and animal liberation.

In analyzing our data, we used insights from discourse analysis, as we were interested in how particular discursive strategies are used to reproduce and/or challenge dominant ideologies regarding human-animal relations. More specifically, we found feminist critical discourse analysis (feminist CDA) helpful. Feminist CDA is a methodological approach at the juncture of feminist studies and critical discourse analysis aimed at detecting gendered power relations and hierarchies in discourse. It aims to advance “rich and nuanced analyses of the complex workings
of power and ideology in discourse in sustaining hierarchically gendered social orders” (Lazar 141).

While intersectionality is seen to provide useful insights to feminist CDA, it has thus far operated within the anthropocentric framework, as it is interested only in challenging normative discourses and ideologies related to gender and other categories associated with human social life. This paper, however, takes feminist CDA as a methodological starting point and extends it to be attentive also to speciesist bias in discourse, to unpack ways in which the speciesist social order is being reproduced or challenged. In doing so, we apply a feminist method designed to expose ideological bias in mainstream (non-feminist) normative discourses, to discourses used by feminists themselves, to challenge their normative understandings of species and human-animal relations.

In our analysis, we do not pay as detailed attention to linguistic structures and stylistic features as discourse analysts tends to do. Rather, our focus is on identifying broader discursive strategies used to justify and/or challenge speciesist ideologies. In presenting quotes from the interviews, we have chosen the most representative answers.

Analysis and Results

4.1. Conceptualizations of Feminism and Own Feminist Praxis

Before inquiring our respondents about their views on animal liberation and its relation to feminism, we asked them to outline how they conceptualize feminism in theory and practice. This enabled us to better understand the perspectives they are informed by as feminists and particular topics that are important to them. The aim of collecting this information was to use it
in analyzing our respondents’ views on animal liberation and draw parallels between the
discursive strategies used to present feminism and animal liberation/veganism.

Most of our respondents understood feminism as a quest towards equal rights and
opportunities for women and men. Feminism was seen as a perspective or lens through which to
view society and one’s personal life, a particular way of seeing the world, in both theory and
practice. Focus was not only on women; the concerns of men, as gendered beings, were also
deemed important. Further, feminism was conceptualized as not only concerned with noticing
inequality and stereotypes, but as a wider critical project questioning normative understandings:
R5: “[Feminism] makes you doubt everything that seems ‘normal’ in the social organization and
within yourself.”

Feminism was described as deeply integrated in our research participants’ everyday
practices, even as something “natural.” It was presented as an ideology and everyday practice for
greater social justice that had become inevitable for them, with no way to opt out, even
temporarily. It was not conceptualized as a burden or effort in our respondents’ lives, but
something rather part of personal identity. No excuses or obstacles were outlined as to why one
cannot be feminist on a daily basis.

While the focus was mostly on inequalities between men and women, an intersectional
approach was also present in some responses:

R3: For me, to be a feminist means that it is impossible not to notice certain
relations of domination and subordination, patterns of behavior, jokes and folklore
that operate on someone’s expense: women, minorities, Russians (in the Estonian
context), the elderly, which is related to gender, ethnicity, class, race and sexual
orientation.

As part of what they do as feminists on a daily basis, our respondents emphasized noticing and
challenging prevailing gender norms and stereotypes in various ways, as well as acknowledging
and problematizing inequalities built into social structures. This included turning their critical feminist perspective towards themselves and practicing self-reflexivity, knowingly policing their own language and behavior as not to reproduce gender stereotypes, and paying attention to gender equality when raising children. Several research participants emphasized that they make sure to voice their feminist opinions in different social settings, even where hostile reactions might follow. They brought examples of situations where they have problematized gender inequality or stereotypes.

When asked to outline their understanding of feminism and their own feminist practices, none of our respondents initially associated feminism with animal liberation, even not those few who later indicated support towards vegetarian ecofeminist ideas and veganism.

### 4.2. Feminism and Animal Liberation: Theoretical Understanding and Personal Practices

There was little awareness of vegetarian ecofeminist theory. While there were those who claimed to be familiar with its basic principles, most admitted to have no knowledge of it (a few were interested to find out more). While some agreed with the core ideas, most displayed disagreement and skepticism towards associating animal liberation with feminism:

R14: I have not directly familiarized myself with vegan feminism. I find animal studies very interesting, but as some people do not believe in quotas, then I do not believe in the absolute independence of animals, which seems to be the aim of the vegan movement. I appreciate free-range chicken that lay eggs and try to support that [system]. Manure seems to be the best substance to fertilize plants and to produce that; you need the labor of cows or horses. Cows also give milk and I do not want to oppose that.

Here, an exploitative human-animal relationship was essentialized and deemed as necessary. Interestingly, while quotas are often misunderstood and dismissed in popular understanding as well as in political discourse (certainly this is the case in Estonia) as an unfair and unnecessary
mechanism, thereby undermining feminist endeavors to reach gender equality in decision-
making, here a reference to quotas was made with the aim to dismiss animal liberation as a
viable and desirable goal.

4.2.1. Discursive Strategies Used to Support or Challenge Speciesism

In presenting the following discursive strategies, we juxtapose them with
conceptualizations of feminism outlined earlier. Often, some of these strategies occurred as
intertwined and were used to support each other in the responses of one and the same individual.
We have separated them here for analytical purposes.

4.2.1.1. Rendering Human Exploitation of Other Animals as “Natural” and Inevitable:
Humans Considered Similar to, yet Superior to, Animals

An important part of advocating for gender equality involved challenging widely invoked
connections to the biological and natural in popular understandings of gender, and placing
emphasis on the social construction of gender norms: R8: “[Feminism] means an understanding
that biological limits for men and women are considerably smaller than the social.”

In understanding gender as socially constructed, and hence efforts towards gender
equality as feasible, human-animal relations, however, were essentialized and grounded in
discourses of naturalness and biology. Thus, an important reason why animal liberation cannot
be advocated for in our respondents’ understanding, is humans’ “biological” and “natural” need
to consume animals: R14: “I would like to know how a totally vegan world would function
because the exploitation of animals seems to be as inevitable as the fact that people must go to
work, and it is a natural part of our life cycle, as we are made to sleep, eat and reproduce.”
Here, references to the biological were made ("natural part of our life cycle," “we are made to…”), dismissing the social construction of reality otherwise advocated in feminist endeavors. Thus, meat eating as a “compulsory institutional norm” (Kheel 329) was reinstated. An appeal to “naturalness” was made as justification for the exploitation of animals without providing further explanation as to what exactly constitutes “natural.” This is in contrast with their feminist practices, which aim to systematically deconstruct essentialized understandings of gender relations and the alleged “naturalness” of gender inequality. In this context, any claims to the “naturalness” of gender relations would be disputed.

Also, in this excerpt, no attempt was made to linguistically conceal the most prevalent relationship that humans have with other animals: that of exploitation. Exploitation might not be conceptualized as unacceptable if constructed to be inevitable, instead of a matter of choice. Indeed, our respondents claimed to be well aware of ways in which meat and dairy are produced, in factory farms as well as in smaller family-owned farms.

Furthermore, humans ceasing to consume animals was seen as a threat to ecosystems and feared to disrupt what was understood as the “natural cycle of life” with humans implicitly at the top of the “food chain”:

R16: Nature has made humans to be omnivores […]. In nature there is a cycle, isn’t it? Mice eat bugs, snakes eat mice, cats eat mice and someone eats the cat. The usage of animal-based food is part of this natural cycle. If no one did it and did not kill them, then what would happen if we let a domesticated animal in the forest? It would die there. I haven’t been in India where cows roam free, but is this what we are striving for? Should we kill all of them? What will happen to animals? It raises several questions right away.

Here again, words and expressions such as “nature has made” and “natural cycle” were used to describe human-animal relations and to justify human exploitation of other animals. In the case of feminism, changes were called for in gender relations in society on the basis of the social
construction of gender and problematizing biological and genetic explanations of gender, but here humans were depicted as inevitably bound in nature and “natural hierarchies,” unable to surpass nature. Hence, while essentialism and the discourse of naturalness were being explicitly challenged as basis for gender difference and inequality, the same discursive strategy was invoked to justify human exploitation of animals. The “naturalness” of animal use by humans was reaffirmed. Paradoxically, this was done by associating humans with animality, while in the case of gender relations, their humanity was emphasized.

2. **Upholding Species Boundaries and Human Exceptionalism: Humans Constructed as Different from, yet Superior to, Animals**

Naturalizing and upholding species boundaries to (re)center the human and justifying human exploitation of animals, as outlined in the previous section, are discursive strategies deeply intertwined and reinforcing each other. Invoking the first helps to construct and reaffirm the second.

Feminism was understood as a human rights issue, and as such, firmly established in the humanist discourse and any intersectional connections with what was considered to be located outside of the human were dismissed: R9: “Animal rights is not a question of human rights and this constitutes a crucial difference for me. Not that I do not consider animal rights important, but I do not think it is right to place them in the same context with human rights.”

The respondent did not deem it necessary to offer further explanations to this claim and illuminate why exactly he relied on what he understands as fundamental differences between animals and humans which prevent him from taking into consideration animal interests alongside with human concerns. In using this discursive strategy, species boundaries were firmly drawn
and the hierarchy between humans and other animals was (re)established. In doing so however, the “human” itself was essentialized and left unproblematized (see Twine, “Intersectional Disgust?”). The human was taken to be something given and human-animal relationships were dehistoricized. Yet, our socialization as humans involves an implicit relationship to other animals. In this process, we acquire values and understanding of how we should relate to other species and learn how to treat them. In contemporary societies, where systematic violence towards animals is normalized and endorsed, socialization takes places according to speciesist values. Thus, we have acquired at least a part of our understanding of what it means to be human in relation to what we understand as “animal” and how we treat other species. This structural system of speciesist socialization was left unproblematized by our research participants, who, in presenting their feminist practices, emphasized being attentive to ways in which socialization is gendered. This helps to leave unquestioned human privilege in the species hierarchy.

Another way to re-establish human exceptionalism was to ascribe lesser importance to animal concerns and exclude animals from an intersectional agenda of liberation. Again, the food chain was invoked, placing humans (again by emphasizing their animality) within the “survival of the fittest” discourse, ignoring the possibility of choice in this context. Animal liberation was not considered a legitimate struggle as long as injustices against human beings were perpetuated: R12: “I believe that those who are weaker than us deserve our protection, but at the same time, we are part of the food chain [...] But I also think that in my world there are currently too many topics that are related to protecting human rights, including feminism, and increasing general tolerance.

Another participant replied as follows: R16: “[Animal exploitation is inevitable] as long as there is child labor and discrimination against children and women, and slavery… well …
animal is an animal.” The tautological phrase “an animal is an animal” was used here without further explanation, assuming it does not need one, similarly to the argument presented above, where humans were seen to have rights because of their humanity, taking the human as a given. The “animal” here was constructed as essentially oppositional to the “human” and simultaneously as a category of lesser worth.

3. **Problematising Animal Exploitation on Intersectional Grounds and by Emphasizing Similarities between Patterns of Domination over Marginalised Groups and Animals**

While a minority position, a few respondents embraced links between animal liberation and feminism, recognizing similarities in the patterns of domination:

R5: I do not have thorough and long-term knowledge, but in the last years I have become more acquainted with [vegetarian ecofeminist ideas]. Of course, I relate to the core idea of vegan feminism, that the pattern of domination is similar: men dominating over women, whites dominating over other races and humans dominating over animals. [...] If you fight against [exploitation] in one category, it is inconsistent not to do it in all others.

While in the previous discursive strategies, either differences or similarities between humans and animals were emphasized. Here, the capacity to suffer, shared by humans and non-human animals alike, was highlighted as important grounds for problematising human exploitation of other animals: R7: “Giving up meat means first and foremost a clear conscience for me—my consumption depends less on the suffering of other beings.”

Focus was not so much on the connections of feminism with animal liberation, but on problematising animal exploitation because the suffering of other beings for human ends was seen as unethical. In the latter quote, however, a clear conscience was emphasized as the primary reason for challenging animal exploitation, which arguably places humans and their wellbeing at the center, instead of animal lives.
4.2.2. Personal Food Practices and Views on Veganism

The discussion of food practices as presented by our respondents should be viewed as intertwined with the discursive strategies to support or challenge the speciesism outlined above.

4.2.2.1. Veganism as an Ethical Ideal towards which to Strive

Those few for whom animal liberation was a legitimate concern and/or was seen as related to their feminist pursuits, indicated their willingness to adopt a vegan diet:

R15: I am familiar [with veganism] and I practice it to a large extent, but not completely. I understand it as a norm or ideal, which I deviate from once in a while. It is important to consume less animal products and move towards veganism. I understand veganism as an animal rights practice, and to some extent as an anti-capitalist practice. Also environmental and health aspects are important, but not primary.

There were also those who considered veganism as a desired ideal, but brought forth several reasons why they themselves have not been able to adopt a (fully) vegan diet. These will be discussed in the next sections.

4.2.2.2. Resistance to Adopting Veganism as Personal Food Practice

While in explanations of feminism, the rights of women and other disadvantaged groups were placed in the centre, animals and their interests were virtually absent when expressing opinions on vegetarian ecofeminism and veganism. Instead, human beings and their interests were foregrounded and reasons why veganism cannot be adopted were cited. The following excerpt sums up well ways in which veganism was dismissed:

R12: I am not familiar with vegan feminism and it seems distant to me. I practice vegetarianism sometimes for health reasons. […] I believe that humans are carnivores and need animal protein, at least that’s how I feel. I have been raised in a farm and I know how a burger ends up on the table […]. I am, however, opposed to useless cruelty […] and I try to consume animal products that have been
produced using sustainable and humane means—products of small farms, and locally produced, etc.

This attitude was discursively accomplished by distancing oneself from concerns over human treatment of other species; advocating for less meat consumption for health reasons while arguing for the necessity of humans to rely on animal protein; positioning oneself as a legitimate speaker on human-animal relations due to close contacts and experience with animals; and emphasizing being knowledgeable of common practices in meat production, which includes criticizing “unnecessary cruelty” against animals while arguing for “humane” meat products and promoting locavorism. All these justifications were used to support the strategies outlined above: constructing the use of animals by humans as natural and inevitable and upholding species boundaries and human exceptionalism. These will be discussed in more detail in the next sections.

_Veganism as personal (lifestyle or dietary) choice_

Contrary to feminism, which was presented as an ideology addressing gender justice both on structural and individual levels, and seeing these as intertwined, veganism was seen as a matter of personal choice, which should not be imposed on anyone; it is an individual practice detached from political motivations: R4: “If [veganism] is someone’s choice, I approve it. But if it implies vilifying those who have made other choices (I have experienced that), then not.” This discursive strategy involves depolitizing food practices by relegating these to the private sphere, which Jenkins and Twine have argued against, as presented earlier.

_Veganism as a source of personal discomfort_
As veganism was seen as a personal, depolitized lifestyle choice, justifications were brought as to why one cannot adopt this “lifestyle.” In presenting their everyday feminist practices, many took pride in their involvement in various activities towards gender equality on a daily basis. No particular obstacles were cited which would limit or prevent them from constantly problematizing gender bias in the dominant culture. These very same discursive and material practices—resisting and challenging dominant cultural understandings, and explaining one’s cause even in hostile social settings—that were endorsed with feminism, were considered difficult and tiresome in the case of veganism:

R13: [Veganism] would require resistance to the culture, continuous explanations and temporary starvation in the company of omnivores, which would be annoying […] It seems to me now that my life is so chaotic at the moment, that it would be a great burden to me, if I made it even more uncomfortable with veganism.

R8: I have carefully considered becoming vegetarian and I am moving towards this (I have considerably reduced my meat consumption), but I haven’t made the final step. I have not considered becoming vegan and I do not think it will be feasible for me, as it seems too restrictive to me now. I have understood that veganism means that all kinds of animal products are forbidden, in the case of objects, clothes, shoes as well as in the diet (also milk products, eggs, etc.). It has been very important for me that I have reduced my consumption and waste, and I promote it also among my close ones.

Thus, one’s own comfort takes priority over other beings’ lives. These justifications also reflect fears of being deprived of something essential when adopting veganism. However, discomfort was not stated as a valid reason to abandon feminist practices. Yet, the practice of speaking up as a feminist in non-feminist social settings involves challenging those who express desire to remain in their own comfort zones and stick to established practices by arguing that certain sexist, patriarchal and otherwise oppressive traditions constitute important foundations of the society. Hence, feminists expect others to abandon certain oppressive traditions and ideologies,
yet they are not willing to do so themselves in the context of animals for these very same reasons that they critique.

Veganism as unhealthy and therefore unsuitable for humans

While many feminist activities cited by our respondents focused on challenging dominant myths and stereotypes about gender on a daily basis, this critical perspective to detect injustices and challenge normative discourses that several of our respondents described themselves to possess, was absent when discussing veganism. Explanations of veganism were often based on common misinformation or popular knowledge, which were then used to reject veganism. Most commonly, it was dismissed as unhealthy and therefore unsuitable for humans:

R2: I have not considered becoming vegan because I have not seen any respectable medical research, which would support this kind of a diet. […] I also know what vegans often consume large quantities of medications and food supplements, which furthermore confirms that it is an idealist lifestyle, not a medically grounded one.

Curiously, the same respondent, and most others, did not prioritize the role of feminist theory or research in becoming feminist. Yet, in the case of veganism, evidence from medical research was required to confirm the viability of a vegan diet. Feminist perspectives constitute a counter-discourse to normative views on women and gender relations, and our respondents have immersed themselves in this non-mainstream critical thought to challenge mainstream culture and its oppressive practices. Yet, in the case of veganism, mainstream medical research and nutritional information is unquestioningly accepted, not considering the role of, for example, corporate interests and influences in the production of these nutritional discourses. Dismissing veganism as a healthy food practice both in popular as well as medical discourses is a common trend in contemporary Estonia. To this day, the vast majority of Estonian doctors and health
professionals do not recommend or endorse a vegan diet; moreover, many warn of the dangers of veganism to human health. Opinions of leading nutritionists, sometimes featured in the media, are openly hostile towards veganism, and national nutritional guidelines do not consider plant-based diets as suitable. In Estonia, scientists and nutritionists are working close with animal farmers to produce animal biotechnologies and medical and nutritional knowledge. Hence, particular business interests are very much present in the (re)production of dominant discourses regarding the benefits of animal products to human health, packaged in and legitimized through scientific and medical narratives.

Relying on medical discourses as a basis for dismissing veganism has to do with veganism being primarily viewed as an embodied practice, certainly to a greater extent than most feminist practices, associated largely only with the discursive level. However, many feminist practices also include various ways of engaging material bodies to challenge hegemonic patriarchal norms. Thus, in placing importance on these nutritional discourses and focusing on the body in declaring veganism as unsuitable for humans, the material-discursive properties of bodies and feminist practices are implicitly sidelined. While in the context of feminism, the material body is seen as an entity onto which cultural meanings are ascribed, in the case of veganism, it is taken as a given.

**Veganism as unsustainable**

Here, examples include claiming that plants feel pain too and that consumption of plants is equally harmful to the environment:

R10: Why do you think plants should be eaten and not animals? What makes plants lesser beings? Because they do not make noise? Does it mean that because we do not hear their voices, they are not talking? For me personally, plants have
always been totally living beings. What efforts must plants make to reproduce? And someone thinks that they are not alive and they have no rights.

Again it is notable how misinformation is used as the basis for this argument. The fact that by eating animals many more plants are destroyed was conveniently forgotten.

Alternatives to veganism: Lesser consumption, “happy meat” and locavorism

Although dismissing veganism, most respondents expressed health and environmental concerns, as well as worry over waste and overconsumption. Also, factory farms and “unnecessarily cruel” treatment of animals were condemned. This has led some respondents to (attempt to) give up meat. However, consumption of animals was justified if the animals killed are given due respect:

R1: I am in favor of animal rights and I detest exploitation of animals and the irresponsible waste that goes along with it. At the same time, I acknowledge animal farmers, who treat their animals with respect and provide them with happy and species-appropriate lives during their lives, even if the life of the animal ends on the table of those people who give it due respect. [...] In summary, I am not a vegan, but I respect people who have this worldview. I favor respect towards our surroundings, and sustainability, which for me are related to feminism.

Close personal contact with and knowledge of the animals who are killed for food was valued. If this is lacking, legitimate claims regarding human-animal relations cannot be made: R2:

“Unfortunately, the image of a vegan is that of an urban dweller who fights for the rights of animals from a distance, not knowing anything and not having seen animals personally.”

Urban vegans were seen as not possessing sufficient and valid experience or knowledge to problematize animal exploitation by humans. This statement implies that in order to critique systemic injustice and systems of domination, one must have personal contact with the exploited or marginalized for whom one is advocating. Yet intersectional concerns important to feminists do not necessarily require personal contact with disempowered groups, but rather an enhanced
understanding of the interconnectedness of systemic injustices based on socially constructed categories.

This statement also implies that knowing how meat is produced justifies its consumption. Placed in the context of relationships between humans, the claim becomes absurd: thorough knowledge and experience of how sexist practices manifest themselves should not lead feminists (or anyone else) to endorse them, but rather to a moral obligation of denouncing them.

Further, locavorism was seen as a sustainable ideal:

R10: I am familiar with veganism and animal rights. I have been vegetarian. Concerning veganism, I believe that Estonian vegetation does not enable this; it places too much stress on the environment and adds enormous numbers of food miles to everyday food, and it is much more destructive to the environment than moderate meat consumption. What is wrong with when humans keep cows and make efforts to provide hay or them, and in return get milk? Humans also take care of calves, feed them and care for them every day. This is just one example. In addition, we get manure from cows, on which plants grow.

The idealization of an ecological lifestyle involving “pure” and organic food, decreasing waste and consumption, purchasing products, especially animal products, from small local producers should be understood as part of and supported by a wider popular discourse of environmentalism and related new “ecological” lifestyles in contemporary Estonia, especially among educated (urban) ethnic Estonians. This movement includes an increasing popularity of ecocommunities in Estonia, envisioned as (sometimes secluded) spaces for alternative “green” lifestyles (see Allaste). While most of our respondents probably would not explicitly identify themselves with any specific ecocommunity, or the entire movement in general, their views reflect some of its core ideas.

While factory farms were condemned for their wastefulness and unnecessary cruelty towards animals, the use of animals by humans was seen as inevitable and hence “humane” treatment of animals was advocated. These views reflect the central ideas of the new
environmental movement, which foregrounds environmental concerns, and might involve a move towards lessening meat consumption, or consumption of “organic” or local meat. Intertwined with this is the growing health movement in Estonia, which involves the increasing popularity of raw food. So, paradoxically, in Estonia, vegetarianism or veganism (sometimes taken up temporarily for health reasons) are advocated and serve as personal lifestyle projects of self-actualization among some relatively privileged groups able to afford organic specialty foods. Thus they are compatible with the prevalent individualism in the Estonian neoliberal society. Animal liberation is a concern largely absent from the environmental as well as the health movement.

The locavorist discourse, reflected from our respondents’ responses, involves the idealization of small organic farms and a kind of “rural idyll” reflecting aspirations to turn back to rural roots—indeed, most ethnic Estonians trace their roots to rural areas, where many contemporary urban dwellers’ grandparents still live. Non-Estonians overwhelmingly have historically lacked material access to these rural spaces, which are now becoming idealized locations for cultivating new ecological lifestyles, sometimes infused with new age spirituality (in the form of ecocommunities, for example). Also, in discursive representations, rural life is implicitly ethnicized, as it is associated with Estonianness. Hence, implicitly, this idealization of the rural idyll is linked to nationalist ideas about Estonian identity and ethnic boundaries, as minorities in Estonia, mostly Russian-speakers, tend to be concentrated in urban areas. As such, ideas about the rural idyll, which include close contact with farm animals while exploiting them for human needs, tend to be exclusive and elitist in terms of ethnicity and as well as class.

Discourses and practices of sustainability and locavorism are commodified in the capitalist system and go hand in hand in Estonia. Particular lifestyles are packaged and sold to
educated urban elites. Notably, most of our respondents did not associate their feminism with anti-capitalist struggle. Indeed, their immersion in the ideologies of organic consumption and locavorism suggests that they implicitly support the capitalist system by uncritically adopting greenwashed capitalism.

In his critique of the locavore movement, Vasile Stanescu points out the incorrect basis on which the sustainability of local food production is judged, and its infeasibility to be replicated on a large-scale. He demonstrates how “locavores engage in the construction of ‘a literary pastoral,’ a desire to return to a nonexistent past, which falsely romanticizes the ideals of a local based lifestyle” (Stanescu 8). Moreover, this is inconsistent with feminist ideals, as locavores have been found to “gloss over the issues of sexism, racism, speciesism, homophobia and anti-immigration sentiments which an emphasis only on the local, as opposed to the global, can entail” (Stanescu 8). While his discussion of locavorism is based in the US context, these issues are certainly not entirely absent from the Estonian context, as often falsely believed. Thus, our research participants, by glorifying local food production and “organic” meat are in fact sustaining a particular form of elitism, as this kind of a lifestyle is primarily available to educated urban ethnic Estonians who tend to be on average better off economically when compared to other groups and have closer connections to small rural farms and, therefore, better access to organic meat and free-range eggs. Also, ironically, the fact that the extra burdens involved in obtaining “pure” food or preparing raw food are usually placed on women goes unnoticed to our feminist respondents. The ideal of returning to “rural roots,” eating “pure” and local food, including animal products, then could be seen as implicitly speciesist, ethnicized, gendered and classed in the Estonian context.
While intersectional concerns were important to several respondents in the case of feminism, including the wellbeing of differently positioned women in various contexts, in the discussion of food practices however, issues of global food injustice go unnoticed, as the consumption of animal products is justified by most of our respondents. Links between the global animal industrial complex and the exploitation of people in the Global South are thus overlooked. Yet, those concerned with intersectional oppressions and human rights, as well as wider social justice, should be concerned about the effects of the global animal industrial complex to especially vulnerable human populations.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

This paper took as its starting point the fact that feminist thinkers and activists have committed themselves to critiquing and problematizing the patriarchal social order for carrying out and perpetuating systemic injustices towards marginalized and disempowered groups. They have explicitly critiqued essentialism and normative understandings of gender and gender relations by emphasizing ways in which gender is socially constructed and performed. As Lynda Birke states, “one of the strengths of feminist thought is that it is never ‘just’ about women: it is a critical discourse that tends to ask uncomfortable questions about everything” (33). Mainstream (Western) feminist theory and activism have increasingly started to adopt intersectional thinking, seeing various forms of oppression, such as sexism, racism, and classism as interlinked. In doing so, feminists have strived to empathize with and take seriously the concerns of those who are differently positioned and with experiences quite unlike their own. Despite these changes, intersectionality as an increasingly important theoretical approach in contemporary feminist thought has failed to include species as a category of oppression. As vegetarian ecofeminist and
CAS scholars have argued, intersectionality should not stop at the social being defined only in terms of the human.

Our aim in this paper was to explore further this reluctance of most mainstream feminists to incorporate animal liberation as a form of oppression in their (intersectional) agendas. We have done this by focusing on how a group of Estonian feminists understand links between feminism and animal liberation, examining their discursive strategies to support and challenge speciesism, and their views on veganism.

With this analysis, we do not wish to challenge the feminist identities, views and actions of our research participants or to diminish their accomplishments as feminists. Instead, we seek to open up space for constructive dialogue with other feminists to build coalitions aiming for a wider agenda of social justice, of which concern for animals would be an integral part. Aiming to establish such dialogue is especially important in the Estonian context, and indeed in the entire post-Soviet space, where feminist communities are rather small and still struggle to promote basic feminist ideas rooted in traditional humanism, which due to historical and political reasons encounter more resistance and are considerably less established compared to many Western societies.

Most of our respondents, who in their feminist practices have explicitly committed themselves to challenging normative ideologies, were reluctant to turn this critical gaze towards problematizing exploitative human-animal relations, mainstream nutritional information regarding veganism, and discourses of locavorism they are immersed in, but instead uncritically adopted and reproduced dominant ideologies on these matters. Moreover, in the case of several discourses used to uphold speciesism and exploitation of animals by humans, the very arguments or practices used or performed as feminists to advance feminist causes were used to defend
speciesist views and practices. Self-reflexivity and policing of own practices were emphasized in feminist commitments; nevertheless, similar self-reflexive practices were absent from the understanding of human-animal relations. In other words, while gendered socialization was problematized, “speciesist socialisation” (Nibert) was left unchallenged by most. The socialization of individuals into a deeply speciesist social order—where animal exploitation is not only acceptable, but endorsed—enables the same justifications or discursive strategies to uphold speciesism and to support feminism, without perceiving this as contradictory. To be able to claim that other beings’ lives are instrumental to one’s own (often trivial) needs is possible only when one occupies a privileged position in the species hierarchy, a position that remains unacknowledged. As a minority position, however, links between exploitation of women and animals were recognized, animal liberation was seen as a feminist concern and veganism as an ethical ideal was supported.

Drawing parallels between how feminism and animal liberation were overwhelmingly presented, the social construction of gender was emphasized, yet the possibility that species constitutes a social construct, and ways in which we implicitly define ourselves in relation to our idea of the animal were not considered. While gender was seen as socially constructed, species and its boundaries were essentialized and understood as grounded solely in biology and nature. Hence, while the gender binary was seen as socially produced and therefore subject to change and resistance, human-animal dualism and species boundaries within the dominant speciesist framework were left unchallenged and reaffirmed.

In upholding speciesism, two main opposing discursive strategies were used: when convenient, animality was emphasized in humans (their “natural” need to consume meat and the inevitability of being part of the food chain); but in other cases, they were discursively distanced.
from animals and their humanity was invoked (“animal rights are not human rights”). Their flexible use of these conflicting discursive strategies achieves an opposite effect than they expected: it helps to see ways in which the category of species and species boundaries is socially constructed. As such, they are subject to change and are understood differently in different social and cultural contexts. This also implies that the human-animal dualism, while normative and always implicitly part of the construction of the category of human, is never given or fixed, but must be continuously reproduced. As human-animal relationships change and vary in different social and cultural contexts, their representations also transform, and along with these changes, our idea of what it means to be human is continuously shifting and must be reaffirmed.

The contradictory implications of the simultaneous endorsement of feminist and speciesist ideals, especially with regards to supporting privilege, are best manifested in the promotion of a locavorist vision. Similarly to how implicit whiteness functions within the US vegan movement (Harper, “Race as a ‘Feeble Matter’ in Veganism”), the locavorist consumption practices of meat and dairy that our feminist respondents supported and advocated for, help to tacitly reproduce ethnic and class privilege in the Estonian context, as not all groups have equal access to “free-range” animal products. These are forms of oppression that most feminists explicitly challenge, along with sexism. It is their own privileged positions in terms of ethnicity/race, class, education, geographical location and not the least, species, which enables our research participants to construct the consumption of such products as a desirable ideal to which to aspire and in doing so to build a self-image of an environmentally conscious urban dweller.

In the presentation of connections between feminism, animal liberation, and veganism, hegemonic speciesist discourses hostile towards animal liberation and veganism as an ethical
food practice were relied upon. In fact, sometimes blatantly false information was cited or absurd argumentation was used to justify speciesism, which would not be tolerated or used in discussing gender inequalities. The particular interests of our feminist respondents in holding on to human exceptionalism and speciesism should be further explored.

It is hard to see this ignorance as a consequence of insufficient information. As feminists, our respondents are accustomed to being critical towards mainstream discourses and are used to looking for information from various alternative sources and marginalized perspectives. In exploring their reluctance to incorporate the idea of animal liberation into their feminist agenda, attention should also be paid to their particular positioning as an educated ethnic majority and generally well-informed urbanites based in Estonia with adept command of English and ready access to the world wide web. Furthermore, due to the small size of Estonian society, several respondents have friends or acquaintances involved in the local animal rights and vegan movements.

Hence, we suggest that the discursive strategies used to justify speciesism and the general failure to link animal liberation with gender equality (and more widely, social equality, considering anti-racist and queer perspectives challenging whiteness and heteronormativity) could be framed as strategic ignorance. The concept of strategic ignorance has been used to talk about actively and consciously produced ignorance or “unknowledge” to “support white privilege and supremacy” (Sullivan and Tuana 1). While originating from critical studies of whiteness, we believe this concept is useful in framing the lack of interest and motivation from feminists to tie animal rights with feminism. In the context of veganism, epistemology of ignorance has been used to analyze the implicit white privilege in US vegan rhetoric and consumption practices (Harper, “Race as a ‘Feeble Matter’ in Veganism”). In our case, strategic
ignorance serves to uphold human exceptionalism and speciesism by producing and maintaining a particular idea of the human and endorsing the hierarchy and exploitative relationships between humans and other animals. Feminist thought, while still not part of mainstream epistemology, stems from a particular ontology and epistemology rooted in human exceptionalism and associating the social exclusively with the human. As such, although marginal vis-à-vis mainstream epistemology, mainstream feminism nevertheless constitutes a hegemonic body of thought in relation to other, yet more marginal strands of thinking in this context, such as CAS and vegetarian ecofeminism, which openly challenge some of its implicit core foundations such as humanism and speciesism. Feminism, due to its origins and position within the humanist paradigm, has certain interests in upholding an unproblematized human-animal boundary. Thus, while de-essentializing women and (re)gendering men, the human itself has remained unquestioned. In this particular context, challenging speciesist cultural norms and practices can be seen as irrelevant and easily evaded.

While feminist reluctance to link feminism with animal liberation can be framed as strategic ignorance, further questions could be asked about reasons which permit this epistemology of ignorance to sustain its hegemonic status, which in turn enables acceptance of the compartmentalization of different forms of oppression. In our view, this has to do with the continued denial of speciesism as a legitimate form of oppression and its subsequent exclusion from intersectional approaches, which have widened feminists’ circles of concern and made them increasingly attentive to the interconnectedness of various forms of oppression in studying human societies. As long as species is not seen as a legitimate category of oppression within intersectionality, which has become an increasingly dominant paradigm in contemporary feminist thinking, it continues to be dismissed theoretically and practically. A vicious circle is
formed here, as it is the very existence of speciesism that prevents species from becoming part of feminist concerns.

Hence, answering the question of why speciesism is dismissed as a form of domination to be taken seriously would require further studies into how speciesism operates as an intertwined set of human institutions, practices and values. As a system of oppression, speciesism is not fixed and static, but contradictory and fragmentary, and it needs to be sustained continuously. This paper has provided some insights into how speciesism is reproduced in the discursive practices of feminists. Further analysis remains out of the scope of this paper. We suggest that in further research, the complex ways in which speciesism is reproduced in individual discursive and material practices and at the institutional level could be examined using the critical perspectives and tools developed by feminists.

References


Film Reviews

Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues*

**Keywords:** Anthropocentrism; science fiction; speciesism; vegaphobia

Directed by Christopher Nolan, *Interstellar* is a science fiction film about a team of astronauts who travel through a wormhole in search of a new planet where humanity can live. The search is urgent because humanity’s survival is at risk due to massive and irresponsible use of natural resources, which has led to Earth being devastated by drought and famine.

The film follows Cooper, a former NASA pilot who became a farmer living with his father-in-law, teenage son Tom and daughter Murphy. Murphy believes that her room is haunted because routinely throughout her life she has been receiving messages in morse code., Cooper realizes this is not a figment of Murphy’s imagination, as he learns that a set of binary co-ordinates have been left in the dust in Murphy’s room, and he decides to find out what they correspond to. He discovers the co-ordinates lead to a secret NASA installation, which is run by the physicist Professor Brand. When Cooper meets Brand, the professor explains that the current situation of the Earth is hopeless and humans need to find a new place to live. He explains to Cooper that strangely a wormhole has appeared near Saturn and enables humans to travel to a distant region of space to find a new habitable planet. Professor Brand also explains that some astronauts have been sent through the wormhole and have identified three possible habitable planets – Miller, Edmunds and Mann – near the black hole Gargantua. These planets were named after the astronauts who went searching for them. Brand tries to convince Cooper to pilot the

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spaceship *Endurance* through the wormhole to recover the astronauts’ data, find a habitable planet and save humanity. The crew will also include Brand’s biologist daughter Amelia, the physicist Romilly, and the geographer Doyle. Cooper reluctantly accepts the offer and goes into space.

The mission seems to be unsuccessful at first, but right before they head home Cooper and his crew are accidentally pulled into the Tesseract, the gravitational singularity that is maintaining the wormhole. It is at this moment that many aspects of the film are explained. We learn that humans from the future created the wormhole and that through the Tesseract, Cooper can observe the past, present and future. He realizes that what his daughter saw in her room was him communicating with her via a time-space bend. Hence, he transmits to her in morse code all the necessary data she needs to save humanity.

As a mass-market feature film, *Interstellar* is a good example of an influential cultural form. Cinema is one of the main forms for the transmission of cultural values in Western societies. In fact, as Ducombe (2007) points out, spectacle has become the lingua franca of our time. Hence, spectacle in general, and cinema in particular, are vehicles for the transmission of values and part of what allows Westerners to make sense of the world (Lowe, 2012: 190).

My claim is that this film *inadvertently* conveys a speciesist message. In *Interstellar*, the idea of human supremacy over other species is left unproblematic, and this is portrayed most clearly in the moral questions posed in the film. Particularly illustrative of this is how the current situation of Earth in *Interstellar* is described and the way in which the moral dilemmas are posed as human-centred. The environmental disasters on Earth in the film are described in reference to the well-being of humans. For example, Cooper says bitterly that humans used to worry about exploring the universe but now they have to worry about the Earth and human survival. Equally,
in *Interstellar*’s trailer the solution to the tragedy that is happening on Earth is described as ‘Mankind’s next step’ (Warner Bros, 2014). Thus, as can be observed, the language used to describe the tragic environmental situation in *Interstellar* routinely refers to how it is damaging for humans, there is no reference or concern for for nonhuman animals.

The environmental disaster is also described in a human-centered way when Murphy’s school principal states that humans have run out of food. This apparently innocuous statement gains more relevance when we realise that throughout the film there are no visual images of nonhuman animals. The absence of nonhuman animals seems to symbolize the disappearance of food and this, obviously, is a way to reinforce the idea that the only value of nonhuman animals is their instrumental value for humans. In doing so the film equates the tragic situation of humans with a vegan diet. For if humans tragically run out of food and the lack of food is symbolically represented with the inexistence of animals in the film, then the message conveyed is that humans have tragically run out of food and now they are forced to be vegans. In fact, because this representation of vegans reflects the common public perception of veganism as an ascetic lifestyle (Cole, 2008), then it helps reinforcing stereotypes about vegans.

Bearing this in mind, the apocalyptic setting of *Interstellar* is routinely described as a tragedy for the human condition, rather than a moral problem that also affects nonhuman animals. This conveys the message that the only subjects of justice are humans and that all other beings are secondary. Additionally, by indirectly connecting the tragic human condition in *Interstellar* with veganism, Nolan is substantiating the claim that veganism is the result of a cataclysmic situation that forces humans to live in asceticism. This, in turn, subverts vegan ethics by characterizing it not as a moral obligation, but as a sorrowful state of affairs.
The moral dilemma that is routinely posed to the characters in slightly different ways throughout *Interstellar* is whether saving the human race from extinction justifies sacrificing individual humans. When this dilemma is posed, nonhuman animals are always absent from the debate, leaving them outside the scope of morality and justice. To the extent that one of the main issues concerning nonhuman animals in moral philosophy is that it is commonly assumed either that nonhuman animals have no moral status or that human animals should be given preferential moral status over nonhuman animals, this dilemma is instilling the idea that human supremacy over other species is unproblematic (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013: 1–10).

The aforementioned moral dilemma is best illustrated in the conversation in which Professor Brand tries to convince Cooper to go into space. When Professor Brand explains to Cooper that he is to leave the Earth for a long period of time, Cooper shows concern about the fact that he has children to raise. To this, Professor Brand responds: ‘Then get out there and save them. We must reach far beyond our own lifespans. We must think not as individuals but as a species.’ Additionally, in this and other conversations, the expressions ‘save the world’ and ‘save the human race’ are used interchangeably, implying that ‘the world’ refers only to humans. Hence, Cooper is posed with the dilemma of whether he should sacrifice his relationship with his children and risk never seeing them again for the future of the human race. The way in which the dilemma is posed and the choice he makes convey a speciesist message; the dilemma is never posed in terms of saving other species and, thereby, nonhuman animals are left outside the scope of justice. Moreover, his choice to risk his relationship with his children and save the human species reveals his belief that there is a higher normative value to be put on the human race, which ought to be defended. In other words, by making the choice to save the human species and sacrificing his relationship with his kids, Cooper is assigning a higher value to the human species.
than to individual relationships. On top of this, the aforementioned interchangeability of terms suggests, once again, that humans are the only subjects of justice.

A similar moral message is conveyed when the objectives of the *Endurance*’s mission are outlined. This mission to save humanity has a Plan A and a Plan B. In Plan A, where everything goes well, *Endurance* finds a habitable planet, and Brand figure out how to transport Earth’s human population through the wormhole. Plan B will be executed either if Professor Brand cannot solve the equation or if *Endurance* takes too long to find a habitable planet. In this alternative scenario, the crew of *Endurance* will make use of the fertilized human embryos carried in the spaceship to ensure that the human species survives on a new planet. However, Professor Brand never believed in Plan A and misled the crew into believing that they could save all of humanity. The crew of *Endurance* only discovers this reality when they are meeting with astronaut Mann analyzing the data about the planet named after him. Here, they receive a message from Murphy informing them that Professor Brand has died and accusing him of never having any intention of saving the people of Earth. They are surprised by this shocking news, but Mann is not. He reveals that he knew all along that Plan B, the continuation of the human species via the embryos on their ship, was the only real option. When Cooper finds this out he refuses to accept this claim and tries to find alternative ways to save humans on Earth. He suggests that, given their remaining fuel, the best strategy is to send the crew’s robot to the center of the black hole so that they can send data to NASA that will help them travel to the new planet.

These passages also contain various elements of speciesism that suggest human supremacy over other species. Firstly, the only possible dilemma here is whether to save all or some humans, but not nonhuman animals. Similarly to the previous dilemma, the *only* two moral options provided are either saving the whole human species or simply preserving it. On no
occasion is saving nonhuman animals mentioned and this is never part of the plan. Hence, nonhuman animals are left outside the scope of justice again. Secondly, the preoccupation of the hero, Cooper, is not concerned with saving the Earths ecosystems. The way in which the hero is portrayed influences the viewer’s attachment to the moral values and message of the film (Cole & Stewart, 2014; Stewart & Cole, 2009: 463–465) if the hero is constantly portrayed as only concerned with humans, then obviously this stimulates a hierarchical message about species.

A similar dilemma appears again when Cooper realizes that they do not have enough resources to end the mission and he sacrifices himself by ejecting from the spaceship, thinking he will die alone in space, allowing Amelia to go to Edmond’s planet. The reason for his sacrifice is so that Amelia can gather enough data to send back to Earth to save the human race. Once again, the hero of the film is presented with a dilemma that only includes humans and by sacrificing himself in the name of the human race he, once again, gives primacy to the human species.

It could be argued against this view that this film does not view humans favorably given that not only are humans to be blamed for the devastation of the environment, but also because symbolically one of the villains of the movie is called ‘Mann’. Nolan seems to portray Mann as a cold human being, who does not have love and compassion for other humans and, therefore, tries to sabotage Cooper’s attempt to save humanity. Nevertheless, these factors do not necessarily prevent the film from being speciesist.

The environmental message alone has no implications for nonhuman animal rights. As Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka point out (2013), environmentalists have very often neglected the welfare and rights of nonhuman animals for the sake of ecosystems, thereby leaving nonhuman animals extremely unprotected from injustices. With respect to the villain, it is important to notice that Mann as a villain is completely unrelated to the rights of nonhuman
animals. Rather, his villainy is related to the idea that he would betray the hero, who is willing to save all humans, rather than just avoiding the human species’ extinction.

To summarize, Interstellar is a well-written and well-directed movie; however, the plot raises some concerns for animal rights activists. Throughout the film, there are various occasions when the human species is portrayed as the only subject of morality and justice. This is a reinforcement of speciesism to the extent that one of the main battles of moral theorists sympathetic to the cause of nonhuman animals and animal rights activists is to convince others that nonhuman animals are morally relevant. Hence, by being such a powerful vehicle for the transmission of culture and values, and by ignoring nonhumans as irrelevant, this film may reinforce values that promote the supremacy of humans over other species.

It is important, however, to point out that this kind of emphasis on the value of human species has the surprising effect of not underrepresenting different races and classes in the film, which is common in science fiction. For not only there are various important characters in the film who come from distinct racial and class backgrounds, but also routinely the idea of thinking of humanity as a whole implies that all humans matter, not just some.

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Review: *This is Hope: Green Vegans and the New Human Ecology* (2013) by Will Anderson
Joel Helfrich*

**Keywords:** activism, animal rights, ecology, environmentalism, veganism

Academy Award winning movie director James Cameron recently exclaimed, “You’re not an environmentalist if you eat meat.” He continued, “You can’t be an environmentalist, you can’t be an ocean steward, without truly walking the walk. And you can’t walk the walk in the world of the future, the world ahead of us, the world of our children, not eating a plant-based diet.” Cameron and his wife, Suzy Amis-Cameron, adopted a vegan diet in 2012 after watching the documentary *Forks Over Knives.* “It’s not a requirement to eat animals, we just chose to do it, so it becomes a moral choice and one that is having a huge impact on the planet, using up resources and destroying the biosphere,” stated Cameron. Cameron’s comments are not generally well-received in every group working on environmental issues, nor within most social justice, food justice, or even animal advocacy organizations. You do not have to watch the excellent documentary *Cowspiracy* (2014) to see what I mean.

The nonprofit environmental organization the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is a notable exception. In March 2014, the CBD launched its Earth-friendly Diet campaign. The project, titled “Take Extinction Off Your Plate,” has been signed by more than 19,000 people as of the end of December 2014. The CBD’s effort was followed by an additional campaign to have McDonald’s add more meatless options to its menu. But as author Jim Mason pointed out,

After having laid down such a strong rhetoric, however, the movers and shakers of conservation and environmentalism, with rare exceptions, stop dead in their tracks when they approach the Animal Question—the whole sticky mess of human views toward, relations with, and uses of animals. This part of the Nature

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Question is oddly off limits […]. Those who address it are regarded as emotional, sentimental, neurotic, misguided, and missing the bigger picture of human relations with the living world. One’s bigness and seriousness as a thinker on the Nature Question is measured, in part, by how well one steers clear of the Animal Question.

However, according to Mason, “the Animal Question is the very heart of the Nature Question.”

The “Animal Question” and its relationship to environmental and dietary concerns is also at the center of Will Anderson’s book, *This is Hope: Green Vegans and the New Human Ecology* (2013). Anderson attempts to make sense of the copious amount of reports, studies, books, arguments, and justifications for and against killing and eating animals, as well as how our dietary choices impact and relate to our current human ecology, or the relationship between humans and nature. Reports linking higher greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions to animal-based diets, as well as animal agriculture to environmental degradation, continue to come, as do scientific studies that show how demanding our eating habits are on the environment. Such studies investigate the myths surrounding locavore movements and “food miles”; “sustainable” or “happy meat”; the large amounts of water and land use, pollution, and resource extraction associated with animal farming; the wildly disproportionate quantities of grains to feed animals raised for human consumption; and the ecological and evolutionary impacts of hunting.

Anderson plans to establish a new vegan human ecology: “My intent in *Hope* is to describe the unsustainable harm we cause with our current human ecology, how the new human ecology will stop that harm, and how we get from one to the other” (p. xxv).

Indeed, the key to understanding *This is Hope* is Anderson’s call for a new globalized and vegan human ecology. After an exhaustive description of the various ways in which current, unsustainable ecological thinking and actions are killing the planet through “neo-predation” (specifically mega predation, presence predation, and economic predation), Anderson states that “we need a universal consensus about standards of decency toward ecosystems, individuals from
other species, and Earth.” Early on in the book, he draws from the work of psychologist and author Melanie Joy’s calls for an abolition of “carnism” to lay the foundation for our understandings of empathy and the ways in such efforts can inform the new human ecology (xxviii-xxix). Anderson notes that “the rights of other-than-human individuals and species has [sic] been a concern of environmental philosophy far longer than today’s environmental community seems to care to remember” (xxix). Finally, we have someone who attempts to lay out the vast ways in which meat-based diets are working to kill life on Earth and significantly impact ecosystems everywhere. For anyone who has ever made an effort to have colleagues and friends understand that the choices they make concerning fishing, hunting, meat-eating, etc.—during on-campus gatherings, among family, and at work parties—have an impact on the planet, you will find a great amount of support for your intuition and beliefs here.

This is Hope is an impressive work which Anderson writes with passion, empathy, and compassion. I appreciate his citation of at least six studies from the scholarly journal Conservation Biology, but unfortunately, nothing from the Journal for Critical Animal Studies. He is best when taking to task the inconsistencies of Al Gore, Lester Brown, and especially the ever-derivative Michael Pollan (62-86). In fact, Anderson builds on the work of Vasile Stănescu and B. R. Myers in this regard. Anderson should also be applauded for taking on the people who think that the Earth can hold as many people and more than it currently does, the experts who claim that it is sustainable to kill animals and eat them, and those who argue that culture, beliefs, and tradition concerning consuming animals are unshakable, fixed attitudes about which we should not mess. I agree with Anderson. We need a new, resolute vegan human ecology.

But Anderson’s work is not without problems. Anderson does not take on the faulty thinking held by one of the most well-known climate change crusaders, Bill McKibben, nor the
“face” of the oxymoronic “sustainable meat” ilk, farmer Joel Salatin. In fact, Anderson never mentions McKibben in his book, nor the important work of former rancher-turned-vegan Harold Brown, nor any number of organizations that are working on behalf of wildlife and endangered species and protecting their critical habitats. Despite his extensive lived experiences working on environmental and animal rights campaigns, Anderson rarely draws from those first-hand accounts (108, 120). Instead, he cites Wikipedia as a source at least five times. Within the first chapter, Anderson’s drumbeat of ways in which humans need to “change our human ecology” quickly become overstated (9). What is more, to the book’s detriment, Anderson relies almost extensively on scientific studies, rather than philosophical and religious writings.

It is likely that Anderson’s book will never reach what I assume to be his desired audience: regular, meat-eating people, let alone people who care about the planet in any way and might perhaps be willing to make necessary lifestyle and mindset changes. If you are already a member of the vegan church and have been awake enough to realize the devastation that humans have wreaked on this planet, there is little that will surprise you in the pages of this tome. I find it unlikely that the people I would most like to reach with such information would purchase this book nor read it as a gift. *This is Hope* and its key idea will be lost to the general population who needs the author’s message. The sheer size of the book (442 pages, including endnotes) is progression-halting. I kept wondering if *This is Hope* could arguably have been a series or collection of well-apportioned booklets—perhaps something in the same vein as the historic great pamphleteers—or for the “{bio}graphies” series from Lantern Books or the “Speaker’s Corner” series by Fulcrum Publishing. I would likely assign only the early chapters to my undergraduates, if at all.
This comment about “audience” is not insignificant. One friend wrote me to say that she felt *This is Hope* “did not authentically grapple with the real-world challenges of doing intersectional work. So far as I can see, ‘Green Vegans’ does little but hijack eco and social justice arguments for purposes of promoting veganism (rather than ACTUALLY working on environmental and social justice problems as part of an integrated project of liberation for everybody).” She continued, “That tends to be off-putting to environmentalists and social justice activists, and thus has the opposite of its intended effect. There ARE people doing real intersectional work, and many of them are women and/or nonwhite.” Although I do not agree entirely with this assessment (for example, I think that there is a great deal to appreciate about Anderson’s efforts), it is easy to see how Anderson’s work will likely not have the staying power of other books on veganism, animal rights, or environmental action. Indeed, using environmental rhetoric to promote veganism is no way to create a bridge between and among these movements. Readers might additionally have problems with Anderson’s terminology and lack of cultural awareness; for example, he discusses the “sub-developing regions of the world,” instead of more suitable phrases such as “global south” (48) and he draws attention to American Indians killing bison by driving them off cliffs without acknowledging that the real destroyers of bison were nineteenth century white hunters who then stacked their skulls at railheads so that they could be used a fertilizer (309). Yellowstone National Park kills hundreds more each year; Anderson mentions canned hunts by tribes, but not the other, related disturbing facts.

This book has a number of problem areas that lessen from the overall usefulness of the message, as well as the book itself. Foremost is that the book lacks an index. I imagine a quick list of terms that would be useful: circuses, elephants, fishing, hunting, ivory, lobsters, Maasai, Makah whaling, rats, whales, wolves, etc. Anderson is not naïve to the value of an index. For
example, when discussing Al Gore’s personal contradictions, Anderson writes without irony, “Whenever one of his new books comes out, I immediately go to the index and look for the words ‘vegan,’ ‘vegetarian,’ ‘food,’ and ‘meat’” (85). The book included more than 70 pages of bizarrely-formatted endnotes and lacks a bibliography. Even a brief bibliographic essay could have helped the reader understand how Anderson went about putting this book together. The book also needed an editor. There are countless errors. Such sloppy mistakes run throughout the text.

*This is Hope* is filled with stylistic shortcomings, careless errors, and has a meandering length. Yet we need studies that compellingly connect plant-based diets with social justice and species rights, but especially with environmental justice. For me, the difficult-to-find edited work by Martin Rowe, titled *The Way of Compassion: Vegetarianism, Environmentalism, Animal Advocacy, and Social Justice*, was a step in the right direction. I only hope that someone more capable will put it more plainly and argue for it more passionately and inclusively than Will Anderson in *This is Hope*.

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Book Reviews

Jake Dionne¹

Keywords: agrilogistics, critical history, domestication, social activism, trauma

Although the material and symbolic annihilation of nonhumans is under constant discursive erasure due to the politics of anthropocentrism, interdisciplinary scholars are actively working to remember and compose more-than-human histories. In doing so, an increasing number of scholars are locating precise moments throughout history in which human and nonhuman suffering is uniquely linked and mutually reinforcing. In his second critical animal studies book, Animal Oppression & Human Violence: Domesecration, Capitalism, and Global Conflict, sociologist David Alan Nibert provides a critical transhistorical examination of how human (mis)treatment of nonhumans results in violence against all species. Nibert’s analysis of human and nonhuman entanglement, though comprehensive, is appropriately limited to what he calls “domesecration,” or “the systematic practice of violence in which social animals are enslaved and biologically manipulated, resulting in their objectification, subordination, and oppression” (Animal Oppression 12). In reinterpreting the word “domestication” as “domesecration,” Nibert not only argues that human and nonhuman relationships are not partnerships, a belief touted by corporate enterprises, but also develops and demonstrates an anti-speciesist ethic that resists such institutionalized propaganda.

Although more scholars are aware of human mastery of nonhumans than ever before, commonsense appeals to anthropocentrism still trouble thinkers in the humanities (Worsham

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713). Often scholars fail to recognize and prioritize the disparaging relationship between humans and nonhumans. Even more so, scholars interested in domination tend to focus on language and power as concepts that relate solely to human-centered violence. Aaran Stibbe writes, “One of the main reasons that animals are excluded from discussions of language and power is that they are not, themselves, participants in their own social construction through language” (“Language, Power” 146). In other words, scholars build a hierarchy within academic arenas that prevents nonhumans from being a site of research (especially in terms of nonhuman agency). Recognizing this concern, Nibert not only fills such a scholarly void, but also further grounds theoretical understandings of the human/animal dualism, a discursively constructed binary understanding of “human” and “animal” as separate and opposite from one another.

Although Animal Oppression can be read as a stand-alone text, Nibert expands upon arguments made in his first book, Animal Rights/Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation. In both books, Nibert’s scholarly voice is a dominant force in the conversation regarding the impacts of language and power in the construction of a human/nonhuman hierarchy. In Animal Rights/Human Rights, Nibert greatly details the entrenched connection among language, capitalism, and oppression. Rather than focus on the individual, Nibert attacks capitalism as the dominant ideology fueling contemporary human and nonhuman massacre. He writes, “the thesis of this book is that oppression of humans and other animals is entangled as that such exploitation is motivated primarily by economic interest” (Nibert, Animal Rights 15). Unlike other texts, Animal Rights/Human Rights leaves little room to invalidate the sociopolitical nature of interconnected human and nonhuman oppression. That is, Nibert demonstrates that human and nonhuman exploitation is a structural issue rather than a personal problem.
Accordingly, *Animal Rights/Human Rights* serves as the groundwork for *Animal Oppression*'s much more historically rich analysis.

Building upon this established critique of capitalism, *Animal Oppression* focuses on the unequal sociopolitical relationship between humans and nonhumans. Speaking about the hierarchal nature of human and nonhumans, Noreen Giffney writes, “The human is both a discursive and an ideological construct which materially impacts on all those who are interpellated through that sign, especially those who find themselves on its margins or those who transgress its boundaries” (55). The category “human,” in other words, is a social construct situated against the category “animal.” In locating humans on the left side of the human/animal dualism, the nonhuman is *Othered* and thus transformed into a symbolic and material surface for violence. It is important to note that “human” is not an all-encompassing term in itself. Rather, “human” typically represents the most privileged form of *homo sapiens* (Caucasian males). Nibert provides a number of examples of the impacts of the human/animal dualism on both humans and nonhumans. In one of the more visually impactful cases, Nibert documents expansion of confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) in the United States (*Animal Oppression* 237). Though it is common knowledge among critical animal scholars that CAFOs are damaging, Nibert details the global reach of improper nutrition due to land use and grain misappropriation associated with the food system (*Animal Oppression* 240). This unbalanced relationship among the most privileged of humans, less privileged humans, and nonhumans culminates in added complexity to the human/nonhuman hierarchy.

While theoretical and historical questions guide *Animal Oppression*, Nibert’s commitment to nonhuman liberation underlies the book. Nibert intersects his book with not only theory, praxis, and history, but also activism connected to his ideological concerns. More
specifically, impacts regarding the human/animal dualism become more violent as global
capitalism gains strength. Nibert mentions, “oppression—of both humans and other animals—is
entangled with and motivated by the desire for material gain, especially by elites” (Animal
Oppression 5). Certainly, the idea that global capitalism is a dangerous power structure is not
novel; however, unlike many criticisms, Nibert both implicates the audience as contributors to
global capitalism and offers introductory guidelines on how to mediate one’s relationship to
consumer violence against the nonhuman. He calls for an outward rejection of global capitalism
through veganism. In doing so, Nibert propels himself even further into the conversation
currently being had by critical animal studies scholars actively seeking to construct a new
tomorrow with their literature. With that said, in order to both critique and construct a new
reality—one with less violence—Nibert separates Animal Oppression into three movements.

In movement one, which includes chapters one through seven, Nibert offers a
transhistorical examination of what Timothy Morton refers to as “agrilogistics,” or “the time of a
certain logistics of agriculture that arose in the Fertile Crescent and went virile, eventually
requiring steam engines and industry to endure” (259). Nibert’s of assessment of agrilogistics
begins with the human transition from egalitarian groups that relied upon localized, non-
exploitative food sources before moving to focus on the nomadic pastoralists who frequently
migrated and relied almost exclusively upon domesecrated nonhuman for food and other
products. Nibert’s overview of human and nonhuman violence is skillfully executed as he
grounds sociopolitical analysis in deep history all whilst reminding audiences that nonhuman
violence extends many millennia in the past. By grounding the theoretical relevance of the
human/animal dualism in perpetual and mutually reinforcing violence through historical
examples, Nibert productively limits the scope of human and nonhuman violence to the last
ninety thousand years, and ultimately concludes that the last ten thousand years have been the most harmful. Positioning human and nonhuman violence as a more recent practice, at least when juxtaposed against Earth’s complete history, Nibert ushers readers into a position where they are uncomfortably close yet forced to face human and nonhuman violence. Nibert makes theories all too real.

In movement two, which details the second to last chapter, *Animal Oppression* transitions from a theoretical and historically-rich analysis to a manual for change. Nibert explicitly frames readers as agents for change by illustrating the catastrophic impacts of global capitalism on humans and nonhumans. In this movement, Nibert extends his arguments in favor of creating a series of contemporary and relevant impact scenarios. Here Nibert returns to CAFOs and argues that they are massive in number and ever expanding with more than twenty thousand currently in operation in the United States. Echoing concerns common to scholars of critical animal studies, Nibert contends that CAFOs are directly linked with global warming, as the animal-industrial complex is the number one perpetrator of greenhouse gas emissions. While this argument is sure to resonate with modern audiences that are growing more aware of the impacts of global warming, Nibert offers another area of concern—zoonotic diseases. According to Nibert, “The confinement of thousands or tens of thousands of domesecrated animals in CAFOs vastly increases the possibility of dangerous, mutated viruses” (*Animal Oppression* 249). Certainly, this argument is sure to spark interest in readers that have lived through media coverage of the H1N1 scare or, more recently, the Ebola outbreak, both of which relate back to nonhumans in some way or form. Simultaneously, such an argument reminds readers that (1) human violence inflicted upon nonhumans causes the more-than-human to suffer, and (2) when nonhumans
suffer, negative consequences ensue for human. Quite simply put, Nibert spells out human and nonhuman entanglement through real world scenarios.

In movement three, which spans the final chapter, Nibert leaves the reader with a guidebook, so to speak, on how to mediate one’s relationship to ever proliferating violent institutions. What differentiates Animal Oppression from other nonhuman texts with an activist slant is Nibert’s critique of New Welfarism. Stibbe employs the term ambivalent discourses to describe “discourses which at first sight appear to be constructive,” but may in fact still exist in symbiosis with institutions that trigger the issue under question (“An Ecolinguistic Approach” 123). In a needed evaluation of internal nonhumans rights discourses, Nibert shifts the conversation away from mainstream human domination of the nonhuman to focus on how already-enlightened readers can further redefine their personas as responsible and compassionate individuals. In other words, Nibert illustrates a keen understanding that readers, at least by the final movement, are aware of how humans treat nonhumans, and thus he offers a new critique and alternative reality specific to an enlightened audience. Abolitionism, Nibert’s preferred alternative, stands in opposition to individuals that reject only part of the animal-industrial complex (e.g., those who buy “humane” meats). Through abolitionism, Nibert calls for a complete boycott of global capitalism in its current state. Providing a practical solution, Nibert warns audiences that they must avoid capitalism’s “imperative for expansion, exploitation, increasing profits, and concentrated wealth and income” (Animal Oppression 270). In layman’s terms, consumers must be wary about what they purchase, actively avoid giving money to violent corporations, and select their representatives with the awareness that institutions promote human and nonhuman violence.
Furthermore, in order to effectively and accurately negate capitalism under an abolitionist paradigm, Nibert argues one must adopt veganism as a lifestyle. Fittingly, the adoption of veganism helps shape a future without domesecration and thus provides a working alternate to the status quo. Nibert’s promotion of veganism is another component of the book that stands out in relation to other texts. In this sense, the book reads as an abolitionist manifesto. Rather than leave the diet open for interpretation, Nibert makes it a necessary part of resistance. Readers will commend this inclusion, as it is a risky decision since capitalism depends on the commodification of nonhumans. Overall, the activist component of *Animal Oppression* can be summed up into the following quotation: “The history of the capitalist system is one in which the lives of humans and other animals are expendable—indeed, are fodder for acquisition of wealth” (*Animal Oppression* 247).

In all, *Animal Oppression*’s strength stems from Nibert’s keen ability to blend high-level theory with comprehensible scenarios all while showing deference to lives lost. As a potential text for coursework, *Animal Oppression* remains both collegiate and engaging all while respecting the traumatic history of catastrophic violence upon humans and other animals. Nibert does not fetishize historical trauma through storytelling, but rather communicates to the audience such violence through chronological and comparative accounts of domesecration.

While Nibert does provide many detailed instances of abuse, torture, and slaughter, which may polarize some audiences, Nibert remains respectful and compassionate to the victims of global capitalism. In crafting the book with theory and practice, Nibert becomes both the author and a character in the human and nonhuman violence story. He does not disavow his relationship to violence, but rather illustrates how humans, especially in this moment in time, have the ethical obligation to deconstruct the human/animal dualism. In this way, Nibert further
breaks down the aforementioned academic predisposition to human exceptionalism. Nibert illustrates that he, as an author, is no better than the reader. Individuals seeking knowledge will certainly celebrate Nibert’s persona captured in the book.

Overall, Animal Oppression & Human Violence: Domestecration, Capitalism and Global Conflict works at reversing the erasure of human use and extermination of nonhumans by reconstructing important narratives regarding the origin of the human/animal dualism and the impacts thereof. Nibert’s second book is a necessary addition to the library of any scholar in any field researching links between human and nonhuman violence. For the scholar and activist in all of us, we must remember, “As long as the capitalist system is dominant, the people of the world will be embroiled in endless crisis, turmoil, conflict, struggle, and deprivation” (270).

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Review: *Growl: Life Lessons, Hard Truths, and Bold Strategies from an Animal Advocate* by Kim Stallwood

Norm Phelps

**Keywords:** Kim Stallwood, animal rights, animal rights movement, British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), *The Animals’ Agenda*

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### Growl as Memoir

In 1975, Peter Singer published *Animal Liberation* and transformed a localized fringe movement—little more than a coterie of academics kicking up some dust around Oxford—into an international *cause celebre*. The following year, a young Kim Stallwood, newly graduated from a post-secondary school of restaurant and hotel management, joined the staff of Compassion in World Farming (CIWF), an animal welfare organization founded by former dairy farmers Peter and Anna Roberts in 1967 to combat the spread of industrial animal agriculture.

In 1978, Stallwood left CIWF to join the staff of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV), founded in 1898 by the venerable Frances Power Cobbe to be the radical leading edge of the anti-vivisection movement. By the 1970s, however, BUAV had become the trailing edge of the movement, listless, bureaucratic and hidebound, trading on prestige earned decades earlier. Stallwood and several like-minded young activists set out to change that. First, he and two friends founded Coordinating Animal Welfare (CAW). Composed of representatives from several leading groups, including BUAV, CAW was intended to serve as an unofficial steering committee encouraging the British animal protection movement to coalesce around a

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common agenda. It was through CAW that Stallwood got to know Peter Singer, Richard Ryder, Clive Hollands, and other iconic figures from the early days of animal rights.

Simultaneously, he and his allies set out to shake the cobwebs off BUAV, to which end they engineered a hostile takeover. Since BUAV was a membership organization, they encouraged like-minded activists to join with a view to voting the current leadership out of office. Not surprisingly, in late 1980 his attempts to takeover the organizations got Stallwood fired, but not before the rebels had gained enough strength to see their slate of candidates win the election for officers. In January 1981 he “was rehired as campaigns officer with responsibility for [BUAV’s] programmes.” (106)

Now firmly in control, Stallwood and his allies set about the “radicalization” (106) of BUAV. Specifically, the new leadership undertook three initiatives: First, with help from Lawrence and Beavan, a graphic design studio run by two animal activists, they implemented “the first professionally produced corporate identity for any animal group, a practice that is now the norm for most.” (107) Second, they sought to encourage the various groups in the movement to pursue a more comprehensive and unified agenda and provide more support for one another’s campaigns. BUAV’s newsletter began carrying announcements of protests organized by other groups and BUAV staff began taking part in them. As part of this outreach initiative, Stallwood tells us, “we developed a relationship with the ALF [Animal Liberation Front] Press Office and with the various regional ALLs.” [Animal Liberation Leagues, a loose network of local groups that advocated direct action]. (108) Beyond publicizing above-ground events sponsored by the ALF Press Office, Stallwood does not tell us what this “relationship” entailed. But in an article included in Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?, an anthology of writing on militant direct action, he has said that BUAV provided the ALF’s above-ground support group with rent-free office
space, but that BUAV ended the relationship over the ALF’s increasing focus on property
destruction (as opposed to rescues) and their efforts to take control of BUAV. (Stallwood,
“Personal Overview”) Farther along in Growl (133-170), Stallwood makes it clear that as his
commitment to nonviolence grew, his support for militant direct action waned. Finally, BUAV
began to focus on animal liberation as a political as well as a moral issue. In 1977 Kim
Stallwood had attended a symposium at Cambridge University entitled “The Rights of Animals,”
featuring such luminaries as Brigid Brophy—whose 1965 op-ed in The Sunday Times, “The
Rights of Animals” inspired the modern animal rights movement—, Richard Ryder, Tom Regan,
Stephan R. L. Clark, Ruth Harrison, and Jon Wynne-Tyson.1 But the presentation that made the
deepest impression on him from Lord Houghton of Sowerby a retired Labour member of the
House of Commons,. Lord Houghton told the assembly that “animal welfare, in the general and
in the particular, is largely a matter for the law. This means that to Parliament we must go.
Sooner or later, that is where we will have to go.” (Houghton, 209; italics in original). From that
point on, Kim Stallwood was vocal and persistent in urging the Labour party to make animal
issues a part of their manifesto and urging animal liberation activists to take their campaigns into
the arena of electoral politics.

While at BUAV, Stallwood got to know prominent American activists like Jim Mason,
Alex Pacheco, Jim Motavelli, and Alex Hershaft. In January 1987 these connections led to
Stallwood moving to the United States to become the first executive director of People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), founded seven years earlier by Pacheco and Ingrid
Newkirk.

1 The proceedings of the conference were published as Animals’ Rights—a Symposium, ed. David Patterson and Richard D. Ryder,
At PETA, his challenge was to take an innovative, frenetic, fly-by-the-seat-of-your-pants, almost reckless organization and transform it into a cleanly-organized, smoothly running machine capable of growing exponentially and able to mount campaigns on a scale to match—all without stifling the organization’s energy and creativity. First, he created a strong corporate brand for PETA, including the iconic PeTA logo, designed by Lawrence and Beavan. Next, he worked with Newkirk and Pacheco to establish an efficient organizational structure with clear lines of authority and responsibility. Finally, he installed a modern, professionally managed, system for raising funds.

But by late 1991, Stallwood found himself frozen out of the inner circle of PETA’s leadership. Never given a specific reason for his fall from grace (and apparently, he never asked for one), he believes that it was the same question of strategy that led to Alex Pacheco’s resignation several years later. Stallwood (and later Pacheco) wanted to expand PETA’s signature undercover investigations and public education campaigns, while gradually taking on new issues in a planned, systematic way. By contrast, Ingrid Newkirk wanted to focus on the flamboyant stunts (like pies in the face and the “Got Cancer?” anti-milk ads) that garnered PETA so much free coverage in the media. One particular friction point was the “I’d rather go naked than wear fur” campaign, one of the most successful of PETA’s campaigns at generating national publicity and also one of the most sharply criticized, within the movement and beyond. Stallwood describes his disaffection this way:

The chasing after publicity at all costs and the fetishization of celebrity and nudity seemed a long way from the brilliant simplicity of PETA’s original . . . strategic approach . . . Surely, I started to believe, there could be other ways to further our mission to educate people about animal exploitation without doing it at the expense of someone else. The pandering for publicity at all costs brought PETA attention, certainly, but in my judgment it overwhelmed the brilliant undercover investigations that had initially made PETA’s name. (134)
In early 1992, Kim Stallwood resigned from PETA. After a year as a strategic consultant to organizations like The Physicians’ Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM), he accepted the position of editor of *The Animals’ Agenda* magazine. Rudderless after the departure of the previous editor, the magazine needed a thorough overhaul if it was to survive. Stallwood immediately set about revamping its look, re-organizing its finances, and strengthening its credibility as the non-partisan voice of the animal rights movement. For a decade, he succeeded in staving off the inevitable. But ultimately, the savage economics of publishing a traditional paper magazine devoted to the rights of animals forced *The Animals’ Agenda* to cease publication in 2002.

After the *Agenda* gave up the ghost, Kim Stallwood returned to consulting. And in 2007, after two decades in the United States, he and his partner returned to their first home, England, where Stallwood continues to consult with animal organizations (including CIWF, where he began), served as European director of the Animals and Society Institute (ASI), and took up the writing that he never had time to pursue when he was fully engaged in the management of organizations.

*Growl on Strategy*

Stallwood describes three strategic themes that he believes are essential to the success of the animal rights movement: unity, politics, and management.

*Unity:*

Throughout his career, and most especially at BUAV and the *Agenda*, Kim Stallwood worked to end the internecine warfare that drains away so much activist time, energy and morale. He sees a
coordinated, mutually supportive approach to campaigns as essential to success, and he believes that disagreements within the movement should be understood by all as less important than the common goal.

**Politics:**

Ever since the 1977 symposium at which Lord Houghton announced that, “to Parliament we must go,” Kim Stallwood has been a tireless advocate for transforming animal liberation into a political movement. The movements for the abolition of human slavery and civil rights for African-Americans and women all began as apolitical moral crusades; but it was in the political arena that success was achieved. And Stallwood believes it will be no different for animal liberation. Politics is the mechanism by which democratic societies shape themselves. Animal liberation will be won in legislatures or not at all.

**Management:**

Happily, as more and more young academics representing an ever-widening spectrum of traditions enter the field, the animal rights movement has an expanding and increasingly diverse cadre of philosophers and theologians. The challenge that the movement now faces is the need for better linkage between these theorists and the activists who drive the movement forward in the wider world, the world in which campaigns will either succeed or fail. (And that linkage needs to communicate both ways; the theorists need to listen to the activists as much as the activists need to listen to the theorists—activists represent the theorists’ most valuable feedback loop—which is why I applaud JCAS’ commitment to the inclusion of activist voices in its
pages.) The animal rights movement needs more people with the skills to fashion and direct programs that translate the moral and intellectual message of the philosophers and theologians into organizations, strategies, and marketing campaigns that change the world. *The animal rights movement needs more managers and better trained managers.*

It is widely believed in the animal rights movement that the morality of our cause is all that matters, and that management is a kind of necessary evil, useful only for raising money and producing and distributing educational materials. Such management as needs to be done is seen as something that pretty much anyone can do well with little or no training. Kim Stallwood’s description of his work at BUAV, CAW, PETA, and *The Animals’ Agenda* shows that he has understood from the beginning the value of corporate branding, efficient organizational structures, coherent financial systems, an equitable and transparent personnel system, and properly functioning lines of internal and external communication. Going back to the 1970s and ‘80s, Kim Stallwood was a pioneer of sound corporate management in the animal rights movement. While much of this is clearly due to natural talent, I suspect that his three years of training in hotel and restaurant management have served him well in the animal rights movement.

**Growl on Philosophy**

The book you read is never the book the author wrote. The book you read is your own personal blend of what the author put into it and what you bring to it. No two readers ever encounter the same book.

The *Growl* that I read carried first and foremost a message about the importance of professional-quality management to the animal rights movement. The second message that I took
away from Growl is that *philosophy ought not to be a purely theoretical indulgence in abstract, disembodied reason*. To be relevant and valid, philosophy, including animal rights philosophy, must arise organically out of an individual’s life experience. Abstract reason and formal logic are essential tools, but when we mistake them for the totality of philosophy we go astray.

Stallwood begins Growl with the story of Catherine Ward, “Camberly Kate,” as everyone called her, a well-known “eccentric” in his home town who fostered and found homes for hundreds of homeless dogs. As a child, when Stallwood went into downtown Camberly with his mother, he often saw Kate manipulating a half-dozen leashes as she took a gaggle of her charges for their daily walk. The sight of an elderly, retired woman devoting her meager resources and fading energy to dogs in need has resided in Kim Stallwood’s memory ever since, acting as a moral compass by which he set the course of his life. The spirit of Camberly Kate is never absent from *Growl*.

Later in his story, Stallwood devotes considerable space to what he terms, rightly I think, “the magical connection,” the bond of empathy and love that can unite humans and animals. Influenced by Peter Singer and Tom Regan (both of whom he has known personally since the 1970s), in his early days he:

> would have argued vehemently that you didn’t have to love animals in order to be their advocate. Animal rights were moral and political issues, and affection or feelings or an ethic of care had nothing to do with either of these. In fact, to be called an ‘animal lover’ was, I felt, a slur. (137)

Two experiences changed his mind: First, a chihuahua named Bubele, whom Ingrid Newkirk brought into the PETA office when his guardian died, “adopted” Kim right off the bat and stole his heart in the process. And second, his encounter with ecofeminism inspired him to examine more deeply the role of empathy and compassion in the human-animal relationship. He
came to understand that animal liberation should be rooted in the heart as well as the head; it should be an expression of our total being, not our faculty for logic alone. And that is how, both expressly and through the thrust of its narrative, Growl presents animal advocacy—as the response of a whole person. A brain devoid of emotion and heart devoid of reason will both get it wrong. Heart and head must respond in tandem to the enslavement and slaughter of animals, motivated by empathy and guided by compassion and reason working together.

In a tip of the hat to rationalist philosophy, Stallwood quotes with approval Tom Regan on responding to charges that animal advocates are too emotional: “. . . we can give the lie to these accusations only by making a concerted effort not to indulge our emotions or parade our sentiments.” (87, the quotation is from Regan, lli)

To the contrary, I believe that the answer to the speciesist and sexist accusations that animal advocates are “too emotional” is not to shrink back into exclusive reliance upon “reason” and “objectivity,” but to assert the validity of empathy, compassion and caring, buttressed by reason, as guides to right and wrong. And I find support for this view in the fact that two of the four pillars of Kim Stallwood’s philosophy of animal rights as described in Growl (See below.) are compassion and nonviolence, neither of which is grounded in rationalism, not to mention his memory of Camberly Kate and his love for Bubele. It is, I think, significant that while reason plays a significant role in Stallwood’s thought, it is not one of his four primary themes. We need a balance, not an either/or, and a balance is what the arc of Growl’s narrative gives us.

The response of a whole person to the suffering and death of others, Kim Stallwood tells us, is based on a commitment to Truth over self-interest, Compassion over selfishness, Nonviolence over anger and hatred, and Justice over power. Taken together, these four principles
add up to a worldview that is radically egalitarian. The ultimate philosophical message that I found in *Growl* is this: when we are motivated by empathy and guided by compassion and reason, we arrive at an unshakable belief in the moral equality of all sentient beings—and we act accordingly, in both our personal lives and our activism.

Truth, compassion, nonviolence and justice are hardly original concepts. And the originality of Stallwood’s contribution does not reside primarily in his description of them. The unique contribution of *Growl* lies in his presentation of these four principles as a unified worldview arising out of his life experiences and lent focus by modernist thought, especially the deontological ethics of Tom Regan, the insights of ecofeminism, including the primacy of compassion, and concepts of interconnectedness that ultimately originate in religion—primarily Buddhism, which Stallwood, although not a practicing Buddhist, claims as an important influence on his worldview. “The secret,” as Idgie Threadgoode told us in *Fried Green Tomatoes*, “is in the sauce.” And Kim Stallwood has blended a “soft” philosophy of compassion and nonviolence with a hardheaded, practical approach to organization and strategy to create a unique sauce that transforms familiar ingredients into a fresh and vital philosophy of animal liberation.

**Conclusion**

Combining three different undertakings into a single book has advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, the structure allows Stallwood to locate his historical narrative and discussion of strategy within the framework of an overarching moral philosophy. The inevitable consequence, however, is that considerations of length and narrative flow sometimes force him to shortchange one or another of his themes. Life stories, like his early awareness of Camberly Kate and his
summer working in a chicken processing plant, bring the book to life, as do insider recollections
of the early days of the movement. More such anecdotes would have been welcome, as would a
more comprehensive narrative of the movement’s growth and development from the Sixties to
today. In Growl, Kim Stallwood has given us a valuable source of information and insight—and
left us hoping for more in the sequel that he is rumored to have already begun work on.

References

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Editorial Objectives
The journal for Critical Animal Studies is open to all scholars and activists. The journal was established for the purpose of fostering academic study of critical animal issues in contemporary society. While animal studies is increasingly becoming a field of importance in the academy, much work being done under this moniker takes a reformist or depoliticized approach that fails to mount a more serious critique of underlying issues of political economy and speciesist philosophy. JCAS is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on animal liberation philosophy and policy issues. The journal was designed to build up the common activist’s knowledge of animal liberation while at the same time appealing to academic specialists. We encourage and actively pursue a diversity of viewpoints of contributors from the frontlines of activism to academics. We have created the journal for the purpose of facilitating communication between the many diverse perspectives of the animal liberation movement. Thus, we especially encourage submissions that seek to create new syntheses between differing disputing parties and to explore paradigms not currently examined.

Suggested Topics
Papers are welcomed on any area of animal liberation philosophy from any discipline, and presenters are encouraged to share theses or dissertation chapters. Because a major goal of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies is to foster philosophical, critical, and analytical thinking about animal liberation, papers that contribute to this project will be given priority (especially papers that address critical theory, political philosophy, social movement analysis, tactical analysis, feminism, activism and academia, Continental philosophy, or post-colonial perspectives). We especially encourage contributions that engage animal liberation in disciplines and debates that have received little previous attention.

Review Process
Each paper submitted is initially reviewed for general suitability for publication; suitable submissions will be read by at least two members of the journal’s editorial board.

Manuscript Requirements
The manuscript should be in MS Word format and follow MLA guidelines. All submissions should be double-spaced and in 12 point Times New Roman. Good quality electronic copies of all figures and tables should also be provided. All manuscripts should conform to American spelling.

As a guide, we ask that regular essays and reviews be between 2000-8000 words and have limited endnotes. In exceptional circumstances, JCAS will consider publishing extended essays.
Authors should supply a brief abstract of the paper (of no more than 250 words). A brief autobiographical note should be supplied which includes full names, affiliation, email address, and full contact details.

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